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ILAC Rule of Law Report:

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# Under Assault: A Status Report on the Ukrainian Justice System in Wartime

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International  
Legal Assistance  
Consortium



Ukraine Map Vectors by Vecteezy

## List of Abbreviations

DPR: Donetsk People's Republic

HACC: High Anti-Corruption Court

HCJ: High Council of Justice

HCIP: High Court of Intellectual Property

HQCJ: High Qualification Commission of Judges

LPR: Luhansk People's Republic

NABU: National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine

PCIE: Public Council of International Experts

SSU: Security Service of Ukraine

SAPO: Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office

SJA: State Judicial Administration

UBA: Ukraine Bar Association

UNBA: Ukrainian National Bar Association

UAH: *Ukraine hryvnia*, refers to the national currency of Ukraine

URAU: Unified Register of Attorneys of Ukraine

## Note to Reader

Multiple systems have been proposed and used for the transliteration of place names from the Ukrainian alphabet to Roman characters. No specific transliteration system has been adopted in this status report, and some variances in the spelling of place names should be expected.

Since the original publication, we have made slight edits to this Status Report to include additional information from Ukrainian justice sector stakeholders. ILAC will publish a full update to the Report in early 2023.

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## Acknowledgements

ILAC would like to thank the dozens of Ukrainian stakeholders who assisted in gathering the information for this status report under difficult circumstances. Special thanks to Olga Veretilnyk, whose research and investigation in Kyiv provided significant detail for the report. ILAC would also like to thank Mykhailo Zhernakov and Stepan Bernak of the DEJURE Foundation, and Artem Shaipov with the USAID Ukraine Justice for All Activity for their information and advice. The continuing efforts of these young lawyers under extraordinary circumstances is truly inspiring.

Various ILAC members also provided information and insight for this report including the CEELI Institute, the International Bar Association, and the American Bar Association.

## Putin and the Rule of Law in Ukraine

The late-night speech was described as impatient and directly threatening, painting a nightmarish vision of an utterly corrupt Ukraine controlled by a network of foreign advisors, non-governmental organizations, and other Western institutions. Among the worst offenders, he said, was the judiciary. “There is no independent judiciary in Ukraine,” the President intoned. Instead, the Ukrainian judiciary was working under the “noble pretext of invigorating efforts against corruption,” while all the time operating “at the West’s demand.”<sup>1</sup>

The date was February 21, 2022. The occasion was President Vladimir Putin’s rambling litany of grievances that served as a justification, three days later, for the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.

While Putin’s stated grievances were many, he oddly chose the Ukrainian judiciary and the country’s nascent anti-corruption agencies as central villains. Few wars in history started based on an aggressor’s loathing of an adversary’s judges and prosecutors. Yet for some observers, Putin’s vitriol toward the Ukrainian courts was not some irrational rambling. Though stumbling through its infancy, Ukraine’s effort to create an effective, honest judiciary willing to take on the country’s endemic corruption offers a clear, next-door alternative for Russian reformers battling a similar, Putin-led kleptocracy. For Putin, the threat that the “rule of law infection” could spread across Russia’s borders was alarming.

Fast forward five months to the Summer of 2022. Putin’s original military aspirations have long since imploded. Though Russia continues the war, the likelihood of a Ukrainian capitulation has receded. At the same time, Russia’s grinding military operations are slowly and methodically chewing through Ukraine’s vital infrastructure.

Among the institutions facing this challenge is the Ukrainian justice system. Buildings are being damaged, files and equipment are being destroyed, and court proceedings are being disrupted. Perhaps more alarming, the system’s human assets – judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and court staff – continue to be weakened by the violence, chaos, and privation spawned by the Russian attacks.

Such challenges would test the most mature institutions, but the Ukrainian system of justice is far from mature. At the start of the war, the reform campaign despised by Putin still struggled for traction against the well-entrenched oligarchs and decades of embedded corruption. Russian military assaults have added immense complications to this already formidable task.

Yet Russia’s aggression also has given impetus to the Ukrainian reform movement. Western invitations to join the European Union and NATO offer the prospect of bona fide rewards if Ukraine meets its goals. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, among others, has called for a Marshall Plan to help rebuild Ukraine when the conflict ends.<sup>2</sup>

Any such effort, of necessity, must be broad ranging across the entire arc of the battered Ukrainian nation. But one component of any such program must be support for rebuilding – and in many instances building anew – the country’s justice system. While the hostilities continue, it is imperative that the groundwork be laid to identify the issues that likely will be facing the justice sector in a post-conflict Ukraine.

<sup>1</sup> “Address by the President of the Russian Federation,” dated 21 February 2022, found at <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828> (“Putin Speech”).

<sup>2</sup> “What would a ‘Marshall Plan’ for Ukraine entail?” dated 25 June 2022, found at <https://www.dw.com/en/what-would-a-marshall-plan-for-ukraine-entail/a-62262435>.

For the past two decades, ILAC and the more than 50 international legal organizations who are its members have worked in post-conflict situations around the globe. At the request of our members, ILAC prepared this interim appraisal – a snapshot of the “facts on the ground” facing the Ukrainian justice system after nearly five months of war.

While this work has received the invaluable assistance of numerous Ukrainian professionals both inside and outside of the country, the turbulence and ambiguities created by the ongoing warfare make it impossible to generate data that is complete and precise. The changing conditions in the midst of a major conflict renders some information out of date by the time of publication.

Recognizing these inherent shortcomings, ILAC prepared this interim report using available data to outline the circumstances faced by the Ukrainian justice system as of July 15, 2022. Our goal is to provide a benchmark, a starting point for those interested in understanding the current situation and thinking about the future. Putin’s goal of extinguishing Ukraine’s push for an honest, effective system of justice for its people must fail. The contours of how that system will look and operate is for our Ukrainian colleagues to decide, but by recognizing the nature of the problems they are facing, the international community can be an effective partner in that effort.

## Executive Summary

Putin’s invective was historically accurate in one respect: for decades the Ukrainian judiciary has not been independent. But his characterization of the issues was classic Kremlin disinformation.

Since its independence in 1991, Ukraine’s justice system has been heavily influenced by outside forces. However, the judicial corruption that – according to Putin – had “permeated and corroded Ukrainian statehood” was not introduced by the West, but was perpetuated by a cabal of Ukrainian oligarchs, many of whom were supported by and aligned with Russian interests. The “pretextual efforts against corruption,” which Putin condemned, in fact were programs launched by the Ukrainian government headed by President Zelenskyy to rid the justice system of these destructive influences.

Though differing in detail, various Ukrainian legislation adopted in the latter part of the 2010s sought to (a) rid the justice system of corrupt and incompetent professionals, and (b) encourage prosecutions of the power brokers at the center of the web of corruption. The first element of this cleansing effort involved massive programs to vet the entirety of the judicial and prosecutorial corps, often with the involvement of international experts. The latter component created new judicial and prosecutorial structures comprised of vetted professionals to take on the powerful interests behind the labyrinth of corruption.

At the same time, Ukrainian reformers began to tackle some of the root causes for the lack integrity among the professionals within the justice system. Ukrainian legal educators for decades have pumped out tens of thousands of ill-prepared graduates, many of whom bribed their way into and through one of the hundreds of institutions licensed to offer legal education. Hundreds of thousands of these graduates offer legal services as unlicensed professionals, becoming a breeding ground for incompetence and dishonesty. Even among the elite *advokats* licensed to handle criminal matters in the courts, bribery in the licensing process has been widespread.

Slowly, painfully, and against entrenched opposition within the judicial system, these reform programs began to make progress at the dawn of the new decade. Thousands of judges and prosecutors either were removed, or resigned to avoid the vetting process. Many cleared

the process and continued to work, though thousands more were still working through the vetting processes. Structural changes were implemented in the courts and prosecutor's offices to increase transparency and invigorate efforts to pursue those involved in the corruption. Educators and Bar leaders began tackling the endemic bribery and lack of integrity in their institutions.

When Putin launched the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, these initiatives were thrown into chaos. According to official reports, 72 court buildings – nearly 10% of the physical infrastructure in the Ukrainian system – have been damaged, looted, or destroyed. At one point, 132 first and second instance courts that had been operating on February 23 (roughly 20% of the total) were closed, though some later reopened.

Thousands of judges, prosecutors, staff, and lawyers fled the violence, either to central or western Ukraine, or abroad. Others enlisted in the Ukrainian military, while some joined the Russian occupiers. While new case filings plummeted by 80–90% since the start of the latest Russian aggression, the courts also have seen a sharp drop in funding as resources are shifted to support the military. Operating courts and prosecutor's offices struggle to reorganize and function under these wartime conditions.

Russia's attack also dramatically changed the nature of the cases handled by the justice system. Commercial matters have substantially diminished, as businesses grapple with the realities of a wartime economy. "Routine" crime continues, especially in the regions less impacted by direct violence, but judges, lawyers, and prosecutors also face cases involving offenses previously unknown in the Ukrainian courts such as war crimes, collaboration, or expressing support for the Russian invasion on social media.

As lawyers and their clients flee westward, many lawyers have seen their livelihoods fade or disappear. Legal educators who survived the pandemic by turning to remote learning now struggle to reconnect with their students, many of whom are being welcomed by European and other Western educational institutions.

During this turmoil, the processes and institutions put in place prior to February 2022 to reform the Ukrainian justice system are attempting to push through the additional headwinds created by the war. Efforts to reinvigorate the various vetting processes, hamstrung for months by challenges from opponents, continue to make slow progress. Anti-corruption courts and prosecutors face the same challenges as their "ordinary" colleagues, but continue to work.

In virtually every instance, the future hinges on the outcome of the ongoing military engagements. Yet uncertainty does not justify inaction; the issues likely to face the justice system in a post-conflict Ukraine can be identified. Physical infrastructure will need rehabilitation, and judicial and prosecutorial corps must be reconstituted. Caseloads jumbled by the hostilities must be stabilized and integrated with a deluge of new matters involving offenses peculiar to wartime conditions. Most important, reform efforts within the courts, prosecution, Bar, and legal education system – thrown into disarray by Russian aggression – must regain their footing and press forward with the vital task of creating a trustworthy and effective system of justice.

## The Ukrainian Judicial System

As in most countries, the Ukrainian judicial system includes numerous components. Each has been markedly affected by Russian aggression. At the same time, these structures came into the conflict with historical baggage that will impact efforts to rebuild the justice system. To appreciate the current and future challenges to the Ukrainian system of justice, one must understand the outlines of these structures.

The Ukrainian Constitution of 1996 adopted a somewhat typical European judicial model. At a quasi-political level, a Constitutional Court was created to adjudicate whether laws or actions of the other branches of the government complied with the Ukrainian Constitution. Separately, the Constitution specified that the organization and functioning of the other courts, the judiciary, the prosecution, and the Bar would be governed by laws passed by the Ukrainian parliament, or *Verkhovna Rada (Rada)*.

The primary organic law governing the courts and judiciary is the “Law on the Judiciary and Status of Judges” adopted in 2016,<sup>3</sup> which established a three-tiered system for the Ukrainian courts consisting of:

- The Supreme Court of Ukraine.
- Courts of Appeal including:
  - Appellate courts of general jurisdiction in each province, or *oblast*; and
  - Regional administrative and commercial courts of appeal.
- First Instance courts within each *oblast* including:
  - Local district, city, and town courts of general jurisdiction;<sup>4</sup> and
  - Specialized administrative and commercial courts.

In addition, this Law and subsequent legislation created two additional specialized courts at a national level – the High Anti-Corruption Court and High Court of Intellectual Property – that included both first and second instance divisions.

The Constitution also created governance and administrative structures for the courts and judiciary that have played – and likely in the future will play – prominent roles in shaping the justice system:

- The High Council of Justice, composed of members nominated by various segments in the judicial and political system, charged with nominating and disciplining judges; and
- A Congress of Judges of composed of delegates elected by the judges of the various courts.

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<sup>3</sup> Law No. 1402-VIII, dated 2 June 2016

<sup>4</sup> The nomenclature for identifying these courts can be confusing. Prior to 2020, Ukraine’s *oblasts* were organized into hundreds of second-level administrative units known raions, along with various the cities and towns “of regional significance” outside the raions. Hundreds of local first instance courts were established and named in accordance with this administrative pattern. In July 2020, the Rada reorganized this administrative structure, consolidating the original raions, cities, and towns into just 136 larger raions. However, the court structure remained unchanged.

For example, Vinnytsia *Oblast* was reorganized into six raions in July 2020, but has 29 local first instance courts. To add to the confusion, those courts remain organized around and often identified with the names of the pre-2020 raions, towns, and cities. Thus, the first instance court in the town of Lypovets is often referred to as the “Lypovetskyi Raion Court,” even though the Lypovetskyi Raion no longer exists. To limit the confusion, this report will not refer to raion courts, but instead will use the word “district” to denote local first instance courts that originated under the old raion system.

Finally, but of substantial importance, the *Rada* in recent years created additional bodies tasked with removing corrupt or incompetent judges from the judiciary:

- The High Qualification Commission for Judges to vet sitting judges and nominees for judicial vacancies, and
- A Public Council of International Experts tasked to screen the integrity and ethics of candidates for the High Anti-Corruption Court.

As outlined below, each of these entities played a role in creating the state of affairs in pre-war Ukraine, and will be pivotal in rebuilding a post-conflict justice system.

## The Courts and the War

Perhaps one of the most notable – but least acknowledged – aspects of Ukraine’s response to Russian military aggression has been its continued reliance on its civilian courts to provide justice during wartime, including for the invading Russian forces and alleged Ukrainian collaborators. Many nations, when faced with an existential threat to their existence from attacks by foreign forces, abandon their courts in favor of military courts or other specialized, non-judicial tribunals.

At the very outset of the Russian invasion, the Ukrainian government made it clear that “justice in the territory where martial law is imposed is carried out only by the courts,” and that the “creation of extraordinary and special courts is not allowed.”<sup>5</sup> Thereafter, despite their historic shortcomings and in the face immense pressures, the Ukrainian courts have attempted to maintain a semblance of judicial normalcy in extraordinary times.

### Constitutional Court

Perhaps the court least impacted by the Russian invasion in a physical sense has been the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. Like all of Kyiv, the Court has been under constant threat from Russian missile strikes and aerial bombardment, but there are no reports of any damage to its chambers located on Zhylianska Street in central Kyiv.

No specific information has been made publicly available about the whereabouts of members of the Constitutional Court though, like other Kyiv residents, the justices, their families, and the Court’s staff undoubtedly have been impacted by the Russian attacks. For security reasons, the Court has abandoned oral deliberations, and has limited access to information concerning the place, times, and agendas of Court sessions.<sup>6</sup>

Within these limitations, the Court continues to function, deciding cases brought before it and otherwise conducting court business.<sup>7</sup> Longer term, the conflict with Russia inevitably will have significant impacts on the nature of the Constitutional Court’s caseload. As the ultimate

<sup>5</sup> “IMPORTANT! On the actions of the judiciary during the introduction of the legal regime of martial law,” dated 24 February 2022, found at <https://kr.court.gov.ua/tu12/pres-centr/news/1259983/>.

<sup>6</sup> “Judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine Discussed Issues Related to the Peculiarities of the Court’s Work in Martial Law,” dated 17 June 2022, found at <https://ccu.gov.ua/en/novina/judges-constitutional-court-ukraine-discussed-issues-related-peculiarities-courts-work>.

<sup>7</sup> See “Official Website of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine,” found at <https://ccu.gov.ua/en>; “Judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine Discussed Issues Related to the Peculiarities of the Court’s Work in Martial Law,” dated 17 June 2022, found at <https://ccu.gov.ua/en/novina/judges-constitutional-court-ukraine-discussed-issues-related-peculiarities-courts-work>; “Information on the activities of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in June: 47 meetings were held and 103 acts of the Court were adopted,” dated 4 July 2022, found at <https://ccu.gov.ua/novyna/informaciya-shhodo-diyalnosti-konstytucijnogo-sudu-ukrayiny-u-cherвні-provedeno-47-zasidan>.

arbiter of constitutional issues in the country, many thorny issues undoubtedly will be brought before it. History suggests that these highly charged questions may create tensions between the Constitutional Court and other branches of government as Ukraine grapples with issues arising in the post-conflict environment.<sup>8</sup>

## Supreme Court

Like the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court is also located in central Kyiv. Thus far, there are no reports of any damage to its chambers from Russian attacks.

At the beginning of the war, when the situation in Kyiv seemed especially precarious, the Court's work was suspended. However, the Supreme Court began to resume some work in the second half of March, and eventually returned to full operations.<sup>9</sup> Several judges who were abroad on February 24 ultimately returned to the capital and resumed work.<sup>10</sup>

Since the public authorities, including the Supreme Court, remain a target, judges and staff are working a reduced week, taking turns performing their duties at home.<sup>11</sup> Online access to information about pending cases has been temporarily suspended “[t]o prevent the threat to life and health of judges and participants in martial law.”<sup>12</sup> Staffing shortages due to the war continue to plague the Court.<sup>13</sup> The Supreme Court nonetheless continues to decide cases and pursue other business as the war progresses.<sup>14</sup>

But it is not “business as usual.” The flow of cases reaching the Supreme Court has significantly decreased, and it is unlikely that pre-war volumes will resume in the near future.<sup>15</sup> Further, though its jurisdiction has not been legislatively changed, because of its linkage to the lower courts, the conflict outside Kyiv will continue to influence the Court's caseload.<sup>16</sup> As a result, the nature of the questions reaching the Court is evolving.<sup>17</sup> Issues relating to war crimes, collaboration, reparations, and other matters not previously brought before the Court will invade its docket.<sup>18</sup> Many of these issues will be emotionally charged, forcing the Court to grapple with balancing public demands for retribution with the rights of the accused.

8 See “Concluding Remarks of the Deputy Chairman of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine Serhiy Holovaty at the International Conference,” dated 28 June 2022, found at <https://ccu.gov.ua/en/novina/concluding-remarks-deputy-chairman-constitutional-court-ukraine-serhiy-holovaty-international>.

9 “President of the Supreme Court Vsevolod Kniaziev: ‘I am ashamed of the decisions of the HCJ members who resigned two days before the war,’” dated 12 April 2022, found at <https://court.gov.ua/eng/supreme/pres-centr/zmi/1267730> (“Kniaziev Interview.”)

10 *Ibid.*

11 *Ibid.*

12 See Official Website of the Supreme Court of Ukraine, found at [https://supreme.court.gov.ua/supreme/gromadyanam/stan\\_rozg/](https://supreme.court.gov.ua/supreme/gromadyanam/stan_rozg/).

13 “The Chairman of the Supreme Court discussed with representatives of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission the challenges of the judicial system of Ukraine in the conditions of war,” dated 24 June 2022, found at <https://supreme.court.gov.ua/supreme/pres-centr/news/1288143/> (“Report on COE Conference.”)

14 See Official Website of the Supreme Court of Ukraine, found at <https://court.gov.ua/eng/supreme/>; Kniaziev Interview.

15 Kniaziev Interview.

16 See “The President of the Supreme Court will meet with judges of the affected regions (according to the list),” dated 2 June 2022, found at <https://supreme.court.gov.ua/supreme/pres-centr/anons/1280435/>.

17 See “Stanislav Kravchenko, Chairman of the Supreme Court of Cassation, will talk about the peculiarities of criminal proceedings during martial law,” dated 9 June 2022, found at <https://supreme.court.gov.ua/supreme/pres-centr/anons/1282718/>; “Judges of the CCS of the Supreme Court spoke about the problems of administering justice in wartime,” dated 29 June 2022, found at <https://supreme.court.gov.ua/supreme/pres-centr/news/1290059/>.

18 See, e.g., Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 505, “On the collection, processing and accounting of information on damaged and destroyed real estate as a result of hostilities, terrorist acts, sabotage caused by military aggression of the Russian Federation,” dated 26 March 2022; “The implementation of criminal proceedings and martial law: what are the challenges facing the courts of Ukraine,” dated 23 May 2022, found at <https://court.gov.ua/press/news/1276927/>.

## Specialized Courts

**High Anti-Corruption Court.** In his February 21 speech, President Putin explicitly called out the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC), claiming that it was controlled by the United States. A linchpin of the 2016 Law, the HACC was created to be independent of the courts of general jurisdiction and tasked with hearing corruption cases, including high-level cases against political figures.

Prior to the HACC's creation, criminal cases involving alleged corruption were heard by local first instance courts, with appeals to the appropriate *oblast* court of appeals and ultimately to the Criminal Cassation Court. The HACC usurped some of that jurisdiction, taking cases brought by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO) against designated high-level officials (including ministers, deputies, members of parliament, agency leaders, judges, prosecutors, and heads of state-owned enterprises) for a specified set of corruption-related crimes that entail damages in excess of a monetary threshold.

After lengthy negotiations, the *Rada* in June 2018 passed the law laying out the Court's framework.<sup>19</sup> The HACC's most innovative – and controversial – feature was the inclusion of a role for foreign experts in the selection process for the Court's judges. The 2018 Law established a Public Council of International Experts (PCIE) composed of six foreign members recommended by international organizations and tasked to screen the integrity and ethics of HACC candidates proposed by the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ.) If at least three PCIE members have doubts about a candidate's integrity, the PCIE can initiate a joint meeting with the HQCJ. At that meeting, the candidate's record is reviewed and a vote of the joint group is taken. A majority vote is required to advance the candidate's name, with at least three of those votes coming from the PCIE members.<sup>20</sup>

Initially, the process worked, and thirty-eight judges were selected for the HACC and sworn in on April 4, 2019.<sup>21</sup> The HACC began operations in September 2019, and started to examine its first high-level cases in the last quarter of 2019.<sup>22</sup> While a number of questions have arisen concerning the effectiveness and independence of the HACC, the fact that it was specifically targeted by Putin in his February 21, 2022 speech lends it some credibility.<sup>23</sup>

Given Putin's antipathy, the HACC seemed likely to be in the Russian crosshairs when the invasion began. Despite Putin's ire, the HACC's headquarters in central Kyiv near the other national courts has not suffered any physical damage from Russian strikes. While it continues to function,<sup>24</sup> much of the Court's public outreach was curtailed for security reasons.

Though the HACC apparently was fully staffed at the beginning of the war,<sup>25</sup> it likely has not been immune from the strains that have impacted other courts. HACC judges and personnel presumably have dealt with the same personal and operational security issues as the other courts in Kyiv. According to one report, some judges of the HACC joined the Ukrainian

19 "On the Supreme Anti-Corruption Court," Law No. 2447-VIII, dated June 7, 2018.

20 See Kuz, Ivanna, and Stephenson, Matthew, "Ukraine's High Anti-Corruption Court: Innovation for impartial justice," U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (February 2020).

21 "Ukraine's President Creates Anti-Corruption Court," 11 April 2019, found at <https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-s-president-poroshenko-creates-anti-corruption-court/29875480.html>.

22 European Court of Auditors, "Reducing grand corruption in Ukraine: several EU initiatives, but still insufficient results," p. 51 (2021).

23 Putin Speech.

24 "Statistical data of VAKS on the 121st day of declared martial law," dated 24 June 2022, found at <https://hcac.court.gov.ua/hcac/pres-centr/news/1288309/>.

25 High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, "List of Judges as of 21.02.2022," found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf) ("HQCJ List.")

territorial defense forces,<sup>26</sup> and others also may have left their posts. Given the current battles over the HQCJ (as discussed below), it seems likely that it will take a lengthy process to fill these critical vacancies on the HACC.

**High Court of Intellectual Property.** Russia's invasion of Ukraine had no impact on the day-to-day operations of the other specialized court created by the 2016 Law – the High Court of Intellectual Property (HCIP) – since that Court has never become operational. As discussed below, Ukraine is engaged in a protracted competition to choose judges for that court. While the selection procedure continued to plod forward,<sup>27</sup> no judges had been selected for the HCIP when the war began.

## First and Second Instance Courts

Though the war with Russia reached the edges of the Ukrainian judiciary's center of operations in Kyiv, by far the greatest impacts have been felt by the first and second instance courts outside the city center. Shortly after the Russian assault began, the Congress of Judges on March 2, 2022, published recommendations on court operations in wartime.<sup>28</sup> Those recommendations instructed courts to suspend court proceedings in the event of threat to life, health and safety of visitors, court staff, or judges. They also laid out procedures for staffing courts while suspended, and scheduling proceedings to prioritize urgent matters.

Where significant hostilities were occurring, the courts followed these principles. Operational decisions to suspend the activity of courts are made by the judges of the affected court and the State Judicial Administration.<sup>29</sup> At one point, an estimated 20% of Ukrainian courts suspended their activities due to active hostilities and occupation by the Russian army.<sup>30</sup> Given the danger to the judiciary and the parties to trials, information on the status of court proceedings – usually published on official web portals, as well as the Register of the Court Rulings – was closed to the public.<sup>31</sup>

**Damage to Court Buildings.** Though no official list is available, as of July 4, 2022, 72 court buildings (9% of the total) have been damaged or destroyed.<sup>32</sup> These totals likely are understated, since reliable information is unavailable from areas occupied by Russian forces or where combat continues.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, reports of massive damage to occupied cities such as Mariupol<sup>34</sup> and Severodonetsk,<sup>35</sup> and continuing Russian attacks in various other regions suggest that the damage count likely will increase.

26 “Tanasevych No Longer Head Of Anti-Corruption Court, Pavlyshyn Took Her Place,” dated 13 May 2022, found at <https://ukranews.com/en/news/856680-tanasevych-no-longer-head-of-anti-corruption-court-pavlyshyn-took-her-place>.

27 See Aristova, Irina, et al, “Creation of an Intellectual Property Court in Ukraine: Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in a System of Economic Security of a Country,” 9 Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues (May 2020).

28 “To all courts of Ukraine! The RSU has published recommendations on the operation of courts under martial law,” dated 2 March 2022.

29 Kniaziev Interview.

30 “The President of the Supreme Court informed the representatives of the Council of Europe about the urgent needs of Ukraine's judicial system during the war,” dated 27 April 2022, found at <https://supreme.court.gov.ua/supreme/pres-centr/news/1270773/> (“Kniaziev Speech.”)

31 Gvozdiy, Valentyn, “The Rule of Law in Ukraine During Martial Law: Review of Changes to the Criminal Process,” dated 18 May 2022, found at <https://golaw.ua/insights/publication/the-rule-of-law-in-ukraine-during-martial-law-review-of-changes-to-the-criminal-process/>.

32 “DSA of Ukraine on administration of justice in conditions of war as of July 4, 2022,” dated 4 July 2022, found at <https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/pres-centr/news/1291681/>.

33 See Annex 1.

34 “Russia-Ukraine War: Mariupol Mayor In Bleak Assessment Of City Damage,” dated 22 June 2022, found at <https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/russia-ukraine-crisis/russia-ukraine-war-mariupol-mayor-in-bleak-assessment-of-city-damage-articleshow.html>.

35 “Severodonetsk is 90% destroyed – Luhansk regional governor,” dated 26 June 2022, found at <https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/841814.html>.

Virtually all of the damaged court infrastructure is in nine *oblasts* that thus far have borne the brunt of the Russian attacks: Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Mykolayiv, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, and Poltava.<sup>36</sup> The structural damage to buildings ranges from total destruction to windows smashed by explosive pressure bursts.<sup>37</sup>

While reliable data is difficult to obtain, an even more widespread issue likely is the ransacking or looting of court buildings by occupying Russians.<sup>38</sup> In part, these operations are ordinary criminal activity, where rooms have been needlessly vandalized and computer equipment and other valuables have been stolen for resale on the black market.

**Loss of files.** In other instances, Russian actions have been more sophisticated. Without access to court files, pending cases are effectively ended. Russian forces accordingly destroyed files, in some instances to protect parties sympathetic to the Russian cause. In other instances, the destruction was simply to disrupt the processes of Ukrainian justice.

Moreover, court files and computers contain a wealth of information of value to an invading foe. In a digital age, access to electronic files opens a variety of opportunities for wrongdoing. For example, if Russians were able to obtain passwords and the electronic signatures of judges, they could access the register of judgments in the occupied territories and alter those records.

To address these concerns, judicial authorities in Ukraine attempted to remove court files from courts in the path of the Russian invasion. On March 13, the Supreme Court issued an order specifying procedures to be followed in such circumstances.<sup>39</sup> While allowing each court significant discretion, the order specified that priority be given to the removal of certain files and the destruction of various sensitive documents, digital information, and court symbols.

However, the courts in the areas under attack maintained tens of thousands of cases, which would have required a huge amount of transport to remove. Some judges were able to remove documents relating to especially serious crimes and high-profile cases, but the speed of the Russian advance in a number of areas meant that the vast majority of files were left behind.<sup>40</sup>

**Transfers of Territorial Jurisdiction.** None of these Russian actions came as a surprise to Ukrainians since they were simply a reprise of the activities of Russian-controlled forces during earlier hostilities beginning in 2014. As a result, the Ukrainian judiciary in 2022 fell back on a procedure initially utilized during that earlier conflict.

Throughout the years' long conflict with Russia and its allied forces beginning in 2014, Ukraine has continued to assert its lawful right to all lands occupied by those forces, including Crimea and the Donbas (a region in southeastern Ukraine that generally encompasses the Donetsk and Luhansk *oblasts*.) Such lands are referred to by Ukraine as "temporarily occupied territories," signifying the determination that one day they will be recovered by Ukraine. Consistent with that position, Ukraine has refused to terminate the existence of its courts in those temporarily occupied territories. Those courts, at least on paper, still exist and are a formal part of the Ukrainian court system.

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<sup>36</sup> Annex 1.

<sup>37</sup> See State Judicial Administration of Ukraine, "Destroyed/damaged premises of judicial institutions as a result of armed aggression of the Russian Federation," found at [https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts\\_buildings](https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts_buildings). ("SJA Report")

<sup>38</sup> Kniaziev Speech.

<sup>39</sup> Order of the President of the Supreme Court of Ukraine No. 6/0 / 9-22, approving "Recommendations to the courts of first and appellate instance in case of seizure of the settlement and/or court or imminent threat of its seizure," dated 13 March 2022.

<sup>40</sup> Kniaziev Interview.

At the same time, cases pending in those courts at the time of the occupation required adjudication. New cases arose within the temporarily occupied territories that, for various reasons, needed to be decided by the Ukrainian justice system. To both preserve the nominal existence of the Ukrainian courts in the temporarily occupied territories and provide for the resolution of cases from those areas, Ukraine in 2014 transferred the territorial jurisdictions of 84 courts in areas occupied by Russian forces to other nearby courts: 35 courts in the Donetsk *Oblast*, 17 courts in the Luhansk *Oblast*, 27 courts in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and 9 courts in the City of Sevastopol.<sup>41</sup>

Though the courts in the temporarily occupied areas continued to exist on paper, they were effectively deprived of the authority to enter any binding judicial orders. Court buildings were abandoned and court personnel given the opportunity to move to other locations outside the temporarily occupied areas. The transferee court, on the other hand, assumed full jurisdiction over cases arising in the geographical area previously handled by the original court.

While the procedure looked reasonable on paper, the experience in the Donbas demonstrated that this process stumbled in practice. Because the cases arose in a war zone and the transferee courts were in areas adjacent to the hostilities, the litigants' physical access to those courts was significantly restricted and entailed substantial personal risk. In part, this was because of the physical remoteness of the transferee courts, the lack of access from public transportation services, inadequate or destroyed public signage for directions to court facilities, and court locations that were difficult and inconvenient to find.<sup>42</sup>

Moreover, as mentioned above, when cases were transferred, the files often were left behind. In the absence of case files, judges and prosecutors in criminal matters were placed in the untenable position of having to acquit suspects or revoke their pending convictions. According to some reports, authorities released persons being temporarily held in government-controlled areas if their case files were inaccessible in the occupied areas. Though some enterprising litigants managed to bribe authorities in the occupied areas to retrieve their files, such "remedies" did little to solve the problems.<sup>43</sup>

Another difficulty with this procedure is that the transfer dealt purely with the courts' jurisdiction; the judges of the original court were not transferred. The original judge and the original court lost all right to take any action in connection with the case. The case instead was assigned to a new judge in the transferee court, who often was already overburdened. The new judge was required to reopen the case, build a new case file, and essentially start proceedings from the beginning. In virtually all instances, particularly given the other challenges facing the courts and litigants, the transferred cases simply languished.<sup>44</sup>

Nonetheless, after Russian forces invaded in February 2022, Ukraine revived the use of this mechanism. Beginning in early March 2022, the Supreme Court began issuing decrees transferring the territorial jurisdictions of courts in occupied or threatened areas to courts in safer regions.<sup>45</sup> At one point, the territorial jurisdictions of 132 Ukrainian first and second instance courts were transferred to other courts in the same or a neighboring *oblast*.<sup>46</sup>

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41 "SJA of Ukraine on the administration of justice in wartime as of May 18, 2022," dated 18 May 2022, found at <https://court.gov.ua/press/news/1275655/>

42 Kulbida, Roman, et al., "Justice in the East of Ukraine During the Ongoing Armed Conflict," *International Journal for Court Administration*, Article 9, p. 8 (2020), found at <https://doi.org/10.36745/ijca.341>.

43 *Id.*, p. 5.

44 *Ibid.*

45 See, e.g., Order of the Supreme Court No 1/0/9-22, "On changing the territorial jurisdiction of court cases under martial law," dated 6 March 2022.

46 Annex 1.

When Ukraine began to enjoy battlefield success in the north in mid-April 2022, the President of the Supreme Court announced that work was underway to re-open approximately 40 suspended courts in the de-occupied territories of the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts. He also indicated that most judges were ready to resume work.<sup>47</sup> By the end of June 2022, the territorial jurisdictions of 35 of these courts were restored.<sup>48</sup>

As of this writing, the territorial jurisdictions of 97 courts that were changed in 2022 remained with the transferee courts.<sup>49</sup> Of those, 71 courts were located in territories “temporarily uncontrolled by the Ukrainian authorities” that had been occupied by Russia since February 24, 2022.<sup>50</sup>

While some courts gradually resumed their work,<sup>51</sup> the Russian destruction and looting in places such as Bucha, Borodianka, and other areas made it impossible to resume court operations.<sup>52</sup> Many court staff have been left homeless as entire communities have been destroyed or damaged by Russian troops.<sup>53</sup>

Even in courts where there was no physical damage, the shuffling of cases between courts and judges complicates the resumption of work. When the territorial jurisdiction of an original court is restored, the jurisdiction of the transferee court is terminated. Case files must be moved back to the original court, and the matter assigned to a judge of that court. While the “new” judge may be the same individual who earlier had that file, the attrition in the judicial ranks in these front-line courts further muddles the management of cases.

## Conditions in Wartime

In reality, there currently are no truly safe places in Ukraine because Russia continues to attack seemingly quiet areas from long distances.<sup>54</sup> Perhaps the most well-publicized instance involved the Commercial Court of Mykolayiv *Oblast*, situated in the building of the regional state administration. Though there was no active ground combat nearby, a Russian missile struck the building, killing two court employees and badly wounding another.<sup>55</sup> As a result, it is estimated that about 10% of the staff employees are not ready to return to their workplaces.<sup>56</sup>

47 “Currently, measures are being taken to restore justice in the de-occupied territories, and the majority of judges are ready to start work – Chairman of the Supreme Court,” dated 15 April 2022, found at <https://court.gov.ua/press/news/1268724/>.

48 “DSA of Ukraine on administration of justice in conditions of war as of July 4, 2022,” dated 4 July 2022, found at <https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/pres-centr/news/1291681/>; “Territorial jurisdiction of court cases of the Borodyan District Court of the Kyiv Region has been restored,” dated 12 July 2022, found at <https://supreme.court.gov.ua/supreme/pres-centr/news/1294662>.

49 *Ibid.*

50 *Ibid.*

51 *See, e.g.*, “Measures are currently being taken to restore justice in the Occupied Territories, and most judges are ready to begin work,” date 15 April 2022, found at <https://supreme.court.gov.ua/supreme/pres-centr/news/1268719/>; “Representatives of the courts exchanged practical experience in organizing the work of the court during the war,” dated 29 April 2022, found at <https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/pres-centr/news/1271434/>; “Irpın City Court resumed justice,” dated 23 May 2022, found at <https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/pres-centr/news/1277100/>.

52 Kniaziev Interview.

53 “Representatives of the courts exchanged practical experience in organizing the work of the court during the war,” dated 29 April 2022, found at <https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/pres-centr/news/1271434/>.

54 *See, e.g.*, “Russian cruise missiles from Black Sea killed at least 22 people in attack on Vinnytsia, Ukraine says,” dated 14 July 2022, found at [https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-07-14-22/h\\_445618bc0e6522b882e3f5dcffe06054](https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-07-14-22/h_445618bc0e6522b882e3f5dcffe06054); “Ukraine regional governor says Russian missiles kill 3, injure 15 in Dnipro,” dated 15 July 2022, found at <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/three-killed-15-injured-missile-strikes-ukraine-city-dnipro-official-says-2022-07-15/>.

55 Kniaziev Interview.

56 *Ibid.*

The conflict also has complicated the security situation in various courts. In the normal course of criminal proceedings, courtroom security typically is an issue. And prior to the current hostilities, extreme right-wing groups often posed threats to judges and others involved in court proceedings.<sup>57</sup> While efforts were underway to improve this situation prior to February 24,<sup>58</sup> the problem was far from resolved.

These concerns are heightened in wartime, when the normal security personnel and measures may be reduced, and the nature of the crimes (war crimes, treason, collaboration, sabotage) suggests that enhanced precautionary measures should be applied. Thus, during the serious shelling of Kyiv, cases were not considered in open court.<sup>59</sup> In frontline courts, cases accordingly are accepted and considered to the extent possible, but courts now must take into account the safety of the litigants and court personnel.<sup>60</sup>

Away from the active hostilities, most courts have maintained a relatively routine schedule. However, the overall flow of new cases into the system has dramatically decreased. By one estimate, the number of new cases filed since the beginning of the war in the courts of Ukraine has fallen by up to 90%.<sup>61</sup> As the President of the Ukrainian Supreme Court observed: “Today, people think less about going to court, and more on how to save the family, find a job.”<sup>62</sup>

One proposal for overcoming these conflict-induced issues advocated by some in the Ukrainian legal community is the development of a virtual, electronic court system. But this concept faces legal, technological, and financial hurdles. Ukrainian law currently does not permit virtual proceedings. Moreover, despite spending tens of millions Euros, prior efforts to create an electronic court system in Ukraine have had little success.<sup>63</sup> An initiative has been developed to introduce remote justice, but the *Rada* thus far has not supported it.<sup>64</sup>

In part, this reluctance is due to the major financial problems facing the judiciary. Ukrainian resources for the judiciary are limited, and have been further reduced since the beginning of the war. The dramatic decrease in filings led to a dramatic decrease in receipts from court fees, a primary source of revenue for the judiciary. For example, while the courts anticipated revenue of UAH 500 million (€16 million) in March and April 2022, only UAH 126.6 million (€4.1 million) was received.<sup>65</sup>

Other funding for the courts has been cut as the country directs its resources toward the military. While necessary in the face of aggression, the impacts are real. For example, funding for salaries has been reduced by 12%.<sup>66</sup> On a much larger level, the reduction in funding has made it difficult to rebuild damaged or destroyed court buildings, purchase new computers and supplies, and maintain court staff.<sup>67</sup>

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57 International Commission of Jurists, *Between the Rock and the Anvil: Lawyers under Attack in Ukraine*, pp. 25–32, April 2020 (“ICJ Report”).

58 “Ukraine’s youngest Law Enforcement Agency kicks off its communication strategy,” dated 21 October 2021, found at <https://www.euam-ukraine.eu/news/ukraine-s-youngest-law-enforcement-agency-kicks-off-its-communication-strategy/>.

59 Kniaziev Interview.

60 *Ibid.*

61 *Ibid.*

62 “Measures are currently being taken to restore justice in the Occupied Territories, and most judges are ready to begin work,” date 15 April 2022, found at <https://supreme.court.gov.ua/supreme/pres-centr/news/1268719/>.

63 Kniaziev Interview.

64 Kniaziev Speech.

65 “SJA of Ukraine on the administration of justice in wartime as of May 18, 2022,” dated 18 May 2022, found at <https://court.gov.ua/press/news/1275655/>.

66 Kniaziev Interview.

67 Kniaziev Speech; “Oleksiy Salnikov, head of the State Security Service of Ukraine, met with the heads of courts of the Donetsk region,” dated 8 July 2022, found at <https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/pres-centr/news/1293764/>.

Even smaller cuts have created major impacts. Funding for judicial postal services for the Supreme Court and first and second instance courts reportedly was blocked, which impacted court operations.<sup>68</sup> Telephone services to some courts were terminated for non-payment.<sup>69</sup>

With each shift in the military situation, the justice system will continue to adjust. Buildings, equipment, files, personnel, security, finances – all of these issues must be addressed. Given the role of the courts, the ultimate outcome of this effort will be pivotal in shaping a democratic Ukraine.

## The Judiciary

Like the rest of the Ukrainian population, judges have endured the unthinkable as a result of the recent Russian attacks across the country. In some areas, members of the judiciary became targets of direct attacks. Other judges – like the rest of the populace – suffered from indiscriminate Russian assaults. For the entire judiciary, the war forced previously unconceivable changes to their lives.

Yet in a post-conflict Ukraine, the judiciary will need to address not only the effects of the war, but also pre-war issues that dogged the legal system for decades. Ironically – or perhaps purposefully – Russian aggression came at time of great change in the Ukrainian judiciary. These reforms in the latter part of the 2010s caused thousands of judges to leave the system, slowed the filling of vacancies, and created a cohort of judges classified as “not able to administer justice,” *i.e.*, unable to perform judicial functions. Other judges were removed as a result of anti-corruption investigations; 67 were charged in 2021.<sup>70</sup> The result was a major shortage in judicial workforce even prior to February 24, 2022.

But these were not the only issues facing the judiciary when Russian forces invaded. For years, judges and prosecutors reported widespread attempts to influence trials and judicial decision-making by supporters of the accused or other parties to a case. These efforts, often promoted by extreme right-wing groups, included (i) demonstrations in front of courts or, less-frequently, prosecutor’s offices and (ii) occupying public seating in courtrooms with support and advocacy teams, which included, *inter alia*, Ukrainian parliament members. Most often, such groups of observers come to support the defendants from the Ukrainian military or volunteers.<sup>71</sup>

Coupled with the losses in the judiciary as a result of the war, Ukraine faces massive challenges in reconstituting an effective, professional judiciary when the conflict ends.

## Judges and the War

Two days before the war began, 5,282 judges were assigned to various positions in the Ukrainian judiciary.<sup>72</sup> A few weeks later, many judges were no longer working at those courts. These dramatic changes in the judicial workforce can be attributed to several factors:

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68 Kniaziev Interview.

69 “Landlines are disabled in the bodies of the justice system of Lviv region,” dated 29 April 2022, found at <https://lv.court.gov.ua/tu14/pres-centr/1/1271370/>.

70 “Anti-corruption victories of 2021: who’s imprisoned and who’s next,” dated 3 January 2022, found at <https://antac.org.ua/en/news/anti-corruption-victories-of-2021-who-s-imprisoned-and-who-s-next/> (“AntAC Report”).

71 KuIbida, p. 7.

72 HQCJ List.

**Displacement.** By far the most prevalent reason for judges leaving their positions at the outset of the war was displacement. When Russian forces poured across the border and missiles began striking the cities, judges scrambled like most Ukrainian citizens to protect their families. As previously mentioned, 20% of Ukrainian courts suspended their activities due to active hostilities or occupation by Russian forces.<sup>73</sup>

No data has been located regarding the number of judges or court staff who left their positions during the war. One nationwide survey of all civil servants (not limited to the judiciary) found that 83.4% of civil servants did not change their location during the war, 13.6% are internally displaced, and 3% are abroad.<sup>74</sup> However, this data is not broken down by region or position. Unlike some other civil servants, judges and court staff were particular targets for attackers. Anecdotal information indicates that many judges of the first and second instance courts, particularly from the areas involved with or threatened by active hostilities, fled to western Ukraine or abroad.<sup>75</sup> Even judges of the Supreme Court took their families to safe territory.<sup>76</sup>

Countless displaced judges and their families received support from others in the judiciary. The State Judicial Administration (SJA) initiated a program to find housing for judges and staff from areas subject to hostilities.<sup>77</sup> Judges in western Ukraine received the families of colleagues at their homes. The Supreme Court also had access to some housing in quieter areas and negotiated with Ukrainian universities where dormitories were not full. European judges' associations provided assistance, including housing their fellow judges.<sup>78</sup>

When the Ukrainian military recovered territories in the North, some judges were able to return to their original courts. Judges from occupied territories also sought transfer to other courts. In mid-April the Supreme Court began a procedure to allow judges displaced from courts in the Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, Mykolayiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson *oblasts* whose territorial jurisdictions had been transferred to apply for reassignment to certain other courts where additional support was needed.<sup>79</sup> As of late June 2022, more than 200 first instance judges from the occupied territories had been reassigned to first instance courts in territory controlled by Ukraine, and another 200 judges were in the process of secondment.<sup>80</sup> In those courts, the existing judges will decide the specialization of seconded judges, the procedure for allocating cases to such judges, whether they can participate in the election of the court leadership, and other organizational issues.<sup>81</sup> Ukrainian authorities also announced that a similar procedure will begin later in the summer to send all second instance judges from temporarily uncontrolled territories to administrative and commercial courts located in the controlled territory.<sup>82</sup>

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73 Kniaziev Speech.

74 "The vast majority of civil servants (83.4%) did not change their location during the war," dated 17 June 2022, found at <https://te.court.gov.ua/tu20/pres-centr/news/1285741/>.

75 Kniaziev Interview.

76 *Ibid.*

77 "SJA of Ukraine has introduced a service of free assistance in finding housing for employees of bodies and institutions of the justice system," dated 25 March 2022, found at <https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/pres-centr/news/1264908/>.

78 Kniaziev Interview.

79 Supreme Court of Ukraine, "On the beginning of the procedure for sending judges of local courts located in the territories in which combat operations are conducted actions whose territorial jurisdiction was changed by the orders of the President of the Supreme Court," dated 11 April 2022, found at [https://supreme.court.gov.ua/userfiles/media/new\\_folder\\_for\\_uploads/supreme/vidr\\_2022/Ogosh\\_vidr\\_2022.pdf](https://supreme.court.gov.ua/userfiles/media/new_folder_for_uploads/supreme/vidr_2022/Ogosh_vidr_2022.pdf).

80 Report on COE Conference.

81 "The head of the Supreme Court discussed with the judges the urgent problems of the justice system that arose during the war," dated 7 July 2022, found at <https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/pres-centr/news/1281822/>.

82 *Ibid.*

Another uncertainty is how many judges will return to the bench when the conflict ends. Like millions of other Ukrainian citizens, displaced judges will need to make difficult decisions. Some judges will have found new lives or professions in their adopted homes and will choose not to return. Families, once uprooted, may resist returning to areas still threatened by future conflict. Whatever the reason, an unknown percentage of displaced judges will not return to their positions.

**Enlistment.** The judicial workforce has also been affected by the broad Ukrainian military mobilization in response to the Russian invasion. Shortly after the new Russian aggression began, the Congress of Judges outlined procedures for judges who elected to enlist in the Armed Forces or Territorial Defense units.<sup>83</sup> No official data is available, but according to one report, 60 Ukrainian judges and hundreds of court staff joined the Armed Forces or the Territorial Defense Forces after the war began.<sup>84</sup> Another report indicated that 32 judges and 131 court employees joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine, while an additional 23 judges and 47 court employees joined the Territorial Defense Forces.<sup>85</sup>

The enlistees include at least one member of the Supreme Court,<sup>86</sup> and another Supreme Court staff member.<sup>87</sup> Some second instance judges also have enlisted.<sup>88</sup> Other anecdotal reports indicated that some judges of the High Anti-Corruption Court<sup>89</sup> and other courts<sup>90</sup> joined the territorial defense forces. While these enlistments may not be substantial in number, they reflect the ongoing dislocation in the judiciary caused by the war. When and whether such judges return to the bench remains an open question.

**Threats and Detention by Russian Forces.** While many judges fled from areas occupied by Russia, others chose to stay or could not evacuate.<sup>91</sup> Some remain in the occupied territories awaiting transfer to a new court outside the occupation zone. But for many, it is a matter of personal security. Especially in places like Kherson, Melitopol, Mariupol, and some areas of the Kharkiv *oblast*, the Russian military reportedly has lists of judges and does not allow them to leave. In one incident, a judge of the Chernihiv court apparently was shot at a Russian checkpoint. Afraid of violence if caught in the open, some judges presumably are in hiding.<sup>92</sup>

Other reports suggest that Russian troops in some areas are actively looking for judges.<sup>93</sup> Though the evidence is primarily anecdotal, the so-called “filtration” campaign by Russian forces and their pro-Russian allies allegedly targets Ukrainian government officials for

83 *Ibid.*

84 Kniaziev Interview.

85 “Andriy Smirnov: ‘Judges now give 50 percent of their salaries to the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This decision was made by the judiciary of each court,’” dated 30 March 2022, found at <https://lv.court.gov.ua/tu14/pres-centr/1/1265601/>.

86 “Supreme Court Judge Ivan Mishchenko on pseudonym ‘Dredd’: ‘I don’t see any critical problems in the judiciary, it hasn’t stopped working,’” dated 10 May 2022, found at <https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/pres-centr/news/1273226/>.

87 “Oleksandr Kobelchuk, Secretary of the Judicial Session of the Supreme Court of Cassation, has been defending our Motherland since the first day of the war,” dated 13 May 2022, found at <https://court.gov.ua/press/news/1274541/>.

88 “Changing the mantle of a judge to the uniform of a warrior,” dated 25 May 2022, found at <https://dp.court.gov.ua/tu04/pres-centr/2/1277644/>.

89 “Tanasevych No Longer Head Of Anti-Corruption Court, Pavlyshyn Took Her Place,” dated 13 May 2022, found at <https://ukranews.com/en/news/856680-tanasevych-no-longer-head-of-anti-corruption-court-pavlyshyn-took-her-place>.

90 “Participation of judges of the eastern front in national resistance during martial law in Ukraine,” dated 22 March 2022, found at <https://ko.court.gov.ua/tu10/pres-centr/news/1264255/>.

91 “Andriy Smirnov: ‘Judges now give 50 percent of their salaries to the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This decision was made by the judiciary of each court,’” dated 30 March 2022, found at <https://lv.court.gov.ua/tu14/pres-centr/1/1265601/>.

92 Kniaziev Interview.

93 Human Rights Watch, “Ukraine: Apparent War Crimes in Russia-Controlled Areas,” dated 23 April 2022, found at <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/03/ukraine-apparent-war-crimes-russia-controlled-areas>.

interrogation, imprisonment, torture, and/or murder.<sup>94</sup> Ukrainian judges who remain in Russian-controlled territory unquestionably are at risk from these “cleansing” operations.

Ukrainian authorities have lost contact with some judges, and know nothing about their fate. Others are known to be in captivity under the control of Russian forces or their allies.<sup>95</sup> While the Ukrainian government is attempting to free them, it seems probable that the judiciary will suffer further losses due to the actions of occupation forces.

**Defection.** Among the thorniest issues facing judges is cooperation with Russian forces. In the aftermath of the 2014 Russian invasion of the Donbas, 75 judges from Ukrainian courts joined the courts organized in the Russian-controlled areas.<sup>96</sup> Mindful of this experience, the Supreme Court of Ukraine in 2022 explicitly ordered that judges and court staff located in occupied areas “should avoid negotiations with the occupiers ... [and] not agree to proposals of cooperation.”<sup>97</sup>

At this early stage, where no Russian-controlled courts have yet been organized in the newly occupied areas, it is unclear whether the “defection” of Ukrainian judge to serve in those courts will be a significant problem. Some reports have highlighted a handful of specific cases, and other investigations are underway.<sup>98</sup> Given the recent revelations concerning the prosecution and security services, the Ukrainian judiciary undoubtedly will lose some judges who elect to join the occupying forces.<sup>99</sup>

**Retirement from the Profession:** For most Ukrainians, even those who were not displaced or directly under attack, the war with Russia has been traumatic. Some have been forced by infrastructure damage to travel for more than three hours to reach court. Many have performed their duties to the sound of air-raid sirens and missile explosions, exposed without shelter in government buildings that are potential targets. At the end of the day, like their fellow citizens, they must find their way home before curfew.

While the media and Ukrainian government press materials highlight the heroic workers who continue to brave these dangers, these experiences are deeply traumatizing. Some judges, even those not directly in the line of fire, will elect to leave their positions out of fear or simple fatigue from the stresses of the war. Still others, though not outwardly traumatized, may retire or leave the judiciary for personal reasons or other opportunities. Regardless the reason, it seems probable that scores – if not hundreds – of judges will not return to the bench when the conflict ends.

94 See “OSCE Envoy Says Evidence Of ‘Filtration Camps’ Emerging From Areas Of Ukraine Claimed By Russian Forces,” dated 28 April 2022, found at <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-filtration-camps-osce/31825625.html>.

95 Report on COE Conference.

96 Kulbida, pp. 13-14.

97 Order of the President of the Supreme Court of Ukraine No. 6/0/9-22, dated 13 May 2022.

98 Kniaziev Interview; “SBI reported on suspicion of treason to the heads of two district courts in Luhansk and Kharkiv regions,” dated 15 May 2022, found at <https://dbr.gov.ua/news/dbr-povidomilo-pro-pidozru-u-der-zhavnij-zradi-golovam-dvoh-rajonnih-sudiv-na-luganshhini-ta-harkivshhini>.

99 Office of the President of Ukraine, “Actions and inaction of every official in the security sector and in law enforcement agencies will be evaluated – address of the President of Ukraine,” dated 17 July 2022, found at <https://www.president.gov.ua/news/diyi-ta-bezdiyalnist-kozhnoyi-posadovoyi-osobi-v-sektori-bez-76529> (“Zelensky Address”).

## Holes in the Judiciary

As mentioned above, two days before the Russian invasion, official statistics reflected that 5,282 judges were assigned to positions in the Ukrainian judiciary.<sup>100</sup> But as of December 31, 2021, the Ukrainian judiciary had authorized positions for 7,304 judges.<sup>101</sup> In other words, only about 72% of the judicial positions in the country were filled at the beginning of the war.

At the highest levels, there currently are few vacancies. For example, of the 196 authorized positions on the Supreme Court,<sup>102</sup> 189 are currently filled.<sup>103</sup> But for reasons discussed below, virtually no judicial appointments have been made to the first or second instance courts since 2019, leaving many of those positions vacant.

To further complicate matters, the Law on the Judiciary and Status of Judges adopted by the *Rada* in 2016,<sup>104</sup> directed the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) to evaluate the competence and integrity of the existing Ukrainian judicial corps under a strict set of standards, and remove those found lacking. Because sitting judges had been appointed for five-year terms, the goal was to complete the vetting process before their terms expired. If that did not occur, the Law provided that their judicial powers terminated at the end of their term. Such judges remained on the judicial rolls, but were classified as “not able to administer justice,” *i.e.*, disqualified from performing their judicial functions.

For reasons discussed below, the vetting process was slowed and eventually ground to a halt. At the start of the war, the HQCJ had not completed the vetting process for 2,030 sitting judges, leaving roughly 40% of those on the bench “unable to administer justice.”<sup>105</sup>

The impacts of these problems in the vetting process on individual courts were unevenly spread across the system. For example, while 36 judges had been appointed to the Pechersky District Court in the City of Kyiv, only 17 judges were allowed to “administer justice.” In the nearby Shevchenkivskyi District Court in Kyiv City, only 25 out of 42 judges have the authority to consider cases. On the other end of the scale, 23 out of 26 judges appointed to the Kievskyi District Court in Odesa have the authority to administer justice.<sup>106</sup>

In short, the Ukrainian judiciary at the start of the war was substantially understaffed, a problem that will be significantly exacerbated at the close of the conflict. Filling those holes will be a major challenge since the current process for selecting and approving judicial nominees is both inherently cumbersome and facing protracted opposition. The remaining members of the HCJ have proposed, as a stopgap measure, restoring the powers of most judges who currently “cannot administer justice” due to the expiration of their five-year terms.<sup>107</sup> Such proposals, however, signal a backtracking on Ukraine’s commitment to reform, a move that gives pause to both reformers and international donors.

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100 HQCJ List.

101 High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine “Regarding the report of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine for 2021,” dated 19 January 2022, found at <https://vkksu.gov.ua/en/news/regarding-report-high-qualification-commission-judges-ukraine-2021> (“HQCJ Report”).

102 HQCJ Report.

103 Supreme Court of Ukraine, “Judges,” found at [https://court.gov.ua/eng/supreme/pro\\_sud/sud\\_korpus/](https://court.gov.ua/eng/supreme/pro_sud/sud_korpus/).

104 Law No. 1402-VIII, dated 2 June 2016.

105 HQCJ Report.

106 “The ten busiest courts of Ukraine have been identified: details,” dated 2 June 2022, found at <https://yaizakon.com.ua/opredelena-desyatka-samyh-zagruzhenyih-sudov-ukrainy-detali/>.

107 “HCJ advocates early settlement of the issue of restoration of powers of judges of ‘five-year,’” dated 3 June 2022, found at <https://su.court.gov.ua/tu19/pres-centr/news/1281050/>.

## The Gatekeepers

Ukraine long has suffered from corruption, particularly the abuse of high-level power by oligarchs and vested interests.<sup>108</sup> A bulwark of this kleptocracy has been the judiciary,<sup>109</sup> and for decades Ukraine has struggled to control judicial corruption. The Russian invasion came as Ukraine finally was making a determined effort to reform its judiciary and root out the oligarchs' entrenched enablers.

At the center of this effort were bodies such as the High Anti-Corruption Court and the High Qualification Commission for Judges added to the judicial structure by the 2016 Law. These entities were tasked to identify and remove corrupt oligarchs, judges, and other vested interests. Many of those individuals are allies of President Putin, anti-democratic actors aligned with his view of Russian hegemony.

Unfortunately, these reforms created a bureaucratic web overlaid with a labyrinth of often hostile interest groups, which provided multiple opportunities to slow or stymie reform. Prior to the recent Russian aggression, various actors were fighting – but slowly losing – a rearguard action to stall the reforms. These obstacles are the primary reason for the previously discussed 28% vacancy rate in judicial positions in Ukraine.<sup>110</sup>

Some believe, based on Putin's rambling speech of February 21, 2022, that he saw the imminent success of these reforms as a threat.<sup>111</sup> Regardless of his motives, the hostilities have further slowed the torturous pace of implementing the reforms. The hurdles facing the anti-corruption effort continue to shackle efforts to fill the holes in the Ukrainian judiciary and create a legal system capable of dealing with the myriad issues inherent in a post-war environment.

**High Qualification Commission of Judges.** Central to the judicial reforms included in the 2016 Law was the creation of the HQCJ which was tasked with (a) evaluating the competence and integrity of the existing Ukrainian judicial corps under a strict set of standards, and (b) arranging competitions for vacant judicial positions. The law further provided that the HQCJ would send recommendations for vacant posts to the High Council of Justice (HCJ), which would submit names to the President of Ukraine for appointment.

The immediate impact of this process on judicial staffing was dramatic. By 2017, roughly one-third of Ukraine's judges had opted to retire rather than to subject themselves to such assessments.<sup>112</sup> Yet the reforms still did not produce the results desired by reformers, primarily due to the perception that the HQCJ and HCJ were failing to remove corrupt judges from the system. For example, out of 2,827 judges who underwent a qualification test after 2014, only 35 were dismissed.<sup>113</sup>

Accordingly, in October 2019, the *Rada* passed a law proposed by the newly elected President Zelenskyy terminating the authority of the existing HQCJ.<sup>114</sup> The new law created a reconstituted HQCJ, and included a provision creating an Integrity and Ethics Panel, attached to the HCJ, to vet judicial appointments.

108 See, e.g., United States Department of State, "Ukraine 2021 Human Rights Report," (2021); European Court of Auditors, "Reducing grand corruption in Ukraine: several EU initiatives, but still insufficient results," (2021).

109 See, e.g., Zhernakov, Mykhailo, "It's time to start treating Ukraine's corrupt judiciary as a criminal syndicate," *Atlantic Council* (December 1, 2020); Kashporov, Volodymyr, "Judiciary System and Reform," Razom, Inc. (2022).

110 HQCJ Report.

111 Putin Speech.

112 Council of Europe, *Evaluation of the judicial systems (2018 - 2020) Ukraine*, pp. 55-56 (2020).

113 Halushka, Olena, and Chyzyk, Halyna, "Is Ukraine's new judicial reform a step forward?" *Atlantic Council* (October 29, 2019).

114 Law No. 193-IX, dated 16 October 2019.

However, in March 2020, the Constitutional Court annulled key parts of the Law, ruling that the Integrity and Ethics Panel could not overrule decisions by the HCJ and rejecting several amendments for strengthening disciplinary procedures against judges.<sup>115</sup> This ruling effectively blocked the creation of a new HQCJ. Later that year, the Constitutional Court went further, invalidating much of Ukraine's 2014 anti-corruption reform effort as unconstitutional.<sup>116</sup> The result was that the work of the HQCJ, and the vetting and appointment of judges, ground to a halt.

In August 2021, the *Rada* adopted a bill proposed by the President to relaunch the HQCJ.<sup>117</sup> Among the salient provisions of the law was the creation of a Selection Commission to choose candidates to be proposed to the HCJ for appointment to the HQCJ. The Selection Commission was to be composed of three judges nominated by the Council of Judges and three international experts nominated by international and foreign organizations.

The creation of the Selection Commission proceeded smoothly, with the experts appointed and beginning work in November 2021.<sup>118</sup> At its first meeting in January 2022, the Selection Commission announced the process and schedule for the competition to select the sixteen proposed members of the new HQCJ.<sup>119</sup> That announcement indicated that applications to become a member of the HQCJ would be accepted from February 4 to March 4, 2022. No further timeline for final selection of nominees was announced, though the hope was that the Selection Commission would complete its work in August – September 2022.<sup>120</sup>

With the start of the war with Russia, the work of the Selection Commission has again been delayed. The Commission announced on July 13 that it was accepting applications for candidates to the HQCJ, with an application deadline of August 22, 2022.<sup>121</sup> However, history suggests that it will take months for the Commission to complete the competition and arrive at its slate of nominees for the HQCJ. Even then, those nominees must be formally approved by the HCJ and the President, a process that may create additional delay (see below).

Until the new members of the HQCJ are nominated, approved by the HCJ and the President, and begin work, no further vetting of existing judges or competitions for vacancies can be completed. Put differently, until the new HQCJ is formed, the work of vetting sitting judges and selecting new judges remains stalled.

Even when the new HQCJ is finally formed, the past track record of its vetting and selection process demonstrates that it will take months to actually begin making decisions on judicial nominees. The impacts of these delays on the post-war Ukrainian judicial system will be immense. As discussed above, over 2000 judicial positions are officially vacant, with hundreds of additional seats on the bench likely to open up by the time the conflict with Russia ends. Coupled with the fact that more than 2000 additional sitting judges have not undergone the vetting process required by law, rebuilding the Ukrainian judiciary in a post-war environment may effectively be stymied by the snail's pace progress of the HQCJ.

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115 Constitutional Court of Ukraine, Decision No. 4-p/2020, dated 11 March 2020.

116 Constitutional Court of Ukraine, Decision No. 13-r/2020, dated 27 October 2020.

117 Laws No. 1629-IX, dated 5 August 2021.

118 "The competition commission for the selection of new members of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine has begun preparatory work," dated 22 November 2021, found at <https://court.gov.ua/press/news/1215977/>.

119 High Qualification Commission of Judges, "Announcement of the start of the first competitive selection of members of the High Qualifications Commission of Judges of Ukraine," dated 21 January 2022.

120 See "Selection Mission," dated 4 February 2022, found at <https://pravo.ua/articles/selection-mission/>.

121 "The Competitive Commission for the Selection of Candidates for the Positions of Members of the VKKS Resumed its Work and Determined the New Dates for the Submission of Documents from Candidates," dated 13 July 2022, found at <https://pravo.ua/konkursna-komisiiia-z-doboru-kandydativ-na-posady-chleniv-vkks-vidnovylyla-robotu-ta-vyznachyla-novi-daty-dlia-podachi-dokumentiv-vid-kandydativ/>.

**High Council of Justice.** In furtherance of its reform agenda, the *Rada* in December 2016 passed a law creating the High Council of Justice (HCJ).<sup>122</sup> Previously, the power of judicial appointment lay with the *Rada*, a power which many considered one of the primary sources of judicial corruption. Under the 2016 Law, the process was altered so that the HCJ would receive judicial nominations from the HQCJ, make the final decisions about judicial candidates, and send a final list of judicial nominees to the President. The HCJ also was given the power to control the discipline of judges, and generally serve as the highest judicial administrative authority in the country.

Reformers envisioned the HCJ as a diverse group of professionals dedicated to building integrity into the judiciary. Toward that end, the 2016 Law provided that the Council would be composed of 21 members. Ten members would be appointed by the Congress of Judges of Ukraine, while the *Rada*, the President, the Congress of Advocates, a congress composed of representatives from law schools and scientific institutions, and the All-Ukrainian Conference of Employees of the Procuracy would appoint two each. The President of the Supreme Court of Ukraine rounded out the HCJ, serving as an *ex officio* member.

However, the Council soon became mired in controversy, accused of corruption and consistently protecting tainted judges.<sup>123</sup> As mentioned above, in October 2019, the *Rada* passed another judicial reform law.<sup>124</sup> Among the provisions of this law was the creation of an Integrity and Ethics Panel, attached to the HCJ, to vet judicial appointments.

To counter this law, the HCJ on December 11, 2019 published rules that anti-corruption activists claimed would effectively kill ongoing judicial reform.<sup>125</sup> In March 2020, the Constitutional Court went further, ruling that the Integrity and Ethics Panel could not overrule decisions by the HCJ and rejecting several amendments for strengthening disciplinary procedures against judges.<sup>126</sup> The HCJ thus kept its power to appoint judges, unfettered by any oversight.

In August 2021, at the same time that it created the Selection Commission for the HQCJ, the *Rada* passed a law proposed by the President to relaunch the HCJ.<sup>127</sup> Once again, this law added an Ethics Council including international experts nominated by international and foreign organizations to vet persons nominated for appointment as members of the HCJ. While the HCJ balked at appointing its three members to the Ethics Council, it was nonetheless formed by operation of law.<sup>128</sup>

By January 2020, as the Ethics Council began its work, turmoil again erupted. Two HCJ members resigned rather than face an ethics review.<sup>129</sup> Two members appointed by the Ukrainian National Bar Association soon followed.<sup>130</sup> The Congress of Judges – which appointed ten members of the HCJ – stated that it was unacceptable to participate in the evaluation procedures initiated by the Ethics Council and terminated the powers of the HCJ members that

122 “On the High Council of Justice,” Law No. 1798-VIII, dated 21 December 2016.

123 See “High Council of Justice tries to undermine the judicial reform once again,” dated 10 March 2017, found at <https://nabu.gov.ua/en/novyny/high-council-justice-tries-undermine-judicial-reform-once-again>; “227 judges who persecuted Maidan activists remain in their posts,” dated 26 February 2019, found at <https://khp.org/en/1551141773>; “Whistleblowing in Ukraine: Judge Larysa Holnyk, an Update,” dated 28 March 2019, found at <https://www.rechtersvoorrechters.nl/whistleblowing-in-ukraine-judge-larysa-holnyk-an-update/>.

124 Law No. 193-IX, dated 16 October 2019.

125 Sukhov, Oleg, “NGOs say High Council of Justice destroys judicial reform,” dated 11 December 2019, found at <https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/ngos-say-high-council-of-justice-destroys-judicial-reform.html>.

126 Lough, John, “Is Ukraine about to cut the Gordian knot of judicial reform?” *Atlantic Council* (10 May 2021).

127 Law No. 1635-IX, dated 5 August 2021.

128 “Judicial reform in Ukraine: a short overview,” dated May 2022, found at <http://en.dejure.foundation/library/judicial-reform-in-ukraine-what-has-changed-for-the-last-three-years>.

129 “Tainted top judicial officials resign ahead of reform,” dated 20 January 2022, found at <https://kyivindependent.com/national/tainted-top-judicial-officials-resign-ahead-of-reform/>.

130 “Representatives of the Bar in the HCJ resigned because of disagreement with unconstitutional status restrictions,” dated 20 January 2022, found at <https://en.unba.org.ua/activity/news/7396-representatives-of-the-bar-in-the-hcj-resigned-because-of-disagreement-with-unconstitutional-status-restrictions.html>.

it had appointed. On February 22 – two days before the Russian invasion – ten members of the HCJ resigned.<sup>131</sup> Accordingly, the HCJ was left with only the President of the Supreme Court and four appointed members, later reduced to three when one was disqualified by the Ethics Council.<sup>132</sup>

Under Ukrainian law, the HCJ cannot exercise its powers unless it has at least fifteen sitting members.<sup>133</sup> However, with the imposition of martial law after the Russian invasion, the *Rada* passed an emergency law in mid-March transferring some of the powers of the non-functioning HCJ to the President of the Supreme Court.<sup>134</sup> These legislative changes, among other things, allowed the President of the Supreme Court to take some of the actions discussed above, such as changing the territorial jurisdictions of the courts in the occupied territories, referring cases from those courts to others that have the capacity, and reassigning judges from occupied territories to other courts.

However, these powers terminate 30 days after the end of martial law. Moreover, other important powers of the HCJ remain inoperative such as forming the HQCJ and recommending judicial appointments to the President. The HCJ's power to discipline or dismiss judges also remains blocked, even though currently more than 5,000 disciplinary complaints against judges are pending.<sup>135</sup>

Small steps have been taken to resolve some of these issues. The Ethics Council in February 2022 began interviews with candidates to replace resigned members of the HCJ.<sup>136</sup> When the war began on February 24, these interviews were temporarily suspended. In May 2022, the Ethics Council resumed its work and the Secretariat began accepting documents from candidates to be nominated to the HCJ by the Congress of Judges,<sup>137</sup> and these materials were forwarded to the Congress in mid-July 2022.<sup>138</sup> Nonetheless, the process drags on.<sup>139</sup>

If or when the relaunch of the HCJ will be completed remains uncertain. In the meantime, reports of judicial corruption continue.<sup>140</sup> Given their places in the hierarchy of Ukraine's anti-corruption and judicial appointment processes, the continuing controversies and foot-dragging in relaunching the HQCJ and HCJ will greatly hinder post-conflict efforts to rebuild the Ukrainian judiciary.

131 "Judicial reform in action: most members of the High Council of Justice have resigned," dated 22 February 2022, found at <https://en.dejure.foundation/tpost/m2ec3xumi1-judicial-reform-in-action-most-members-o>; "Oksana Blazhivska outlined the problems that are relevant for judicial governance bodies and courts," dated 15 July 2022, found at <https://court.gov.ua/press/news/1296167>.

132 "Judicial reform in Ukraine: a short overview," dated May 2022, found at <http://en.dejure.foundation/library/judicial-reform-in-ukraine-what-has-changed-for-the-last-three-years>; "GRP members call for the immediate resumption of the Council's mandate," dated 26 May 2022, found at <https://court.gov.ua/press/news/1278369/>.

133 "On the High Council of Justice," Law No. 1798-VIII, Article 131, dated 21 December 2016.

134 The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, "On Amendments to Section XII 'Final and Transitional Provisions' of the Law of Ukraine 'On the Judiciary and Status of Judges' on ensuring the sustainable functioning of the judiciary in the absence of the plenipotentiary composition of the High Council of Justice," dated 15 March 2022.

135 "GRP members call for the immediate resumption of the Council's mandate," dated 26 May 2022, found at <https://court.gov.ua/press/news/1278369/>. See also "Disciplinary responsibility of judges: Larisa Rogach noted the need to improve the disciplinary procedure," dated 15 July 2022, found at <https://supreme.court.gov.ua/supreme/pres-centr/news/1296301/>.

136 "The first day of the interviews to the High Council of Justice: one candidate withdrew, three explained their assets," dated 21 February 2022, found at <https://en.dejure.foundation/tpost/plvav7fz81-the-first-day-of-the-interviews-to-the-h>.

137 "Judicial reform in Ukraine: a short overview," dated May 2022, found at <http://en.dejure.foundation/library/judicial-reform-in-ukraine-what-has-changed-for-the-last-three-years>.

138 "The Secretariat of the VRP Handed Over the Documents Regarding All Candidates to the VRP under the Judge Quota," dated 15 July 2022, found at <https://pravo.ua/sekretariat-vrp-peredav-dokumenty-shchodo-vsikh-kandydativ-u-vrp-za-suddivskoiu-kvotoiu/>.

139 "How Ukraine will reboot the judicial system to European standards. Interview with deputy head of OP Andriy Smirnov," dated 11 July 2022, found at <https://su.court.gov.ua/tu19/pres-centr/news/1294053/>.

140 "6 thous. U.S. dollars for a positive court decision – the head of the city district court and a lawyer will be tried," dated 6 June 2022, found at [https://kyiv.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=314372&fp=60](https://kyiv.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=314372&fp=60).

## Prosecutors and the Rule of Law

In early 2016, one of Ukraine's top prosecutors resigned with a blistering condemnation of his profession: "Today, the General Prosecutor's office is a brake on the reform of criminal justice, a hotbed of corruption, an instrument of political pressure, one of the key obstacles to the arrival of foreign investment in Ukraine."<sup>141</sup> Prosecutors at the time wielded immense power in the Ukrainian legal system, as the country retained the model of the Soviet-era *prokuratura* that largely operated as an independent entity. Ukraine's prosecutor's offices in 2013 were swollen with more than 18,000 prosecutors.<sup>142</sup> Exasperated with the ongoing graft, Ukrainian reformers and international donors alike demanded institutional change.

### The Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office

One reform to the prosecution service was the creation of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO) to prosecute cases before the HACC. Reformers hoped that this independent agency, working with the investigators at the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) would bring integrity and commitment to pursuing the oligarchs and their henchmen behind much of the corruption in the country.

SAPO was formed in a timely fashion and began pursuing its anti-corruption agenda in earnest. When the head of the agency resigned in August 2020, an independent selection process to select a new SAPO head was commenced. However, the process has been constantly delayed.

A number of allegations have been raised concerning the reasons for the delay. In any event, in late December 2021, the SAPO selection commission failed to approve the clear winner of the selection competition on the same day that the entire selection process was invalidated by the Kyiv District Administrative Court.<sup>143</sup>

Throughout this time, SAPO continued to function under the direction of the deputy head of the Bureau. Russia's attacks on February 24 changed this dynamic. Materials relating to criminal proceedings, office files, valuable property, and servers were removed to a safe place. Some employees of SAPO and NABU moved to the Lviv Territorial Office, but most remained in Kyiv. While some top-level corruption investigations continued, the agencies shifted to work with military and security agencies to address threats arising from the war.<sup>144</sup>

Shortly after the Russian attacks began, the acting head of SAPO and 11 other employees sent their families west and joined the Kyiv Territorial Defense Forces.<sup>145</sup> A new acting head was appointed,<sup>146</sup> and the remaining staff continued to carry on SAPO's work, albeit under difficult conditions.<sup>147</sup> In mid-July 2022, President Zelenskyy acknowledged the importance of SAPO and

141 "Ukrainian prosecutor quits over corruption as government teeters," dated 15 February 2016, found at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-politics/ukrainian-prosecutor-quits-over-corruption-as-government-teeters-idUSKCN0V01I>.

142 De Waal, Thomas, "Fighting a Culture of Corruption in Ukraine," Carnegie Europe, dated 18 April 2016, found at <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/04/18/fighting-culture-of-corruption-in-ukraine-pub-63364>.

143 "As derailing of anti-graft prosecutor appointment continues, panel members appeal to Prosecutor General," dated 30 December 2021, found at <https://euromaidanpress.com/2021/12/30/as-derailing-of-anti-graft-prosecutor-appointment-continues-panel-members-appeal-to-prosecutor-general/>.

144 "NABU adapts to work under war conditions: discussion," dated 16 June 2022, found at <https://nabu.gov.ua/en/novyny/nabu-adapts-work-under-war-conditions-discussion>.

145 "Anti-Corruption Prosecutors Holding Molotov Cocktails," dated 13 March 2022, found at <https://www.slidstvo.info/english-stories/anti-corruption-prosecutors-holding-molotov-cocktails/>.

146 "Dovhan Becomes SACPO Acting Head," dated 18 April 2022, found at <https://ukranews.com/en/news/850567-dovhan-becomes-sacpo-acting-head>.

147 "NABU adapts to work under war conditions: discussion," dated 16 June 2022, found at <https://nabu.gov.ua/en/novyny/nabu-adapts-work-under-war-conditions-discussion>.

announced that he had instructed the Prime Minister “to intensify the process of launching the relevant competition” to fill the director’s position.<sup>148</sup>

Reports of high-level corruption continue to surface during the war.<sup>149</sup> And Western governments, who are pouring billions in aid into Ukraine continue to push for the country to renew its commitment to fighting corruption. The president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, urged Ukraine’s parliament to press forward with anti-corruption reforms. Pointing to SAPO, she told the lawmakers: “*You have created an impressive anti-corruption machine. But now these institutions need teeth, and the right people in senior posts.*”<sup>150</sup>

## Prosecutors and the 2019 Law

While SAPO was tasked with taking on high-level corruption, reform also was needed in the general prosecution service. Corruption among the prosecution service was viewed as widespread.<sup>151</sup>

After several prior unproductive efforts, President Zelenskyy in September 2019 signed a new law substantially replacing the then-existing prosecution service with new structures intended to bring about meaningful reform.<sup>152</sup> On one level, the changes were organizational. Mirroring the courts, a three-tiered structure was adopted with the Prosecutor General of Ukraine at the top, regional prosecutor’s offices in each *oblast*, and local prosecutor’s offices reporting to the regional prosecutor. This structure was separate from the Ministry of Justice, in many systems the power behind the prosecution service.

At the heart of the reforms, like the reform of the judiciary, was a vetting process referred to as “attestation.” All existing prosecutors in the country were required to undergo a comprehensive re-evaluation including integrity checks and tests of legal knowledge and general aptitude. In addition to increasing the integrity and competence in the Prosecution Service, the reforms had the stated goal of reducing the total number of prosecutors in Ukraine to less than 10,000, which is more in line with the *per capita* average of prosecutors in other European countries.<sup>153</sup>

Though the prosecutor’s attestation procedures suffered from some of the same ills as similar vetting processes for the judiciary, it moved forward with reasonable speed. The first stage – the “attestation” of the prosecutors in the Prosecutor General’s Office – concluded at the end of December 2019. Out of 1083 prosecutors in that office who underwent the certification process, 629 successfully passed. More than 700 additional prosecutors in the Prosecutor General’s Office either did not participate or did not meet other criteria, and were dismissed.<sup>154</sup>

The next stage, which involved attestations at the regional level, resulted in 2,647 of 3,697 prosecutors passing the test. Of the 6,130 local prosecutors taking part in the process, more than 4,671 passed. When the process was completed in Spring 2021, a total of 7,947 prosecutors

148 Zelenskyy Address.

149 “MOD’s auditor attempted bribery: case sent to court,” dated 1 July 2022, found at <https://nabu.gov.ua/en/novyny/mods-auditor-attempted-bribery-case-sent-court>.

150 “Address of President von der Leyen to the Ukrainian Parliament following the European Council decision granting Ukraine candidate status,” dated 1 July 2022, found at [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH\\_22\\_4253](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_22_4253).

151 See AntAC Report; “Whom and for what the High Anti-Corruption Court sentenced in two years of work?” dated 7 September 2021, found at <https://antac.org.ua/en/news/whom-and-for-what-the-high-anti-corruption-court-sentenced-in-two-years-of-work/>.

152 “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Priority Measures for the Reform of the Prosecutor’s Office,” Law No. 113-IX, dated 19 September 2019.

153 EU Advisory Mission to Ukraine, “Justice: Ukraine’s Prosecution Attestation Process reaches its final stage,” dated 14 May 2021, found at <https://www.euam-ukraine.eu/news/opinion/justice-ukraine-s-prosecution-attestation-process-reaches-its-final-stage/>.

154 Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, “Results of reforming the prosecutor’s office,” found at <https://gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/rezultati-reformuvannya-prokuraturi>.

had successfully passed the attestation process.<sup>155</sup> Though about 1,800 of the prosecutors who failed the process have sued, about one-third of Ukrainian prosecutors left the system during the process.<sup>156</sup>

During this same time, the planned organizational reforms were being implemented. The reorganized Office of the Prosecutor General started its work on January 2, 2020, and a Training Center of Prosecutors of Ukraine was established in Kyiv shortly thereafter. The new regional and district prosecutor's offices began working, respectively, on September 11, 2020 and March 15, 2021.<sup>157</sup>

While no comprehensive data has been located, prior to February 24, 2022, new regional offices had been established and prosecutors were working in all 24 *oblasts* plus the City of Kyiv.<sup>158</sup> Roughly 180 district offices had been established, and at least another 156 departmental offices were operational around the country.<sup>159</sup>

Data on the staffing of individual offices is scarce. It appears that of the approximately 8,000 prosecutors in Ukraine, somewhere in the neighborhood of 15% are attached to the national Prosecutor General's Office headquartered in Kyiv. Another 30% or so are assigned to regional prosecutor's offices, while the remainder are working in local district or departmental offices. No information has been located regarding the number of non-prosecutorial staff in these offices.

Available data from some regional offices provides insights. For example, data produced by the Zakarpattia Regional Prosecutor's Office indicated that the Regional Office was authorized to employ 76 prosecutors, but ten positions were vacant and another six prosecutors were on maternity leave. In addition to prosecutors, the office employed another 45 civil servants, maintenance, or other workers. Another 92 prosecutors were assigned to the five district prosecutor's offices, and 43 were located in outlying departmental offices.<sup>160</sup>

Information from the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Prosecutor's Office was similar. According to that data, the Office was authorized to hire a total of 264 employees, of which 183 were prosecutorial positions. Of the prosecutors, 69 were assigned to the regional prosecutor's office, while 114 were located in district or departmental prosecutor's offices. The Office reported that 13 of the prosecutorial positions were vacant, 10 prosecutors had been dismissed or retired during the year, and 11 new prosecutors had been added.<sup>161</sup>

While not definitive, these data suggest that the majority of prosecutors in a region were assigned to work in the district or departmental offices, while roughly 35-40% worked in the main regional prosecutor's office.

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<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>156</sup> Venediktova, Iryna, "A new vision for Ukraine's Prosecution Service," *Atlantic Council* (May 13, 2021). However, this data does not take into account those prosecutors who had not yet completed the attestation process for various reasons.

<sup>157</sup> Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, "History of the prosecutor's office," found at <https://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/istoriya-prokuraturi>.

<sup>158</sup> Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, "Sites of regional prosecutor's offices," found at <https://gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/sajti-oblasnih-prokuratur>.

<sup>159</sup> Annex 3. However, no information has been located from ten *oblasts* regarding the existence or locations of any departmental offices.

<sup>160</sup> Zakarpattia Region Prosecutor's Office, "The structure of the regional prosecutor's office," found at <https://zak.gp.gov.ua/ua/structure.html>.

<sup>161</sup> Ivano-Frankivsk Region Prosecutor's Office, "Information on the results of the activities of the prosecutor's office of Ivano-Frankivsk region in 2021," found at [https://ifr.gp.gov.ua/userfiles/file/informaciya\\_pro\\_rezultati\\_diyalnosti\\_organiv\\_prokuraturi\\_ivano\\_frankivskoyi\\_oblasti\\_u\\_2021\\_roci.pdf](https://ifr.gp.gov.ua/userfiles/file/informaciya_pro_rezultati_diyalnosti_organiv_prokuraturi_ivano_frankivskoyi_oblasti_u_2021_roci.pdf).

## Prosecutors and the War

When Russian forces invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the “new” prosecutors’ service was just getting on its feet. The attestation process for prosecutors had been completed only a year earlier, and the judicial challenges to those proceedings were finding some success. Frontline regional and district offices had been operational for about that same amount of time. During most of that time, the pandemic substantially impacted the ability of prosecutors to work, interact, and train.

As with the courts, the havoc caused by the Russian aggression had substantial impacts on Ukraine’s prosecutors:

**Damage to Physical Infrastructure:** Official information on damage and destruction of prosecutors’ offices is unavailable. However, more than 40% of those offices were in the nine *oblasts* that suffered the heaviest attacks by Russian forces.<sup>162</sup> Anecdotal evidence indicates that like many public buildings, prosecutors’ offices have been hard hit in some of these areas.<sup>163</sup> Given the magnitude of destruction and the history of looting by Russian forces, logic suggests that such damage has been significant.

**Displacement.** Like judges and other citizens, the immediate response of many prosecutors was to protect their families. Though no current data is available, as of December 31, 2018, slightly less than 40% of prosecutors were female.<sup>164</sup> Given the Ukrainian government’s restrictions on travel by adult males, the burden of taking families to safer locations fell on women.

Anecdotal reports confirm the obvious. In areas under siege or where heavy combat is occurring, some prosecutors left the area, while others have stayed. The pace of work has slowed, both because fewer crimes are being reported and damage to infrastructure makes any task more difficult and time-consuming.<sup>165</sup>

Certainly, Ukraine’s experience during the fighting in the Donbas beginning in 2014 offers some troubling comparisons. There, many prosecutors’ offices in the Donetsk and Luhansk *oblasts* were chronically understaffed due to sustained combat operations in residential areas resulting in population displacement, threats to personal security, and the loss of personal property.<sup>166</sup> Whether similar patterns will be seen when the current conflict ends in the rest of Ukraine is unclear.

**Enlistment.** No definitive data have been located concerning the number of prosecutors who joined the Ukrainian military. Some prosecutors unquestionably have enlisted, though apparently not in large numbers. For example, data from the Ivano-Frankivsk and Zakarpattia *oblasts* indicates that around 2% of the prosecutors in those regions enlisted.<sup>167</sup> Under the circumstances, while enlistments may cause some attrition, they likely will not be a major factor in maintaining the workforce in prosecutors’ offices.

162 Annex 3.

163 See, e.g., “Few civilians, charred buildings in Ukraine’s Lysychansk after capture by Russia,” dated 5 July 2022, found at <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/few-civilians-charred-buildings-ukraines-lysyhansk-after-capture-by-russia-2022-07-05/>.

164 Council of Europe, *Evaluation of the judicial systems (2018 – 2020) Ukraine*, p. 25 (2020).

165 “‘The war has made its own adjustments’: Interview with the Deputy Prosecutor of the Mykolaiv region,” dated 2 April 2022, found at <https://news.pn/ru/RussiaInvadedUkraine/269970>.

166 Kulbida, p. 11.

167 Ivano-Frankivsk Region Prosecutors’ Office, “Information on the results of the activities of the prosecutor’s office of Ivano-Frankivsk region in 2021,” found at [https://ifr.gp.gov.ua/userfiles/file/informaciya\\_pro\\_rezultati\\_diyalnosti\\_organiv\\_prokuraturi\\_ivano frankivskoyi\\_oblasti\\_u\\_2021\\_roci.pdf](https://ifr.gp.gov.ua/userfiles/file/informaciya_pro_rezultati_diyalnosti_organiv_prokuraturi_ivano frankivskoyi_oblasti_u_2021_roci.pdf); Zakarpattia Region Prosecutor’s Office, “The structure of the regional prosecutor’s office,” found at <https://zak.gp.gov.ua/ua/structure.html>.

**Detention by Russian Forces.** As Ukrainian government officials, prosecutors undoubtedly have been targeted by Russian forces when they occupied areas of the country. Most likely for security reasons, however, the Ukrainian government has not made any public announcements regarding such detentions.

**Defection.** During the first months of the war, the issue of defection and collaboration among the prosecution services bubbled just below the surface. A few anecdotal instances were reported, such as allegations that the head of one of the district prosecutor's offices in the Mykolayiv *Oblast* had systematically leaked information to the Russians in the hopes that he would be allowed to continue working in the prosecutor's office if the enemy captured the region.<sup>168</sup>

However, in mid-July 2022, President Zelenskyy announced that he was replacing the Prosecutor General due to serious concerns about the loyalty of individuals under her supervision. He announced that, as of July 17, 651 criminal investigations had been commenced regarding high treason and collaborative activities of employees of prosecutor's offices, pretrial investigation bodies, and other law enforcement agencies. In 198 of those proceedings, individuals had been formally notified that they were under suspicion. Equally concerning, more than 60 employees of prosecutor's offices and the state security service had remained occupied territories and were working with the Russians.<sup>169</sup> While it is unclear precisely how many prosecutors were involved in these alleged activities, the President's actions make it clear that he was deeply concerned about the allegations of prosecutorial disloyalty.

## New Challenges for Prosecutors

Prosecuting cases in a war zone, both during and after the conflict, presents significant challenges for a prosecution corps. The intensity and nature of the Russian assault has amplified these challenges in Ukraine.

**Processing Cases.** For prosecutors handling cases from areas that are occupied or involved in active combat, the conflict has greatly complicated the processing of individual cases. Files were lost when courts and prosecution offices ceased to function, and danger levels precluded retrieving them. As reflected in the experience in the Donbas after 2014, files were lost when court facilities were destroyed by shelling, or were stolen by the Russian-separatist armed groups, vandals, or parties against which claims were pending. Without the case files, prosecutors were placed in the untenable position of having to drop cases against suspects or to revoke pending convictions.<sup>170</sup>

With the imposition of martial law in 2022, prosecutors have been given enhanced powers in handling cases. For example, prosecutors have expanded powers to require pretrial detention, previously matters that required the involvement of an investigating judge. Prosecutors also have been given decision-making authority on a variety of issues related to access to documents and other evidence, the search or seizure of property, and the utilization of certain covert investigative techniques.<sup>171</sup>

168 Embassy of Ukraine in the USA, "War Bulletin," dated 5 April 2022, found at <https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/ukraine-war-bulletin-april-5-530-pm-est>.

169 Zelenskyy address.

170 Kulbida, p. 5

171 Gvozdiy; "Features of criminal proceedings during martial law," dated 29 June 2022, found at <https://Radako.com.ua/news/osoblivosti-kriminalnogo-provadjhennya-pid-chas-voienogo-stanu>; "Procedural aspects: problematic issues of pre-trial investigation and court proceedings under martial law," dated 14 July 2022, found at <https://supreme.court.gov.ua/supreme/pres-centr/news/1295799>.

**Threats and Intimidation.** Violence begets violence. Even in peacetime, prosecutors face threats from suspects, convicted persons, and their cohorts. Such risks are magnified in wartime when weaponry is readily available and norms against violence are weakened.

Threats come from both sides of the conflict. Prosecutors handling cases against those allied with Russian forces face not only personal intimidation, but also threats against their relatives in occupied areas.<sup>172</sup> They may also be at risk from right-wing extremists or other Ukrainian “patriots” who either demand retribution against their perceived enemies or absolution for themselves and their colleagues, regardless of the evidence. Again using the experience after 2014 in the Donbas as a benchmark, a 2018 survey showed that 53 percent of prosecutors in Donetsk and Luhansk *oblasts* believed that the Ukrainian government did not take into account political sensitivities and personal security risks attendant to working in armed conflict and enemy-occupied areas.<sup>173</sup>

**Prosecution during Wartime.** While prosecutors currently working in Ukraine continue to handle “routine” crimes, their caseloads are also laden with matters seldom seen during peacetime. At the forefront of these offenses are alleged war crimes committed by Russian troops and their allies. Prosecutors now spend countless hours in training and later documenting thousands of such alleged atrocities. In areas where the hostilities are or have been intense, prosecutors are spending substantial amounts of time documenting war crimes,<sup>174</sup> in some instances to the detriment of other work.<sup>175</sup>

War crimes investigations have arisen far from the primary combat zones. For example, prosecutors from the Kyiv *oblast* are conducting investigations in western Ukraine, interviewing refugees who have sought shelter far from the frontlines.<sup>176</sup> Even prosecutors assigned to the relatively peaceful central and western regions are drawn into investigating allegations of war crimes that occurred in distant areas,<sup>177</sup> or handling alleged, albeit isolated, war crimes in their own jurisdictions.<sup>178</sup>

Though often garnering international headlines, war crimes investigations involving enemy forces are not the only “new” offenses that prosecutors are now handling. With the imposition of martial law, legislation was enacted to make changes to pre-trial investigation and criminal proceedings, abolish criminal liability for certain crimes, create new offenses and, in some cases, increase sentences.<sup>179</sup>

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172 KuIbida, p. 6.

173 *Id.*, p. 7.

174 *See, e.g.*, “Mortar shelling by the Russian military of Sumy region – a pre-trial investigation is underway,” dated 19 June 2022, found at <https://gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/minometni-obstrili-rosiiskimi-viiskovimi-sumshhini-provodit-sya-dosudove-rozsliduvannya>; “Prosecutors have documented another crime committed by the Russian military in the Kharkiv region,” dated 7 June 2022, found at <https://gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/prokurori-zadokumentovali-cer-govii-zlocin-rosiiskix-viiskovix-na-xarkivshhini>.

175 *See, e.g.*, “‘The war has made its own adjustments’: Interview with the Deputy Prosecutor of the Mykolaiv region,” dated 2 April 2022, found at <https://news.pn/ru/RussiaInvadedUkraine/269970>.

176 “Meet the Ukrainians documenting Russian war crimes, in real-time,” dated 19 May 2022, found at <https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraines-sprawling-unprecedented-campaign-to-document-russian-war-crimes/>.

177 *See, e.g.*, “War crimes: Prosecutors of Kirovohrad region continue to collect evidence of armed aggression of the Russian Federation,” dated 20 May 2022, found at [https://kir.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=313714&fp=30](https://kir.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=313714&fp=30).

178 *See, e.g.*, “For the first time since the beginning of the war, Russia launched a missile strike on Transcarpathia – an investigation has been launched,” dated 4 May 2022, found at [https://zak.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=313069&fp=110](https://zak.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=313069&fp=110).

179 Gvozdiy.

Many of these investigations involve accusations against Ukrainians. Some alleged offenses, such as treason<sup>180</sup> or draft evasion<sup>181</sup> are recognizable. However, in March 2022, the *Rada* created a new offense of “collaborationism” which imposed criminal liability for cooperation with the aggressor state in the information, educational, political, military, administrative, economic, and labor spheres.<sup>182</sup> Among the most difficult challenges for prosecutors to determine is whether to charge those who remained in their official positions in occupied territories after the Russian invasion. Is a public servant who continues to perform his or her apolitical duties after occupation nonetheless a collaborator?<sup>183</sup>

In addition to collaboration, the *Rada* criminalized and allowed the seizure of assets based on other actions including:

- Justification, recognition as lawful, or denial of the armed aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine as well as glorification of its participants;
- Dissemination of information concerning the location of weapons, equipment, and soldiers;
- Incitement of regional hatred;
- Defamation of soldiers’ honor and dignity, and threats against soldiers; and
- Illegal use of humanitarian aid.<sup>184</sup>

The widespread use of social media has meant that hundreds of Ukrainians have been accused of being part of “Russia world.” Prosecutors using these laws have charged them for social media posts legitimizing or glorifying the Russian invasion, expressing support for President Putin, or accusing Ukrainians as being “Russophobic” or fascists.<sup>185</sup>

**Staffing Prosecutor’s Offices.** In the aftermath of the hostilities in the Donbas in 2014, survey results suggested that the number of employees significantly decreased in prosecutors’ offices in the area.<sup>186</sup> When the current hostilities began in February 2022, the dramatic push to cleanse and reduce the size of the prosecution service was already playing out. The large number of personal and professional issues facing them as a result of the war may present major challenges in retaining a sufficient number of skilled, professional, and loyal prosecutors.

180 “15 years in prison for switching to the side of the enemy – the prosecutor’s office has achieved the maximum punishment for treason,” dated 4 May 2022, found at [https://vin.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=313055&fp=60](https://vin.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=313055&fp=60).

181 “Organization of illegal crossing of the state border by conscripts for 8,000 euros – suspected resident of Bukovina,” dated 23 June 2022, found at [https://chnr.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=315191&fp=30](https://chnr.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=315191&fp=30).

182 Gvozdiy.

183 See “‘A difficult and painful question’: Ukraine ponders how to punish collaborators,” dated 4 June 2022, found at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/04/ukraine-collaborators-treason-russia-war>.

184 “The Key Legislative Changes : What has changed in criminal law and procedure in 2022?” dated 9 June 2022, found at <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=83d10eb2-cede-4417-9a3f-9a535949585f>. See also, “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Improving the Effectiveness of Sanctions Related to Assets of Individuals,” Law No. 2257-IX, dated 12 May 12, 2022.

185 See, e.g., “In the Carpathian region arrested an Internet agitator who published anti-Ukrainian posts and justified the aggression of the Russian Federation,” dated 31 May 2022, found at [https://ifr.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=314114&fp=54](https://ifr.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=314114&fp=54); “Publicly approved the armed aggression of Russia and the actions of Putin – the prosecutor’s office once again charged for pro-Russian propaganda,” dated 3 May 2022, found at [https://vin.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=313004&fp=60](https://vin.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=313004&fp=60).

186 Kufbida, p. 12.

## Lawyers in Wartime

*On February 28, 2022, as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Pavlove Pole micro district in Kharkiv was hit by Grad rockets. My apartment, where I lived with two minor children, was partially damaged. The windows were blown out. Damaged heating. Now I have to leave the city of Kharkiv with my elderly parents and minor children to a village in order to at least provide my loved ones with a warm home. I have no livelihood...*

Lawyer from Kharkiv region<sup>187</sup>

Some stories are inspiring: lawyers abandoning their law practices to take up arms and fight Russian aggression.<sup>188</sup> Other vignettes are heartrending with descriptions of chaos and the tearing apart of families.<sup>189</sup> Like all Ukrainian citizens, those in the legal profession have dealt with massive changes to their way of life as a result of the recent attacks. As the conflict drags on, the profession itself faces numerous hurdles in moving the country closer to a democratic state governed by the rule of law.

### Advokats and Lawyers

Like the systems in a number of former Soviet states, the legal profession in Ukraine is not a unified body. Rather, the profession is split into two groups:

- Licensed law graduates who can represent individuals and businesses in courts on all matters (often called *advokats*); and
- Unlicensed law graduates who are allowed to give legal advice and represent clients in civil, family, or labor (but not criminal) matters in court.

While *advokats* must hold a master's degree in law and meet additional requirements to become licensed, unlicensed practitioners may provide legal services with only a bachelor's or lesser degree in law (see following chapter). Although no official statistics are available, it is estimated that there are several hundred thousand unlicensed legal practitioners in Ukraine.<sup>190</sup>

Since unlicensed legal practitioners, by definition, are not required to belong to any official body, there is no central organization governing or providing information regarding such persons. One voluntary national organization, the Union of Lawyers of Ukraine, publicizes that its membership consists of more than 100,000 individual members plus nearly as many lawyers from institutional and organizational members.<sup>191</sup> Though the organization continues to operate,<sup>192</sup> it does not appear particularly active.

187 "International Charitable Assistance for UNBA during martial law," dated 30 June 2022, found at [https://unba.org.ua/assets/uploads/7832054cdf7c94b36320\\_file.pdf](https://unba.org.ua/assets/uploads/7832054cdf7c94b36320_file.pdf) ("UNBA Assistance.")

188 See, e.g., "Ukraine lawyer-turned-soldier: 'We will fight for each street,'" dated 8 March 2022, found at <https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/ukraine-lawyer-turned-soldier-we-will-fight-each-street-2022-03-08/>; "From the frontline: from lawyer to soldier," dated 6 April 2022, found at <https://www.rnz.co.nz/national/programmes/ninetonoon/audio/2018837187/from-the-frontline-from-lawyer-to-soldier>.

189 See, e.g., "In Ukraine, Lawyers With Ukrainian Bar Association and NYSBA Chapter Help Refugees to Safety, or Take Up Arms in the Streets," dated 21 March 2022, found at <https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2022/03/21/in-ukraine-lawyers-with-ukrainian-bar-association-and-nysba-chapter-help-refugees-to-safety-or-take-up-arms-in-the-streets/>; "Refugee lawyer describes harrowing invasion of Ukraine," dated 14 April 2022, found at <https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/at-aba-panel-refugee-lawyer-describes-harrowing-invasion-of-ukraine>.

190 ICJ Report, p. 12.

191 See "History of SUU," found at <https://lawyersunion.org.ua/istoriya-syuu/>.

192 "A plenary session of the executive governing body - the Council of the Union of Lawyers of Ukraine - took place," dated 17 November 2021, found at <https://lawyersunion.org.ua/vidbulosya-plenarne-zasidannya-vykonavcho-go-kerivnogo-organu-rady-soyuzu-yurystiv-ukrayiny/>.

Licensed lawyers in Ukraine, or *advokats*, are subject to the “Law on the Bar and Practice of Law,” adopted in 2012.<sup>193</sup> The 2012 Law established the principle that all *advokats* would be required to be members and subject to the authority of the Bar Council of Ukraine and a variety of subsidiary entities. Licensing of *advokats*, however, is handled by self-governing bar councils at the *oblast* (regional) level.

Unfortunately, implementation of the Law was hamstrung by ongoing infighting within the *advokats*’ ranks.<sup>194</sup> By late 2021, however, this rancor seemingly had somewhat dissipated as the Ukrainian National Bar Association (UNBA) emerged as the pre-eminent professional organization for *advokats*.

The UNBA is organized as a self-governing, non-governmental organization that has effectively assumed and exercises many of the functions of the Bar Council of Ukraine.<sup>195</sup> For example, though the 2016 Law specifies that the Bar Council of Ukraine will manage the master list of all licensed *advokats* in the country known as the Unified Register of Attorneys of Ukraine (URAU), the UNBA has assumed that function.

The activities of the UNBA, though seen as progress by many, nonetheless have been subject to ongoing criticism.<sup>196</sup> For example, the UNBA joined forces with other groups opposed to the creation of a Selection Commission to reform the HCJ, and recommended that the Bar-appointed members to the body resign.<sup>197</sup> Recent proposed amendments to the Law intended to strengthen the powers of the leadership of the UNBA, including increasing the powers of and abolition of term limitations for the longtime president of the organization, are continuing to stir controversy even during the current conflict.<sup>198</sup>

A voluntary organizations for lawyers, the Ukraine Bar Association (UBA), was formed in 2002 and continues to operate. Claiming a membership of over 6,000 lawyers,<sup>199</sup> the UBA on occasion offers alternative perspectives to the positions taken by the UNBA.<sup>200</sup>

## The Legal Profession Before the Conflict

Prior to the Russian attacks beginning in February 2022, the Ukrainian legal profession faced several long-standing problems:

**Too Many Lawyers.** A major dilemma for the Ukrainian justice system has been an oversupply of individuals offering legal services, coupled with a lack of effective qualification and disciplinary controls over those individuals. As mentioned above, there are no “controls” on the quality and integrity of those offering legal services unless they seek to become licensed *advokats*.

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193 Law No 5076-VI, dated 5 July 2012.

194 ICJ Report, pp. 12–14.

195 Ukrainian National Bar Association, “System of the Bar Self-Government Bodies in Ukraine,” found at <https://en.unba.org.ua/unba>.

196 See United States Agency for International Development, Agency for Legislative Initiatives, *The Bar of Ukraine: the Lessons Learned from the Early Years of Self-Governance* (Kyiv 2018).

197 “Representatives of the Bar in the HCJ resigned because of disagreement with unconstitutional status restrictions,” dated 20 January 2022, found at <https://en.unba.org.ua/activity/news/7396-representatives-of-the-bar-in-the-hcj-resigned-because-of-disagreement-with-unconstitutional-status-restrictions.html>.

198 See Letter from Ukraine Bar Association to the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Economic Development, dated 6 May 2022.

199 See “About APU,” found at <https://2022.uba.ua/aboutuba/>.

200 See Letter from Ukraine Bar Association to the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Economic Development, dated 6 May 2022.

Even though there were several hundred thousand legal practitioners in Ukraine, as of December 14, 2020, only 58,999 advocates were registered on the Unified Register of Attorneys of Ukraine (URAU).<sup>201</sup> Moreover, of that number, 14,814 *advokats* (or 25%) were listed as suspended or terminated.<sup>202</sup> Such individuals could not represent criminal clients in court, but otherwise could continue their work as lawyers. In other words, as of December 2020, only 44,185 legal professionals were officially licensed to practice as *advokats*.<sup>203</sup> The remaining legal practitioners remained outside the *advokat* system of licensing and discipline.

Nor was the problem easing. One report stated that in the year prior to 2020, an estimated 10,659 individuals graduated with Masters of Law degrees from Ukrainian institutions.<sup>204</sup> While 5,329 professionals were added to the URAU between December 2019 and December 2020,<sup>205</sup> during that same time 3,681 *advokats* had their right to practice law suspended or terminated.<sup>206</sup> In short, though incremental progress was being made to increase the number of licensed legal practitioners subject to quality and disciplinary controls by the Bar, the number of those able to offer legal services outside that system remained staggering.

**Corruption.** Not surprisingly, legal professionals have been part of the corruption that has permeated the Ukrainian justice system. One aspect of this problem has been the participation of lawyers in the corrupt schemes to influence the courts and the outcome of cases.<sup>207</sup> The perception of corruption in the legal profession is widespread, and occasionally acknowledged.<sup>208</sup>

Unlike the judiciary and prosecutors, however, the organized Bar did not implement any mechanism to vet its members. *Advokats* are subject to criminal laws and, on occasion, are charged with corruption-related crimes.<sup>209</sup> Disciplinary proceedings are seldom invoked for corruption-related activities, and anti-corruption critics/reformers within the Bar have faced resistance.<sup>210</sup>

Another aspect of corruption has been allegations of corruption in the admission of new *advokats* for registration on the URAU. As one report noted, corruption risks increase significantly when a large number of lawyers are seeking a license to practice as an *advokat*.<sup>211</sup> Given the large numbers of legal professionals in Ukraine, obtaining a license as an *advokat* is not only a professional privilege, but a financial prize.

201 Ukrainian National Bar Association, *Annual Report for 2020*, p. 7 (Kyiv, 2021).

202 *Id.*, p. 8.

203 *Ibid.*

204 Mudruk, Sergey, *The only professional entrance test in the context of the analysis of regulatory influences and the effectiveness of the educational service*, p. 76, Kyiv: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2021.

205 Ukrainian National Bar Association, *Annual Report for 2020*, p. 7 (Kyiv, 2021).

206 *Id.*, p. 118.

207 See AntAC Report; “Whom and for what the High Anti-Corruption Court sentenced in two years of work?” dated 7 September 2021, found at <https://antac.org.ua/en/news/whom-and-for-what-the-high-anti-corruption-court-sentenced-in-two-years-of-work/>.

208 ICJ Report, p. 18.

209 See AntAC Report; “Exposed a lawyer who demanded from the client 77 thousand rubles. UAH for influence on patrol police officers,” dated 10 June 2022, found at [https://kyiv.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=314577&fp=40](https://kyiv.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=314577&fp=40); “6 thous. U.S. dollars for a positive court decision – the head of the city district court and a lawyer will be tried,” dated 6 June 2022, found at [https://kyiv.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=314372&fp=60](https://kyiv.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=314372&fp=60); “A lawyer has been notified of suspicion,” dated 24 June 2022, found at [https://chk.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=315268&fp=20](https://chk.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=315268&fp=20).

210 “The draft law, that preserves the leadership of the Ukrainian National Bar Association and threatens judicial reform, was registered in the Verkhovna Rada,” dated 18 February 2022, found at <http://en.dejure.foundation/tpost/h89b70a611-the-draft-law-that-preserves-the-leaders>.

211 United States Agency for International Development, Agency for Legislative Initiatives, *The Bar of Ukraine: the Lessons Learned from the Early Years of Self-Governance*, p. 18 (Kyiv 2018).

In order to become licensed, a graduate holding a Master of Laws degree must serve an unpaid internship under, or be hired as an assistant lawyer by, a licensed *advokat*. However, under the 2016 Law, the qualification procedures and issuance of a certificate to practice as an *advokat* are controlled by regional bar councils. In the past, there have been allegations of corruption in this process.<sup>212</sup> In one 2018 survey, more than 47% of attorney-respondents were aware of instances where attorneys seeking to qualify made corrupt proposals to those handling the qualification process, and almost 38% were aware of corrupt proposals made to candidates by those handling the qualification process.<sup>213</sup> Despite calls for standardized national exams for Master's graduates, the UNBA has stated that it is "categorically opposed" to substituting such a standardized exam for bar exams.<sup>214</sup>

A related issue has been the use abuse of disciplinary proceedings, particularly against lawyers who were participating in "parallel" associations of lawyers. While recent reports indicate that abusive disciplinary proceedings are no longer common, the use of such proceedings to threaten the livelihoods of dissident lawyers has worried a number of observers.<sup>215</sup>

**Intimidation.** Another significant issue impacting the Ukrainian legal profession are attacks on lawyers involved in the defense of clients in politically sensitive criminal cases.<sup>216</sup> The UNBA reported more than 2,500 attacks on lawyers from 2014–2018 including:

- 9 murders;
- 6 attempted murders;
- 144 cases of criminal prosecution of lawyers;
- 41 cases of physical violence against lawyers;
- 150 cases of destruction of lawyers' property;
- 983 cases of searches of lawyers' premises;
- 16 cases of secret investigative actions against lawyers;
- 31 cases of interrogation of lawyers as witnesses;
- 1378 cases of interference and obstruction of lawful activities of lawyers.<sup>217</sup>

Reports have described efforts to influence the outcome of cases through intimidation or actual physical attacks.<sup>218</sup> Individuals told of court hearings in which judges, lawyers, litigants, and families were attacked in the courtroom.<sup>219</sup> Some of these attacks were committed by law enforcement officers, who physically assaulted lawyers in local police departments, their own offices, or before witnesses and clients to intimidate the lawyer. Intimidation efforts have even led to the eventual arrest of lawyers.<sup>220</sup>

212 See, e.g., "KDKA members of Kyiv region organized a corruption scheme for obtaining a lawyer's certificate, - military prosecutor's office," dated 13 October 2018, found at [https://antikor.com.ua/articles/263880-chleni\\_kdka\\_kijivskoji\\_oblasti\\_organizovali\\_koruptsijnu\\_shemu\\_otrimannja\\_svidotstva\\_advokata\\_-\\_vijs](https://antikor.com.ua/articles/263880-chleni_kdka_kijivskoji_oblasti_organizovali_koruptsijnu_shemu_otrimannja_svidotstva_advokata_-_vijs); "In Ternopil exposed the corruption 'scheme' of obtaining a lawyer's certificate," dated 14 December 2018, found at <https://ternopil.depo.ua/ukr/ternovpol/u-ternopoli-vikrili-korupciynu-shemu-oderzhannya-advokatskogo-posvidchennya-foto-20181214886392>.

213 United States Agency for International Development, Agency for Legislative Initiatives, *The Bar of Ukraine: the Lessons Learned from the Early Years of Self-Governance*, p. 34 (Kyiv 2018). See also, ICJ Report, p. 18.

214 "Legal education in Ukraine calls for reform, goals contested," dated 16 December 2019, found at <https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/legal-education-in-ukraine-calls-for-reform-goals-contested.html>.

215 ICJ Report, p. 19.

216 United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, *Ukraine 2021 Human Rights Report*, pp. 14–15 (Washington: April 2022).

217 Committee for the Protection of Lawyers' Rights and Guarantees of Advocacy, Ukraine National Bar Association, *Violations of the rights of lawyers in Ukraine in 2014–2018*, dated 19 December 2019, found at [https://unba.org.ua/assets/uploads/news/UNBA\\_Zahyst\\_Prav\\_2019.pdf](https://unba.org.ua/assets/uploads/news/UNBA_Zahyst_Prav_2019.pdf).

218 ICJ Report, pp. 26–27.

219 *Id.*, pp. 25–26; "Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine," UN Doc A/HRC/40/CRP 3, dated 16 November 2018 to 15 February 2019, ¶166.

220 ICJ Report, p. 28.

Other attacks have been carried out by far-right Ukrainian groups. Operating mostly in Kyiv and other large cities, these far-right groups portray themselves as NGOs protecting the “Ukrainians” and “looking for traitors.” In addition to attacking individual lawyers, these groups also have obstructed Bar Association activities.<sup>221</sup>

In the months prior to February 2022, some efforts were being made by the Ukrainian government to reduce the intimidation of lawyers and other judicial officials.<sup>222</sup> However, these concerns remained when the Russian aggression began.

## Lawyers and the War

The chaos created by the Russian aggression has impacted legal professionals throughout Ukraine in much the same fashion as other citizens. At the same time, the particular circumstances of legal professionals created some issues unique to the profession.

**Displacement.** No statistics have been located concerning the numbers of lawyers who have been physically displaced by the war. Nine *oblasts* have borne the brunt of the Russian attacks: Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Mykolayiv, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava.<sup>223</sup> Stories of violence suffered by *advokats* in those areas mirror the general suffering of the Ukrainian people.<sup>224</sup>

Though definitive numbers are unavailable, other data provide some context. Approximately 25,000 (or about 40%) of the Ukrainian *advokats* registered in the URAU as able to practice as of December 2020 were licensed in those nine *oblasts*.<sup>225</sup> When the *advokats* are added from the City of Kyiv, where large numbers of citizens fled in the opening days of the hostilities, the number rises to 50% of all those registered on the URAU.<sup>226</sup> While not all *advokats* fled those areas, and some have returned, the displacement within the Bar has been significant.<sup>227</sup>

One estimate is that 30% of Ukraine’s law firms have shut down since the war began.<sup>228</sup> Some efforts have begun to assist the displaced lawyers maintain their practices. For example, the Dnipropetrovsk *Oblast* Bar Council opened offices for *advokats* from other regions whose cases had been transferred to courts in Dnipropetrovsk *Oblast*.<sup>229</sup>

This chaos also has affected bar organizations. Like many organizations within Ukraine, bar associations shifted from providing routine services for their members to becoming clearinghouses of information and assistance for the hundreds of thousands of refugees – including many of their own members – fleeing the fighting.<sup>230</sup>

221 *Id.*, pp. 26–28.

222 “Ukraine’s youngest Law Enforcement Agency kicks off its communication strategy,” dated 21 October 2021, found at <https://www.euam-ukraine.eu/news/ukraine-s-youngest-law-enforcement-agency-kicks-off-its-communication-strategy/>.

223 Annex 1.

224 UNBA Assistance.

225 Annex 5.

226 See “Ukrainian Lawyers Share Tales Of War And Ways To Help,” dated 8 April 2022, found at <https://www.law360.com/pulse/in-house/articles/1480686/ukrainian-lawyers-share-tales-of-war-and-ways-to-help>.

227 See “Women Lawyers at War: Volunteerism as a Panacea,” dated 30 May 2022, found at <https://uba.ua/ukr/news/9242/>.

228 “Ukrainian Lawyers Share Tales Of War And Ways To Help,” dated 8 April 2022, found at <https://www.law360.com/pulse/in-house/articles/1480686/ukrainian-lawyers-share-tales-of-war-and-ways-to-help>.

229 “Offices for lawyers from other regions are opening in Dnipro and Kryvyi Rih,” dated 15 March 2022, found at <https://advokaty.dp.ua/u-dnipri-ta-kryvomu-rozi-vidkryvayutsya-robotchi-kabinety-dlya-advokativ-z-in-shyh-regioniv/>.

230 “In Ukraine, Lawyers With Ukrainian Bar Association and NYSBA Chapter Help Refugees to Safety, or Take Up Arms in the Streets,” dated 21 March 2022, found at <https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2022/03/21/in-ukraine-lawyers-with-ukrainian-bar-association-and-nysba-chapter-help-refugees-to-safety-or-take-up-arms-in-the-streets/>.

**Enlistment.** Prior to the Russian attacks in February 2022, *advokats* could lose their license by joining the Ukrainian military. In early March 2022, the Bar Council of Ukraine removed that restriction, so that *advokats* could enlist without losing their right to practice.<sup>231</sup>

While specific data is not available on the number of lawyers serving in the Ukrainian military, anecdotes abound.<sup>232</sup> A report from the UNBA indicates that dozens of *advokats* joined the Armed Forces.<sup>233</sup> Based on other informal reports, it appears that hundreds of interns, assistant attorneys, and other legal professionals have joined the Armed Forces and territorial defense forces.<sup>234</sup> An unknown number have been killed.<sup>235</sup>

**Remaining in the Occupied Territories.** Apart from anecdotes, little is known about the fate of lawyers living in areas now occupied by Russian forces or their allies. While current data is unavailable, Ukraine's history from the areas in the Donbas occupied in 2014 may provide a guide. Studies from those areas reflect that a significant number of lawyers working in Donetsk and Luhansk *oblasts* moved to government-controlled regions after the Russian occupation.<sup>236</sup>

At the same time, some did not flee. Both the Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) and the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) established lawyers' self-governing bodies and adopted legislation regulating the legal profession within their legal systems. Beginning in 2015, Ukrainian lawyers could "renew" their licenses in those territories. According to one report, around 300 lawyers registered with the new Bar organization in the DPR, while 90 lawyers registered in the LPR.<sup>237</sup> By way of contrast, as of December 2020, the URAU listed 2884 *advokats* with active licenses in the Donetsk *Oblast*, and 701 *advokats* with active licenses in the Luhansk *Oblast*.<sup>238</sup> Not surprisingly, reports indicate that lawyers who stayed in Russian-controlled territories after 2014 were subject to intimidation, and received little support from these new bar associations.<sup>239</sup>

In other words, while a large number of lawyers quit the profession or fled the occupied territories in 2014, somewhere in the range of 10% remained, accepted the new terms, and continued to practice. Some of these decisions no doubt were ideological, while others likely were more pragmatic based on family or other considerations. Time will tell whether similar ratios will be seen in the territories newly occupied during the current conflict.

231 "Completion of military service does not violate requirements regarding incompatibility with the status of a lawyer," dated 1 April 2022, found at <http://osav.vn.ua/2022/04/01/2022-04-01-viyskova-slugba/>.

232 See, e.g., "Ukraine lawyer-turned-soldier: 'We will fight for each street,'" dated 8 March 2022, found at <https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/ukraine-lawyer-turned-soldier-we-will-fight-each-street-2022-03-08/>; "From the frontline: from lawyer to soldier," dated 6 April 2022, found at <https://www.rnz.co.nz/national/programmes/ninetonoon/audio/2018837187/from-the-frontline-from-lawyer-to-soldier>.

233 UNBA Assistance.

234 See "100 days of full-scale war. How the Anti-Corruption Action Center readjusted the work of organization," dated 3 June 2022, found at <https://antac.org.ua/en/news/100-days-of-full-scale-war-how-the-anti-corruption-action-center-readjusted-the-work-of-organization/>.

235 UNBA Assistance.

236 KuIbida, p. 7.

237 ICJ Report, p. 49.

238 Ukrainian National Bar Association, *Annual Report for 2020*, p. 8 (Kyiv, 2021).

239 ZMINA Human Rights Center, "Submission to the report on protection of lawyers," dated 6 December 2021, found at [https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/zmina-submission\\_0.pdf](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/zmina-submission_0.pdf).

## Lawyers in a Post-Conflict Ukraine

While Russian aggression has thrown the lives of many lawyers into shambles, the post-conflict situation will present its own professional challenges. For many, law practices and offices will need to be restarted, rebuilt, or created from the ground up. Connections must be re-established with existing clients, if they survived the war and the mass migration.<sup>240</sup> The pre-war surfeit of lawyers may or may not reappear.

Personal security – a concern before the war – may become a greater priority. Corruption among lawyers likely will survive the war,<sup>241</sup> as will the resistance to some proposed reforms. Serious questions remain whether lawyers in a post-conflict Ukraine will be willing and able to tackle these issues.

## Legal Education in Transition

The triad of professions that populate the courts of Ukraine – judges, prosecutors and lawyers – share a common heritage: virtually all of their members have been trained in the country's legal education system. That heritage helped shape the legal system's response to the recent Russian aggression and will lay the foundation for the post-conflict structures of justice.

## A Flawed System

Like many countries emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union, access to legal education mushroomed in Ukraine after 1991. Obtaining a degree in law was viewed as a passport to make money, and the discipline has become extraordinarily popular with students.<sup>242</sup> Though official data is not available, it is estimated that at the outbreak of the war in February 2022, somewhere in the neighborhood of 130,000 students were enrolled in legal education curricula.<sup>243</sup>

The expansion in demand for legal education generated a major expansion in supply. Again, though official data is not available, an estimated 300 institutions are currently licensed to offer a legal education in Ukraine.<sup>244</sup> Prior to the war, these institutions employed somewhere in the neighborhood of 10,000 faculty members.<sup>245</sup> While some schools were public universities with good reputations, the system for decades has been extraordinarily corrupt, where students routinely paid to be admitted and for passing grades in their courses.<sup>246</sup>

As a result, the quality of legal education in Ukraine has routinely been rated as very low.<sup>247</sup> A survey of employers conducted by the Ministry of Justice in 2019 shows that many of those who are successful in entering the legal profession are unable to apply theoretical knowledge in practice, lack critical thinking, problem solving, and foreign language skills, and in

<sup>240</sup> See "Women Lawyers at War: Volunteerism as a Panacea," dated 30 May 2022, found at <https://uba.ua/ukr/news/9242/>.

<sup>241</sup> "Exposed a lawyer who demanded from the client 77 thousand rubles. UAH for influence on patrol police officers," dated 10 June 2022, found at [https://kyiv.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=314577&fp=40](https://kyiv.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=314577&fp=40); "6 thous. U.S. dollars for a positive court decision – the head of the city district court and a lawyer will be tried," dated 6 June 2022, found at [https://kyiv.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=314372&fp=60](https://kyiv.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=314372&fp=60).

<sup>242</sup> "What's Wrong with Legal Education in Ukraine?" dated 27 October 2020, found at <http://en.dejure.foundation/library/whats-wrong-with-legal-education-in-ukraine>.

<sup>243</sup> Mudruk, p. 79.

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>245</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>246</sup> Rice, Thomas H. Speedy, et al., "Corruption, Ethics and Integrity in Public administration in Ukraine," in Graycar, Adam (ed.), *Evaluation of the judicial systems (2018 - 2020) Ukraine*, p. 317, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020.

<sup>247</sup> "What's Wrong with Legal Education in Ukraine?" dated 27 October 2020, found at <http://en.dejure.foundation/library/whats-wrong-with-legal-education-in-ukraine>; "Legal education in Ukraine calls for reform, goals contested," dated 16 December 2019, found at <https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/legal-education-in-ukraine-calls-for-reform-goals-contested.html>.

most cases, an adequate sense of professional values, responsibility, and high standards of professional conduct.<sup>248</sup>

Moreover, there is an overabundance of persons with law degrees, with law schools flooding the market with unqualified graduates.<sup>249</sup> Prior to the war, only one in eight law students could find work in the field of law.<sup>250</sup>

While much of the problem can be attributed to simple greed, another factor is that large numbers of “lawyers” are being educated at colleges of applied sciences, sometimes derogatively referred to as “cooking schools” by other legal educators.<sup>251</sup> Among these institutions are government institutes or academies operated by the Ministry of Interior, the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU), the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Defense.<sup>252</sup> These schools are backed by powerful ministries, and receive a majority of public funding for legal education, yet the quality of the education provided to students is low.<sup>253</sup> This share of funding likely will only increase with the war and the government’s emphasis on law enforcement.

The public and private law faculties outside the ministries are regulated by the Ministry of Education and the National Agency for Higher Education Quality Assurance. Historically, these bureaucracies were not particularly effective, as reflected by the problems outlined above. Moreover, neither entity is particularly focused on legal education and the specific issues inherent in that field.

Another factor complicating legal education in Ukraine is the nature of the degrees in law offered, and the professional opportunities related to each degree. Currently, educational institutions in Ukraine offer four types of law degrees:<sup>254</sup>

- Professional Junior Bachelor – a non-university degree usually offered at institutions such as colleges for students after they have completed the 9th grade.
- Junior Bachelor – offered by some universities, usually requires 2 years of study.
- Bachelor (4 years).
- Masters (1.5 – 2 years post-graduate).

To qualify for a position as a judge, prosecutor, or *advokat* (member of the Bar), a graduate must hold a master’s degree in law. Members of those professions also must meet additional requirements that, at least in theory, demonstrate reasonable proficiency in the law

248 Kostova, Nataliia, et al., “Higher Legal Education in Ukraine in the 21st Century: Current Situation and Development Issues,” 9 *Amozonia Investiga*, Issue 27, pp. 42–51 (March 2020); United States Agency for International Development, “USAID efforts to support legal education in Ukraine,” April 2019.

249 Rice, p. 317.

250 United States Agency for International Development, “USAID efforts to support legal education in Ukraine,” April 2019.

251 “Legal education in Ukraine calls for reform, goals contested,” dated 16 December 2019, found at <https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/legal-education-in-ukraine-calls-for-reform-goals-contested.html>.

252 “Problems of Legal Education and Ways to Resolve Them,” found at <http://en.dejure.foundation/problems-of-legal-education>.

253 *Ibid*; Kostova, pp. 42–51.

254 To further complicate matters, prior to 2019, Ukrainian colleges were also allowed to offer a junior specialist degree with a term of study from 3 to 4 years and providing the same professional rights as individuals with junior bachelors. While this degree is no longer offered by colleges, students who enrolled in 2019 are allowed to complete their degree. Ukraine in the past also allowed universities to award a specialist degree. This degree no longer exists, but those who have earned this degree have the same professional rights as holders of master’s degrees.

However, persons holding lesser degrees in law can give legal advice. Moreover, the Constitution permits laws allowing such persons to represent clients in court in certain civil, family, juvenile, or labor matters. It is estimated that there are several hundred thousand such graduates in Ukraine. Graduates with only a junior bachelor's degree can work as entry-level public servants, but rarely work as legal professionals in the private sector. Persons holding only a bachelor's degree commonly work as paralegals and may progress to become junior associates. These practitioners are unlicensed and their activity is not regulated by law.

Though official information is not available, it was estimated that in 2020, Ukrainian institutions graduated the following numbers with degrees in law:<sup>255</sup>

- Junior specialists – 5,062
- Bachelors – 21,017
- Specialists – 208
- Masters – 10,659

As these numbers reflect, while somewhere in the neighborhood of 70% of law graduates are not eligible to assume traditional roles the justice system (judge, prosecutor, *advokat*), a significant number of masters graduates are eligible to enter that system each year. Such graduation rates for decades have caused a surfeit of masters graduates flooding the labor market. According to one study, the Ukrainian justice system only needs 2,100–2,200 new masters graduates each year. The system pumps out far more such graduates than needed, with many simply added to the mass of unlicensed practitioners. Interestingly, much of this excess comes from a few institutions that produce large numbers of graduates each year. One study found that the 20 largest law schools produced almost three-quarters of Masters of Law graduates in 2020.<sup>256</sup>

The impacts of these problems on the Ukrainian justice system are profound. With large numbers of students being attracted to poorly run, often corrupt institutions for legal education, and then being injected into an oversaturated legal job market, the environment is ripe for fraud and dishonesty. As discussed above, the result in Ukraine is that the judiciary and the Bar continue to be plagued with major corruption issues.

In recent years, there have been several positive developments seeking to resolve the problem. Schools began requiring standardized admissions testing for their masters programs.<sup>257</sup> Other changes such as accreditation standards, curriculum modernization, and student surveys were implemented or in the works at law faculties when the war began.<sup>258</sup> Much of this work was slowed by the pandemic since apparently all law faculties in Ukraine were operating remotely on February 24.

In any event, the Ukrainian legal education system faced five major challenges prior to February 2022:

- An oversupply of law schools;
- An overproduction of lawyers;
- Low quality of legal education;
- Public resources spread too thinly; and
- Lawyers being trained in law enforcement and other governmental academies.

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<sup>255</sup> Mudruk, p. 76.

<sup>256</sup> *Id.*, p. 81.

<sup>257</sup> Rice, p. 317.

<sup>258</sup> "Legal Education: 2020 Developments & Forecasts for 2021," dated 28 December 2020, found at <https://uba.ua/ukr/news/8328/print/>.

## Legal Education during the War

The full impact of the Russian invasion on legal education has yet to be seen. Reports indicate that a number of law faculties have been damaged or destroyed.<sup>259</sup> No inventory has been taken specifically related to damaged law faculties, but as of June 10, 2022, 98 professional pre-higher and higher education institutions were reported as damaged, while 13 have been destroyed.<sup>260</sup>

Some schools, particularly in exposed regions, took steps prior to the war to protect their critical information in the event of an invasion.<sup>261</sup> Most schools temporarily closed in February 2022, but resumed working remotely in April. Some schools have relocated outside the areas of active hostilities. Legal education institutions outside the immediate conflict zones plan to resume in Fall, some remotely and some in person, though the threat of expanded Russian aggression makes such planning problematic.

The Russian aggression has caused massive disruption for individual members of the legal education community. Some have died in the fighting.<sup>262</sup> Hundreds of students and faculty members enlisted or were called up as reservists.<sup>263</sup> Thousands more fled, either as internally displaced persons or as refugees to the West.<sup>264</sup>

One unexpected “problem” has been the outpouring of support from universities in the United States and Europe. When American and European law schools and law firms opened their doors to Ukrainian law students,<sup>265</sup> many left the country and dropped out of their Ukrainian schools. A number of Ukrainian schools now find themselves struggling to retain students.<sup>266</sup>

Roughly 80% of master’s candidates in Ukraine pay for their own education. Such departures may exacerbate financial strains for the for-profit law schools, already struggling with the impacts of the pandemic. Even the publicly funded institutions will face additional struggles if resources are moved even more heavily into government-run law enforcement facilities due to the war.

At this point, the disruption from the war has left most institutions of legal education and their students scrambling to define a future. Both reformers and the old guard are addressing personal matters, with less time or energy to address the issues in legal education. Precisely how legal education will emerge from the Russian aggression remains unclear as the military conflict hangs in the balance.

259 “Ukraine News: Mariupol’s Mayor Describes Grim Russian Rule,” dated 24 June 2022, found at <https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/06/24/world/russia-ukraine-war-news>; “12 killed in Ukraine as Russia pounds rebel-claimed province,” dated 6 July 2022, found at <https://torontosun.com/news/world/12-killed-in-ukraine-as-russia-pounds-rebel-claimed-province>.

260 “Overview of the current state of education and science in Ukraine in terms of Russian aggression (as of June 06 -11, 2022),” Ukrainian Ministry of Education and Science, dated 13 June 2022, found at <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/overview-current-state-education-and-science-ukraine-terms-russian-aggression-june-06-11-2022-enuk>; “The occupiers carried out missile strikes on educational institutions of Nikolaev – an investigation was launched,” dated 15 July 2022, found at <https://gp.gov.ua/ua/posts/okupanti-nanesli-raketni-udari-po-osvitnim-zakladam-mikolajeva-rozpocato-rozsliduvannya>.

261 “‘We are ready’: Ukraine’s universities calm in the face of war,” dated 27 February 2022, found at <https://www.sundaytimes.lk/220227/education/we-are-ready-ukraines-universities-calm-in-the-face-of-war-473902.html>.

262 “Ukraine’s mounting death toll includes a growing number of researchers,” dated 22 April 2022, found at <https://www.science.org/content/article/ukraine-s-mounting-death-toll-includes-growing-number-researchers>.

263 “‘We are ready’: Ukraine’s universities calm in the face of war,” dated 27 February 2022, found at <https://www.sundaytimes.lk/220227/education/we-are-ready-ukraines-universities-calm-in-the-face-of-war-473902.html>.

264 “A 15-hour border wait and bar work: How a bright 21-year-old Ukrainian law student is building her career after fleeing the war and leaving her family,” dated 18 May 2022, found at <https://www.businessinsider.com/21-year-old-ukrainian-law-student-describes-fleeing-ukraine-2022-4>.

265 See, e.g., “Amid Russia’s ongoing invasion, Northwestern finds ways to support Ukrainian students and scholars,” dated 20 April 2022, found at <https://news.northwestern.edu/stories/2022/04/support-for-ukrainian-students-and-scholars/>; “European law offices open doors to Ukraine’s displaced law students,” dated 28 March 2022, found at <https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/european-law-offices-open-doors-ukraines-displaced-law-students-2022-03-28/>.

266 Interview with Artem Shaipov, Legal Advisor/Team Lead for Legal Education Reform, USAID Justice for All Activity in Ukraine, June 17, 2022.

## The War's Impacts on Local Jurisdictions

### Vinnitsia Oblast



The *oblast* of Vinnitsia is located in west-central Ukraine on its southern border with Moldova. Like much of the central and western parts of the country, Vinnitsia has been largely spared from Russian attacks. Nonetheless, it has seen sporadic but deadly missile strikes on critical infrastructure and civilian populations.<sup>267</sup> Moreover, given its location and relative safety, the region has become both a destination and staging area for refugees from the East.<sup>268</sup>

The *oblast's* judicial system is comprised of 29 local and city first instance courts, as well as first instance administrative and commercial courts.<sup>269</sup> Vinnitsia also home to the Seventh Administrative Court of Appeals with jurisdiction over appeals on administrative matters from the Vinnitsia, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi and Chernivtsi *oblasts*. No damage has been reported to any court facilities in the *oblast*.<sup>270</sup> Vinnitsia's distance from the areas of active hostilities also means that its courts have not been assigned any additional territorial jurisdictions from courts in battleground areas.<sup>271</sup> On the other hand, six judges (presumably from occupied areas) have been seconded to courts in the *oblast*.<sup>272</sup>

Reports indicate that the *oblast's* courts continue to carry out their normal activities "within the limits of financial capabilities." For the first quarter of 2022, the first instance courts in Vinnitsia Oblast saw a 29% decrease in income from court fees compared to the corresponding period in the prior year.<sup>273</sup> Though dealing with the issues that impact all Ukrainian courts, it appears that courts in Vinnitsia continue to carry on operations in a relatively normal manner.

Similarly, the *oblast's* seven district prosecutor's offices, and twelve smaller offices in subsidiary departments continue to function.<sup>274</sup> Their workload during the first three months after the Russian invasion was reduced, since Vinnitsia reported 30.5% fewer criminal offenses than in the same period in 2021.<sup>275</sup>

At the same time, prosecutors have become involved in bringing wartime charges based residents' use of social media and other forms of expression. For example, the Vinnitsia Regional Prosecutors Office brought felony charges against a 54-year-old woman for posting materials on

267 See, e.g., "Russian cruise missiles from Black Sea killed at least 22 people in attack on Vinnitsia, Ukraine says," dated 14 July 2022, found at [https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-07-14-22/h\\_445618bc0e6522b882e3f5dcffe06054](https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-07-14-22/h_445618bc0e6522b882e3f5dcffe06054).

268 "Inside Ukraine: Refugees In Vinnitsia 'Become Family To Us,'" dated 25 March 2022, found at <https://www.benzinga.com/news/22/03/26300531/inside-ukraine-refugees-in-vinnitsia-become-family-to-us>.

269 Annex 1.

270 *Ibid.*

271 Annex 2.

272 "Judges were sent to the local general courts of Vinnitsia region to administer justice," dated 17 May 2022, found at <https://vn.court.gov.ua/tu02/pres-centr/news/1275137/>.

273 "Organizational support for the activities of local general courts of the Vinnitsia region during martial law!" dated 26 May 2022, found at <https://vn.court.gov.ua/tu02/pres-centr/news/1278221/>.

274 Vinnitsia Regional Prosecutor's Office, "The structure of the Vinnitsia Regional Prosecutor's Office," found at <https://vin.gp.gov.ua/ua/structure.html>.

275 "The head of the regional prosecutor's office coordinated the activities of the heads of law enforcement agencies in the field of combating crime under martial law," dated 16 June 2022, found at [https://vin.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_c=view&\\_t=rec&id=314863](https://vin.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=314863).

her page on a Russian social media network banned in Ukraine that “contained public excuses and recognized the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine as lawful.”<sup>276</sup>

The roughly 1200 *advokats* in the Vinnytsia *oblast*<sup>277</sup> largely have been spared any direct impacts from the war. The Bar Council in the *oblast* continued to function, holding regular meetings, sponsoring webinars, and continuing to monitor internships.<sup>278</sup> In short, while the legal community in Vinnytsia *oblast* has been impacted by the war in numerous ways, it largely continues to function as it did before the conflict began.

## Volyn Oblast



For centuries, the area now known as the *oblast* of Volyn in northwest Ukraine passed back and forth between various forms of Russian and Polish control. Much of the *oblast* was wrested from Polish authority and annexed to Ukraine by the Soviet Union after the end of World War II. A land of forests, agriculture, and lakes, it now occupies a corner of Ukraine bordered by Belarus and Poland, well removed from the fighting in the eastern part of the country.

Due to Volyn’s location, it is one of the few areas in the country that has seen no combat or missile strikes. The *oblast*’s proximity to the Polish border also placed it on the route for tens of thousands of refugees headed for the West.

Volyn’s location also has shielded its eighteen courts (seventeen first instance and a court of appeals) from many of the more serious impacts of the war.<sup>279</sup> Authorities have not reported any damage to court buildings.<sup>280</sup> And its courts have not been assigned any additional territorial jurisdictions from courts in battleground areas.<sup>281</sup> At the same time, five additional judges were sent to the *oblast* in May 2022,<sup>282</sup> though it is unclear whether these assignments resulted from workload issues or a reassignment of judges from occupied areas.

The prosecution service in Volyn is relatively small with just four district prosecutor’s offices, and six subsidiary departments.<sup>283</sup> Much of their work focused on crimes unrelated to the war,<sup>284</sup> though even in that remote area prosecutors dealt with allegations of war crimes<sup>285</sup> and of publicly supporting Russian attacks.<sup>286</sup>

276 “Supporters of the ‘Russian world’ have been charged,” dated 10 June 2022, found at [https://vin.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_c=view&\\_t=rec&id=314602](https://vin.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=314602).

277 Annex 5.

278 “The Bar Council of the region works in regular mode,” dated 3 March 2022, found at <http://osav.vn.ua/category/news/>.

279 Annex 1.

280 *Ibid.*

281 Annex 2.

282 “Regarding the secondment of judges,” dated 11 July 2022, found at <https://vl.court.gov.ua/tu03/pres-centr/news/1294193/>.

283 Annex 3.

284 See, e.g., “Prosecutors will insist on taking into custody the man from Volhynia who drunkenly beat an 11-year-old girl to death in Shatsk,” dated 30 June 2022, found at [https://vol.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=315601](https://vol.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=315601); “Directors of the enterprise in Volyn are suspected of embezzling over 160,000 hryvnias of budget funds,” dated 1 June 2022, found at [https://vol.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=314188&fp=60](https://vol.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=314188&fp=60).

285 “The prosecutor’s office established the identity of the commander of the Russian aviation regiment who gave the order to attack the oil depot in Lutsk – he was informed of the suspicion,” dated 24 May 2022, found at [https://vol.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=313818&fp=80](https://vol.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=313818&fp=80).

286 “A Volyn woman who supported Russian aggression was taken into custody,” dated 20 May 2022, found at [https://vol.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=313708&fp=80](https://vol.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=313708&fp=80).

While the number of *advokats* in the *oblast* is small,<sup>287</sup> members of the local Bar actively supported the war effort. Out of roughly 700 members, 20 *advokats* joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 11 joined the territorial defense forces, and 13 joined a group of local volunteers to patrol the cities and protect infrastructure facilities. Some even formed their own unit.<sup>288</sup> Other lawyers provided accommodations to internally displaced persons, raised funds for military and humanitarian supplies, and worked with Polish lawyers to assist those seeking asylum in Poland.<sup>289</sup>

## Dnipropetrovsk Oblast



Home to Dnipro, Ukraine's fourth-largest city, the Dnipropetrovsk *oblast* is a major industrial center in Ukraine. Since the expansion of hostilities on February 24, 2022, the *oblast* thus far has stood as an island of relative safety surrounded on three sides by fighting. Though numerous locations within the *oblast* have been shelled or hit with missile attacks,<sup>290</sup> there have been no reports of damage to court buildings or prosecutor's offices.<sup>291</sup>

A regional administrative center, Dnipro is home to both regional administrative and commercial courts of appeal, in addition to the *oblast's* own court of appeals of general jurisdiction. The *oblast* also has 44 local courts of general jurisdiction, plus *oblast* first instance administrative and commercial courts.<sup>292</sup> These courts bear the dubious honor of seeing twice as many visitors attempting to enter court with prohibited items (firearms, knives, tear gas, etc.) as in any other *oblast* in the country.<sup>293</sup>

Because of its size, Dnipropetrovsk *Oblast* ranks second in Ukraine in the total number of judges serving in its courts. Prior to February 24, 2022, there were 73 second instance, and 352 first instance judges assigned to the *oblast's* courts.<sup>294</sup> Though it is unclear how many judges have left their positions in the *oblast*, at least one second instance judge has enlisted.<sup>295</sup>

Due to its geographic location and the capacity of its courts, Dnipropetrovsk *Oblast* has been a primary recipient of jurisdictional transfers from occupied territories or areas where hostilities were more intense. The territorial jurisdictions of at least ten Donetsk courts were transferred to the Dnipropetrovsk *Oblast* from areas in the Donbas prior to February 24, 2022.<sup>296</sup> The territorial jurisdictions of another 57 courts were transferred to courts in the *oblast* from courts in the Kharkiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, and Donetsk *oblasts* after the current hostilities intensified.<sup>297</sup>

<sup>287</sup> Annex 5.

<sup>288</sup> "The volunteer battalion 'Themis' went to the Kherson direction," dated 9 June 2022, found at <https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/pres-centr/news/1282689/>; "The 'Themis' battalion was visited by volunteers from the judicial system," dated 12 July 2022, found at <https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/pres-centr/news/1294387/>.

<sup>289</sup> "About the work of the Bar Council of the Volyn region under martial law," dated 22 April 2022, found at <http://Radadvolyn.com.ua/ua/anons/479/>.

<sup>290</sup> "Ukraine regional governor says Russian missiles kill 3, injure 15 in Dnipro," dated 15 July 2022, found at <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/three-killed-15-injured-missile-strikes-ukraine-city-dnipro-official-says-2022-07-15/>.

<sup>291</sup> "SJA of Ukraine on the administration of justice in wartime as of May 18, 2022," dated 18 May 2022, found at <https://court.gov.ua/press/news/1275655/>.

<sup>292</sup> Annex 2.

<sup>293</sup> "In the first half of 2022, the number of attempts to get to court with weapons increased 15 times compared to last year 2021," dated 8 July 2022, found at <https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/pres-centr/news/1293572/>.

<sup>294</sup> Annex 1.

<sup>295</sup> "Changing the mantle of a judge to the uniform of a warrior," dated 25 May 2022, found at <https://dp.court.gov.ua/tu04/pres-centr/2/1277644/>.

<sup>296</sup> Annex 2.

<sup>297</sup> *Ibid.*

The *oblast* also has a number of prosecutor's offices, with 16 district prosecutor's offices, plus 10 additional departmental offices.<sup>298</sup> Given the *oblast*'s proximity to the areas of hostilities, prosecutors devoted large amounts of time to investigating war crimes and pursuing allegations of collaboration and other support to Russian aggression.<sup>299</sup>

For similar reasons, members of the *oblast*'s Bar have been heavily engaged in addressing the impacts of the war. With the transfer into the courts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast of the territorial jurisdictions and cases from so many courts in other *oblasts*, the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Bar Council opened offices in Dnipro and Kryvyi Rih for lawyers from other regions.<sup>300</sup> Though no detailed information is available, it is clear that some *advokats* from the *oblast* enlisted in the armed forces.<sup>301</sup> Others were involved in humanitarian work.<sup>302</sup> Like others, the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast regional Bar Council worked to provide assistance to its members during wartime.<sup>303</sup> With the hostilities continuing in the immediate vicinity, the legal system and its members in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast likely will continue to be actively involved in addressing numerous issues arising from the war.

## Donetsk Oblast



Ukrainians consistently remind others that Russian aggression did not commence on February 24, 2022. Portions of Donetsk, Ukraine's most populous *oblast*, were seized by pro-Russian separatists in March 2014, who quickly renamed the areas as the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR). Referred to as "temporarily occupied territories" by Ukrainians, the DPR included an estimated 2 million people including major cities such as Donetsk, Makiivka, and Horlivka.

Before the new Russian offensive began in late February 2022, 31 first instance courts in the *oblast* were in areas under the control of the DPR.<sup>304</sup> In September 2014, the territorial jurisdictions of 35 Donetsk first instance courts were transferred to other courts.<sup>305</sup> A month later, both the Donetsk Commercial Court and Commercial Court of Appeals were moved (not transferred to another court) to Kharkiv.<sup>306</sup> At the same time, the Donetsk Administrative Court was moved to Slavyansk, while the Donetsk Administrative Court of Appeals moved to Kramatorsk.<sup>307</sup> As battlefield conditions changed, the territorial jurisdictions of a few Donetsk courts were restored prior to February 2022.<sup>308</sup>

298 Annex 3.

299 See "News and Publications," found at <https://dnipr.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html>.

300 "Offices for lawyers from other regions are opening in Dnipro and Kryvyi Rih," dated 15 March 2022, found at <https://advokaty.dp.ua/u-dnipri-ta-kryvomu-rozi-vidkryvayutsya-robochi-kabinety-dlya-advokativ-z-in-shyh-regioniv/>.

301 "Attention lawyers!" dated 5 April 2022, found at <https://advokaty.dp.ua/do-uvagy-advokativ-4/>; "Collection to help the Armed Forces," dated 14 June 2022, found at <https://advokaty.dp.ua/zbir-na-dopomogu-zsu/>.

302 "The tragic death of our colleague, lawyer Alina Molchanova, was an irreparable loss for the legal community of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast," dated 8 April 2022, found at <https://advokaty.dp.ua/vyslovyuyemo-spivchuttya-ridnym-ta-blyzkym-nashoyi-kolegy-aliny-molchanovoyi/>.

303 "On assistance to lawyers injured as a result of military actions," dated 22 March 2022, found at <https://advokaty.dp.ua/pro-dopomogu-postrazhdalym-vnaslidok-voyennyh-dij-advokatam/>.

304 "SJA of Ukraine on the administration of justice in wartime as of May 18, 2022," dated 18 May 2022, found at <https://court.gov.ua/press/news/1275655/>.

305 Decree No. 2710/38-14, dated September 2, 2014.

306 Decree No. 868/2014, dated 12 November 2014.

307 Decree No. 867/2014, dated 12 November 2014.

308 See, e.g., Decree, dated 19 January 2022; Decree No. 5/0/38-16, dated 25 January 2016.

When the Ukrainian courts were closed and transferred, the DPR in October 2014 began creating a new court system modelled on the Russian judiciary. This system included a supreme court, 15 local courts, an arbitration court, and field military courts. No specific judicial qualifications were required, apart from ideological reliability. At the end of 2018, this judiciary included 118 judges, including 43 former Ukrainian judges who defected.<sup>309</sup>

While perhaps atypical, the situation with staffing of the Donetsk *Oblast* courts prior to February 2022 was stark. As of the end of 2021, out of 246 full-time authorized positions for judges, the *oblast* had only 129 first instance judges (52%) “authorized to administer justice.” Pending cases were redistributed among other judges, complicating the already difficult workload situation.<sup>310</sup>

The Russian aggression of February 2022 dramatically changed the situation. Prior to February 2022, the Ukrainian government continued to operate about a dozen courts in the Donetsk *Oblast*.<sup>311</sup> Preliminary reports indicate that in the recent fighting at least twelve judicial structures in those areas were damaged.<sup>312</sup> At least one judge was killed in the shelling.<sup>313</sup>

By July 2022, Russian forces and their allies had substantially expanded their territorial gains in the Donetsk *Oblast*. Judges, court staff and their families were forced to flee. Relying on its strategy from 2014, the Ukrainian government transferred the territorial jurisdictions of an additional 12 first instance courts in Donetsk to other jurisdictions,<sup>314</sup> apparently leaving no functioning courts in the *oblast*.

According to its reports, the Ukrainian government in February 2022 had eight district prosecutor’s offices and 10 departmental offices operating in the areas outside DPR control in the Donetsk *Oblast*.<sup>315</sup> But like the judges, the prosecutors faced Hobson’s choices about whether to flee or stay when Russian forces and their allies expanded their control. Many fled, and some were transferred to other prosecutor’s offices. Others continue to work on war crimes and other wartime issues from Donetsk *Oblast* prosecutor’s offices that continue to function from facilities outside the occupied territories.<sup>316</sup>

The *oblast*’s Bar Council initially remained in Kramatorsk,<sup>317</sup> though it apparently later suspended operations.<sup>318</sup> Like many other citizens, many *advokats* in the Donetsk *Oblast* fled the area, often to areas far to the West.<sup>319</sup> With the military situation looking grim, the justice system in the *oblast* has essentially shut down.

309 KuIbida, p. 13.

310 “Information on the consideration of cases,” dated 12 July 2022, found at <https://dn.court.gov.ua/tu05/pres-centr/news/1294674/>.

311 Annex 2.

312 “SJA of Ukraine on the administration of justice in wartime as of May 18, 2022,” dated 18 May 2022, found at <https://court.gov.ua/press/news/1275655/>.

313 “We express our condolences on the tragic death of the judge of the Sloviansk city district court Olga Vitalievna Ilyashevych and her mother!” dated 1 July 2022, found at <https://sa.dn.ua/vislovlyuiemo-spivchuttya-z-privodu-trag/>.

314 Annex 2.

315 *Ibid*.

316 “Bakhmut and Seversk at gunpoint of the invaders – the Russian army killed 5 civilians and seriously injured a child,” dated 8 July 2022, found at [https://don.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_c=view&\\_t=rec&id=316050](https://don.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=316050); “Treason under martial law – suspect taken into custody,” dated 12 April 2022, found at [https://don.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=315950&fp=30](https://don.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=315950&fp=30).

317 “Dear colleagues!” dated <https://sa.dn.ua/shanovni-kolegi-7/#more-4248>

318 “Meeting of the Council of Advocates of Donetsk region on March 30, 2022 will not take place,” found at <https://advokaty.dp.ua/shhodo-stvorenniya-yedynogo-informatsijnogo-tsentru/>.

319 “Premises for professional activities of lawyers,” dated 14 April 2022, found at <https://sa.dn.ua/primishhennya-dlya-profesijnoi-diyalnos/>.

## Zhytomyr Oblast



Located north and west of Kyiv, Zhytomyr *Oblast* was on the western edge of the initial Russian advance from Belarus seeking to envelope the capital. Though no significant Russian land forces entered the region, dozens of Ukrainian civilians died from missile strikes and shelling. At least two first instance courts in the *oblast* suffered minor damage to some of their windows, doors, and ceilings from shock waves from nearby missile strikes.<sup>320</sup>

Concerned about the possibility of advances by Russian troops, Ukrainian authorities began considering the transfer of the territorial jurisdictions of its courts to safer areas. Eventually, the territorial jurisdictions of three courts in eastern Zhytomyr were transferred to the Koretsky district court in the Rivne *oblast* in early March 2022.<sup>321</sup> When the Russians were forced to withdraw north, the violence subsided and by the latter part of April the jurisdictions of the three courts were restored.<sup>322</sup>

Though its border with Belarus remains uneasy, there currently are no active hostilities in the *oblast*. With a general jurisdiction court of appeals and 25 first instance courts, and a combined pre-war total of 165 judges, Zhytomyr has a moderately-sized court system by Ukrainian standards.<sup>323</sup> Recently, two judges from the Markiv District Court in the Luhansk *Oblast* were seconded one of the first instance courts in Zhytomyr.<sup>324</sup>

In the immediate aftermath of the Russian invasion, prosecutors in the *oblast* began focusing much of their time on documenting alleged war crimes. With the withdrawal of Russian forces from the area, both judges and prosecutors began handling a blend of routine work and charges related to wartime activities.<sup>325</sup> Nonetheless, the threat from Russian forces to the north remains, leaving Zhytomyr *Oblast* exposed to continuing attacks.<sup>326</sup>

## Zakarpattia Oblast



Anchored in the Carpathian Mountains in western Ukraine, Zakarpattia (aka Transcarpathian) *Oblast* has a complex history. Long part of Hungary, the region became part of Czechoslovakia at the end of WWI. After changing hands multiple times through the end of WWII, the territory was ceded to the Soviet Union as part Ukraine. Presently, it is the only Ukrainian *oblast* that borders four countries: Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania.

<sup>320</sup> SJA Report.

<sup>321</sup> Order No. 4/0/9-22, dated 10 March 2022.

<sup>322</sup> Order No. 24/0/9-22, dated 21 April 2022.

<sup>323</sup> Annex 1.

<sup>324</sup> "Replenishment of the corps of judges of the Korolovsky District Court of Zhytomyr," dated 8 July 2022, found at <https://zt.court.gov.ua/tu06/pres-centr/40/1293706/>.

<sup>325</sup> See News and publications – Zhytomyr Regional Prosecutor's Office, found at <https://zhit.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?fp=0>.

<sup>326</sup> "Russian invaders launched more than 20 rockets on military bases in Zhytomyr *Oblast*," dated 25 June 2022, found at <https://zhit.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?fp=160>.

This history, coupled with its remote location far from Kyiv, often means that Zakarpattia can be at odds with its urban countrymen to the east. In fact, a demonstration by a few dozen women in Zakarpattia protesting the mobilization of their husbands for military service after the Russian invasion in February 2022 became a Twitter sensation.<sup>327</sup>

The oblast's location also has insulated it from many effects of the hostilities. No courts have been damaged; the only Russian attack in the *oblast* was a missile strike on railroad infrastructure connected with Western Europe.<sup>328</sup>

Zakarpattia's legal system, not surprisingly, is one of the smallest in the country. The *oblast* has a general jurisdiction court of appeals and 13 first instance courts.<sup>329</sup> Prior to the war, those courts were manned by 12 second instance and 104 first instance judges.<sup>330</sup>

As mentioned above, statistical information concerning the various regional prosecution offices is difficult to locate. Zakarpattia is one *oblast* that has made such information publicly available.<sup>331</sup> This information indicates that 86 prosecutors are assigned to the regional prosecutor's office, while 135 are assigned to the outlying district and departmental offices. Out of this total, four prosecutors are listed as "discharged for military service." Substantially more are listed as on childcare leave.

At the same time, there are slightly more than 80 non-prosecutorial staff (inspectors, civil servants, maintenance other similar personnel, drivers) employed in the various prosecutor's offices.<sup>332</sup> Whether these patterns are similar in prosecutor's offices in other *oblasts* is unknown. Though the prosecutor's offices, in the regional prosecutor's words, "have been transferred to an enhanced mode of operation,"<sup>333</sup> it appears that they are generally functioning in a relatively normal fashion.

Roughly 70% of the Bar in the *oblast* is male, the highest percentage in the country.<sup>334</sup> Moreover, *advokats* in Zakarpattia *Oblast* reflect the community's distrust of distant Ukrainian officials in Kyiv.<sup>335</sup> While historic issues simmer just below the surface,<sup>336</sup> the legal system in the *oblast* appears to be stable at the moment.

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327 "In the small Ukraine city Khust, a rare public display of dissent over war with Russia," dated 2 May 2022, found at <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-russia-ukraine-war-conscription-protest/>.

328 "Evening Russian Missile Strikes Hit Critical Infrastructure Across Ukraine," dated 4 May 2022, found at <https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/evening-russian-missile-strikes-hit-critical-infrastructure-across-ukraine.html>.

329 Annex 1.

330 *Ibid.*

331 Zakarpattia Region Prosecutor's Office, "The structure of the regional prosecutor's office," found at <https://zak.gov.ua/ua/structure.html>.

332 *Ibid.*

333 "Head of The Transcarpathian Regional Prosecutor's Office Dmytro Kazak appealed to the residents of Transcarpathia," dated February 24, 2022, found at [https://zak.gov.ua/ua/zak\\_zmi.html?\\_m=publications&\\_c=view&\\_t=rec&id=311743](https://zak.gov.ua/ua/zak_zmi.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=311743).

334 Annex 5.

335 See "News and Events," found at <http://Rada-advokat.uz.ua/index.php>.

336 "Ambassador: Hungary has no territorial claims in western Ukraine," dated 10 May 2022, found at <https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-politics/3479954-ambassador-hungary-has-no-territorial-claims-in-western-ukraine.html>.

## Zaporizhzhia Oblast



One goal of the attacks in February 2022 was the establishment of a “land bridge,” *i.e.*, a ground corridor from Russian territory to Crimea. Much of the land along the Black Sea coast sitting squarely in the middle of this objective is within the territory of Zaporizhzhia Oblast. With a large Russian speaking minority and bordering on the western edge of the Donbas, the region appeared ripe for a Russian takeover and occupation.

Russian forces quickly swept along the *oblast*’s southern coast, occupying several major cities including Berdyansk and Melitopol. Soon thereafter, the Russians and their allies began installing local administrators loyal to Moscow in various part of the occupied *oblast*.<sup>337</sup> Some reports indicated that Russian nationals (as opposed to DNR proxies) were taking over various positions in the occupied territory in Zaporizhzhia in an effort to strengthen their bureaucratic control over the area.<sup>338</sup> To further cement Russian control, on May 25, 2022, President Putin signed a decree allowing residents of Zaporizhzhia to obtain Russian citizenship through a simplified procedure previously introduced for residents of parts of Donetsk and Luhansk.<sup>339</sup>

Given these Russian advances, the Ukrainian government transferred the territorial jurisdictions of 18 of the *oblast*’s 29 courts to other regions.<sup>340</sup> Ironically, seven of those transferred courts themselves had expanded territorial jurisdictions, since they were among those to whom the territorial jurisdictions of courts from Donetsk had been transferred back in 2014.<sup>341</sup>

Initially, the transfers were to various courts in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, further to the north.<sup>342</sup> However, Russian efforts to move north further into the interior met heavy Ukrainian resistance, stalling out as their troops began to approach the city of Zaporizhzhia, the *oblast*’s administrative capital. Though the situation remains fluid,<sup>343</sup> reports indicate that roughly 40% of the *oblast*’s territory remains in Ukrainian hands.<sup>344</sup> Accordingly, a few later transfers were made to other courts behind the front lines within the Zaporizhzhia Oblast.<sup>345</sup>

While detailed damage assessments cannot be made in the occupied areas, at least four court buildings have been damaged and one is occupied by Russian-backed separatist forces.<sup>346</sup> Because active hostilities are continuing in the *oblast*,<sup>347</sup> additional damage may occur.

337 “Life resumes in Berdyansk, Ukraine, but not all is normal under Russian occupation,” dated 5 May 2022, found at <https://www.scmp.com/video/world/3176673/life-resumes-berdyansk-ukraine-not-all-normal-under-russian-occupation>.

338 “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 23,” dated 24 May 2022, found at [https://www.einnews.com/pr\\_news/573734483/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-23](https://www.einnews.com/pr_news/573734483/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-23).

339 “Kyiv, Washington Oppose Decree Fast-Tracking Russian Citizenship For Residents Of Newly Occupied Ukrainian Territories,” dated 25 May 2022, found at <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-occupied-ukraine-citizenship/31867923.html?withmediaplayer=1>.

340 Annex 1.

341 Annex 2.

342 Order Nos. 4/0/9-22, dated 10 March 2022; 5/0/9-22, dated 12 March 2022; and 7/0/9-22, dated 14 March 2022.

343 “Large column of enemy vehicles drives via Mariupol towards Zaporizhzhia Region,” dated 16 July 2022, found at <https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3530379-large-column-of-enemy-vehicles-drives-via-mariupol-towards-zaporizhzhia-region.html>; “Russians strike Zaporizhzhia region with MLRS,” dated 17 July 2022, found at <https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3531033-russians-strike-zaporizhzhia-region-with-mlrs.html>.

344 “Almost 60% of Zaporizhzhia Oblast is occupied – Oblast Military Administration,” dated 5 June 2022, found at <https://news.yahoo.com/almost-60-zaporizhzhia-oblast-occupied-183344017.html>.

345 Order Nos. 15/0/9-22, dated 4 April 2022 and 29/0/9-22, dated 10 May 2022.

346 SJA Report.

347 “Russo-Ukrainian War, Day 117: Russia targets fuel facilities. Ukraine counterattacks in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts,” dated 20 June 2022, found at <https://euromaidanpress.com/2022/06/20/russo-ukrainian-war-day-117-russia-targets-fuel-facilities-ukraine-counterattacks-in-kherson-and-zaporizhzhia-oblasts/>.

No specific information has been located concerning current whereabouts of the 207 judges assigned to courts in Zaporizhzhia *Oblast* before February 24, 2022.<sup>348</sup> Reports indicate that at the start of the hostilities 74 judges were assigned to the transferred courts, nearly all of which were in territory occupied by Russia and the DPR.<sup>349</sup> Though at least some of the remaining courts are functioning,<sup>350</sup> it is unclear the extent to which the justice system in the *oblast* continues to operate.

At the outset of the current hostilities in the south, there were eight district prosecutor's offices in the Zaporizhzhia *Oblast*.<sup>351</sup> Reports suggest that prosecutors remain active in opening war-related investigations,<sup>352</sup> though it is less clear that other routine matters are being processed or that court proceedings are common.

*Advokats* in the *oblast* have been forced to deal with this tragic situation. Membership in the Bar in Zaporizhzhia *Oblast* was about 43% female, among the highest percentages in the country.<sup>353</sup> Presumably, like women throughout Ukraine, they took on not only professional burdens, but also assumed additional roles in finding safety for their families.

## Ivano-Frankivsk *Oblast*



Situated in the mountainous part of western Ukraine, the *oblast* of Ivano-Frankivsk is distant from the active hostilities further east. Like a number of its neighboring *oblasts*, the primary impact of the war has been an influx of internally displaced persons and those passing through headed to the West.<sup>354</sup> Swollen by this influx, the *oblast* has struggled to take in the migrants, offering shelter and food while they wait for the war to end.

There have been no reports of damage to court buildings or injuries to court personnel in the *oblast*. The relatively small judicial cadre in the *oblast* at the beginning of the current hostilities (13 second instance and 107 first instance judges)<sup>355</sup> generally continues to work. Interestingly, however, in early June 2022, ten additional judges were sent to the local general courts of the Ivano-Frankivsk *oblast*.<sup>356</sup>

The reason for this move is unclear. The workload of the prosecutors appears relatively unaffected by the war.<sup>357</sup> The regional prosecutor's office remains open along with six district and ten departmental offices.<sup>358</sup>

<sup>348</sup> Annex 1.

<sup>349</sup> Annex 2.

<sup>350</sup> See, e.g., "15 years in prison for treason and participation in the armed attack on the Ukraine – a militant, the so-called 'DPR,' was convicted in Zaporizhzhia," dated 21 June 2022, found at [https://zap.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_c=view&\\_t=rec&id=315021](https://zap.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=315021).

<sup>351</sup> Annex 3. No information could be located regarding the existence of locations of departmental prosecutor's offices in Zaporizhzhia *Oblast*.

<sup>352</sup> See, e.g., "Fraud at the fundraising for the needs of the army – a local resident is suspected in Zaporizhzhia," dated 21 June 2022, found at [https://zap.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_c=view&\\_t=rec&id=315075](https://zap.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=315075); "The invaders carried out missile strikes on Zaporozhye, killed a woman – an investigation was launched," dated 25 May 2022, found at [https://zap.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=313864&fp=30](https://zap.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=313864&fp=30).

<sup>353</sup> Annex 5.

<sup>354</sup> See "The towns in western Ukraine making extraordinary efforts to host internally displaced people," dated 17 April 2022, found at <https://inews.co.uk/news/world/the-towns-in-western-ukraine-making-extraordinary-efforts-to-host-internally-displaced-people-1580549>.

<sup>355</sup> Annex 1.

<sup>356</sup> "Judges were sent to local general courts of Ivano-Frankivsk region for the administration of justice," dated 15 June 2022, found at <https://if.court.gov.ua/tuo9/pres-centr/news/1285297/>.

<sup>357</sup> See <https://ifr.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?fp=0>.

<sup>358</sup> Annex 3.

The situation for the Bar, as well as the others in the Ivano–Frankivsk region, was summed up by a lawyer from the *oblast*:

*We are in western Ukraine, so our city has not been destroyed by missiles – although we have had a few explosions and live with the constant threat of more. Our city has swelled with our compatriots who have fled from the east; we do our best to make life as comfortable as possible for them. Many of our men are away in the military. Our small businesses are trying desperately to stay afloat. The fuel crisis means we cannot operate our vehicles. This gets in the way of the most banal of daily tasks – a sign of how dependent we have become on the toxic substance that fuels the war.<sup>359</sup>*

## Kyiv Oblast



Perhaps the most iconic images arising thus far from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine come from the *oblast* of Kyiv. Names like Bucha and Irpin, little known outside Ukraine prior to February 24, are now indelible parts of history. Often referred to as suburbs of Kyiv, these communities lie in the large *oblast* that surrounds the City of Kyiv, which is a separate administrative area comparable to but different than the 24 *oblasts* that comprise the rest of the country.

The Kyiv *Oblast* stretches north from the city to the border with Belarus, and in theory provided a direct pathway for the Russians from that border to the capital. As the world saw, that strategy proved to be poorly chosen. Ukrainian force mounted a fierce defense in the Kyiv *oblast* along the northern and western outskirts of the city. For over a month, there was heavy fighting in several communities housing first instance courts. In some areas, court staff continued to work during the hostilities to save and protect court documents and files.<sup>360</sup>

Remarkably, damage has been reported at only three of the *oblast*’s 28 first instance courts.<sup>361</sup> Early in the invasion, the territorial jurisdictions of four courts were transferred to other courts in the *oblast*.<sup>362</sup> During this period, the territorial jurisdictions of nine courts from other *oblasts* also were transferred to courts in Kyiv *Oblast* further to the south.<sup>363</sup>

The transferred territorial jurisdictions of three Kyiv *Oblast* courts were restored within a few weeks,<sup>364</sup> though the fourth remained closed until mid-July 2022 due to the destruction of its court building.<sup>365</sup> Repair efforts are underway to restore all of the courts to their original capacity.<sup>366</sup> Some of the burden was eased when the Kyiv *oblast* courts were relieved of the responsibilities for most of the outside courts whose jurisdiction had been transferred to them.<sup>367</sup>

359 “The War on My Homeland Offers a Real Chance to Save the Planet,” dated 26 May 2022, found at <https://www.thenation.com/article/environment/ukraine-war-climate-fossil-fuel/>.

360 “How he survived the occupation and resumed the work of the Makariv district court of the Kiev region after his release,” dated 21 June 2022, found at <https://te.court.gov.ua/tu20/pres-centr/news/1287076/>.

361 Annex 1. See, e.g., “Ivanka stood! Stood and district court,” dated 16 April 2022, found at <https://ko.court.gov.ua/tu10/pres-centr/news/1268729/>.

362 Decree No. 1/0/9–22, dated 6 March 2022.

363 Annex 2.

364 Order Nos. 18/0/9–22, dated of 21 April 2022, 28/0/9–22, dated 5 May 2022, and 30/0/9–22, dated 19 May 2022.

365 See SJA Report; “Territorial jurisdiction of court cases of the Borodyan District Court of the Kyiv Region has been restored,” dated 12 July 2022, found at <https://supreme.court.gov.ua/supreme/pres-centr/news/1294662>.

366 “We bring the Irpin City Court of Kyiv region in order,” dated 8 April 2022, found at <https://ko.court.gov.ua/tu10/pres-centr/news/1267533/>; “Borodianka was visited by the Head of the Kyiv Court of Appeal,” dated 21 April 2022, found at <https://ko.court.gov.ua/tu10/pres-centr/news/1270167/>; “The leadership of the territorial administration took part in the meeting of the Buchan district council,” dated 27 May 2022, found at <https://ko.court.gov.ua/tu10/pres-centr/news/1278611/>.

367 Annex 2.

First instance judges in Kyiv *Oblast*<sup>368</sup> faced the same difficulties as the judges in other *oblasts* subject to active hostilities. During the hostilities, the courts in the *oblast* attempted to operate, though wartime conditions often made it difficult.<sup>369</sup> Prior to February 24, 192 judges were assigned to work in the *oblast*; no data is available on how many have returned to work.

Prior to February 24, there were eight district prosecutor's offices in the Kyiv *Oblast*.<sup>370</sup> No reports have been received about damage to prosecutor's offices. Prosecutors continued to work throughout the hostilities in the *oblast*, at least in areas where conditions allowed. Since the Russian forces withdrew, much of their activity has focused on reports of numerous atrocities in the area during the period of Russian occupation.<sup>371</sup>

The pre-war Bar in the Kyiv *Oblast* was the largest in the country, with a membership of roughly 9,000 *advokats*.<sup>372</sup> Many fled the hostilities, but an unspecified number enlisted in the Armed Forces.<sup>373</sup> Numerous *advokats* had homes damaged or destroyed,<sup>374</sup> and at least one was killed by Russian attacks.<sup>375</sup>

With the withdrawal of Russian forces, some *advokats* began to return, and the Bar began to resume normal operations.<sup>376</sup> At the same time, *advokats* began working to assist local residents that have suffered during the Russian occupation.<sup>377</sup> While the region faces the specter of new Russian attacks, the justice system in the Kyiv *Oblast* has generally resumed a somewhat normal routine.

368 Kyiv *oblast* has no second instance court. Appeals for the *oblast*'s first instance courts are heard by the Kyiv City Court of Appeals.

369 See, e.g., "Participation of judges of the eastern front in national resistance during martial law in Ukraine," dated 22 March 2022, found at <https://ko.court.gov.ua/tu10/pres-centr/news/1264255/>.

370 Annex 3. It is likely that there were additional departmental prosecutor's offices in the *oblast*, but complete information is not available.

371 See "News and publications - Kyiv Regional Prosecutor's Office," found at [https://kobl.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=cat&id=100448](https://kobl.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=cat&id=100448).

372 Annex 5.

373 "Twice defenders. Both lawyers and soldiers are bringing victory closer together - a meeting with representatives of the 114th BRIGADE took place in the Council of Advocates of the Kyiv region," dated 17 June 2022, found at <https://Radako.com.ua/news/dvichi-zahisniki-i-advokati-i-voyini-razom-nablizhayut-peremogu-v-radi-advokativ-kiyivskoyi>; "Heroes among us. Lawyer Andrey Bezv destroyed the military equipment of the occupiers on the approaches to Kiev," dated 1 March 2022, found at <https://Radako.com.ua/news/geroyi-sered-nas-advokat-andriy-bezv-znishchiv-viyskovu-tehniku-okupantiv-na-pidstupah-do>.

374 "During the war, the Bar Council of Kyiv region allocated financial assistance for 28 lawyers," dated 1 July 2022, found at <https://Radako.com.ua/news/yuridichni-novini-ukrayini>.

375 "In Kiev during the rocket attack killed lawyer Alexei Nikitin," dated 27 June 2022, found at <https://Radako.com.ua/news/u-kiievi-pid-chas-raketnogo-obstrilu-zaginuv-advokat-oleksiy-nikitin>.

376 "From June 8, 2022, the acceptance of documents for internships for persons who passed the lawyer's exam is resumed," dated 3 June 2022, found at <https://Radako.com.ua/news/z-8-cheravnaya-2022-roku-vidnovlyuet-sya-priymannya-dokumentiv-na-stazhuvannya-dlya-osib-yaki>.

377 "The new 'military' committee of the Council of Advocates of the Kiev region. First results," dated 27 April 2022, found at <https://Radako.com.ua/news/noviy-voieniy-komitet-radi-advokativ-kiyivskoyi-oblasti-pershi-rezultati-foto#/o>; "The profile committee of RAKO and RSA of Podilskyi district of the capital created a joint working group to document war crimes," dated 2 May 2022, found at <https://Radako.com.ua/news/profilniy-komitet-razko-ta-rda-podilskogo-rayonu-stolici-stvorili-spilnu-robochu-grupu-dlya>.

## Kirovohrad Oblast



Lying in the heart of central Ukraine, the *oblast* of Kirovohrad thus far has been largely shielded by the natural barrier of the Dnieper River from ground assaults by Russian forces. Missile strikes have hit a variety of targets, but the *oblast* generally has been spared the destruction visited on areas to the north, east and south. At the same time, Kirovohrad Oblast has been a transit point for hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing from those regions.<sup>378</sup>

In late March, the government announced that “The territorial department of the State Judicial Administration of Ukraine in Kirovohrad region operates normally.”<sup>379</sup> No courts in the *oblast* have reported physical damage; none have had their territorial jurisdiction transferred to another court based on the hostilities. One court in the *oblast* did take on additional work when it assumed the territorial jurisdiction of a court from Mykolayiv Oblast.<sup>380</sup>

By all accounts, all 19 first instance courts and the oblast court of appeals in Kirovohrad Oblast<sup>381</sup> have generally carried on their routine. Since there have been no active hostilities within the oblast, few war-related cases have been brought before the courts.<sup>382</sup> Data is unavailable concerning how many of the 132 judges assigned to courts in the *oblast*<sup>383</sup> remain at their posts. As in other areas, some judges and court staff enlisted.<sup>384</sup> Given the area’s relative proximity to the fighting and the repeated missile attacks from Russian forces, it is probable that some portion of the Kirovohrad judiciary joined the tens of thousands from the region that fled further west.

Similar conditions presumably exist in the five district and 14 departmental prosecutor’s offices in the *oblast*.<sup>385</sup> Prosecutors continue to work, apparently focusing on more routine cases rather than war crimes or other matters arising from the war.<sup>386</sup>

Though information is sparse, the Bar Council in Kirovohrad Oblast ostensibly is operating on a “business as usual” basis.<sup>387</sup> Whether these conditions change will depend on the course of military operations in upcoming months.

378 See “From Siege to Sanctuary,” dated 8 March 2022, found at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/08/ukraine-refugees-sanctuary/>.

379 “Territorial management operates normally,” dated 28 March 2022, found at <https://kr.court.gov.ua/tu12/pres-centr/news/1261944/>.

380 Order No. 10/0/9-22, dated 16 March 2022.

381 Annex 1.

382 See “News and publications – Kirovohrad Regional Prosecutor’s Office,” found at <https://kir.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html>.

383 Annex 1.

384 “Eternal glory to The Hero!” dated 16 March 2022, found at <https://kr.kr.court.gov.ua/sud1109/pres-centr/news/1263448/>.

385 Annex 3.

386 See “News and publications – Kirovohrad Regional Prosecutor’s Office,” found at <https://kir.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html>.

387 “Up-To-Date Information for Regional Lawyers,” dated 25 February 2022, found at <http://www.advRada.kr.ua/adv.html>.

## Luhansk Oblast



Like Donetsk, the *oblast* of Luhansk first came under attack from Russian-controlled forces in 2014, who ultimately occupied the southern half of the *oblast*'s territory. The adverse impact of the hostilities prompted most courts and prosecutors' offices in those areas to cease operations.<sup>388</sup> At the same time, a Russian-controlled Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) began to assert administrative control over the occupied territory.

In September 2014, the territorial jurisdictions of 16 first instance courts in Luhansk *oblast* were transferred to other courts in the *oblast*.<sup>389</sup> A month later, the Luhansk Court of Appeals was transferred to Severodonetsk.<sup>390</sup> The same day, the Luhansk Commercial Court was transferred to Kharkiv<sup>391</sup> and the Luhansk Administrative Court was moved to Kramatorsk.<sup>392</sup> Because battlefield conditions changed, the territorial jurisdiction of at least one court in the *oblast* was restored before February 2022.<sup>393</sup>

Back in the temporarily occupied territory in Luhansk *Oblast*, the LPR established its own military court system. These "courts" were ineffective, and by October 2014, vigilante justice surfaced when some accused individuals were tried in a public forum with decisions made by a show of hands from the local population.<sup>394</sup> Over time, the LPR sought to establish a system of "ordinary" courts, including 16 first instance courts. One report indicated that at the end of 2018, the LPR's "judiciary" was comprised of 78 persons, including 32 defecting Ukrainian judges.<sup>395</sup>

In the areas where Ukraine retained control in the Luhansk *oblast*, 15 first instance courts continued to function. Courts near the shifting frontlines, in particular, faced numerous risks to their personnel, records, and facilities, often with little security. Many judges and staff faced threats of violence, especially in criminal proceedings, against themselves and their families.<sup>396</sup>

Prosecutors faced a similar situation. Mirroring the courts, when the situation stabilized after 2014, there were five district and ten departmental prosecutor's offices in the government-controlled areas of the Luhansk *Oblast*.<sup>397</sup> Like the judges, these prosecutors faced risks and intimidation, and decisions about whether to flee or stay in this frontier area.

The Russian aggression beginning in February 2022 dramatically changed that status quo. Within the first two weeks, the territorial jurisdictions of all 15 first instance courts that remained operational inside the *oblast* at the beginning of the new hostilities, plus the Luhansk Court of Appeal in Severodonetsk, were transferred to courts in the Dnipropetrovsk *oblast*.<sup>398</sup> These courts also had assumed the territorial jurisdictions of 16 other first instance courts in the *oblast* in 2014, so the 2022 transfers effectively moved the entirety of the Luhansk *oblast* judicial system to Dnipropetrovsk *Oblast*.

388 KuIbida, , p. 2.

389 Decree No. 2710/38-14, dated 2 September 2014, found at [https://zap.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=313864&fp=30](https://zap.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=313864&fp=30).

390 Decree No. 867/2015, dated 12 November 2014. Initially, the Court of Appeals was transferred to Kharkiv, but shortly thereafter it was reassigned to Severodonetsk.

391 Decree No. 868/2015, dated 12 November 2014.

392 Decree No. 867/2014, dated 12 November 2014.

393 Decree, dated 13 November 2020.

394 KuIbida, p. 14.

395 *Ibid.*

396 KuIbida, p. 12.

397 Annex 3.

398 Decree No. 1/0/9-22, dated 6 March 2022.

The transfers of jurisdiction, while symbolically important, essentially ended Ukraine's ability to provide judicial services inside the Luhansk *Oblast*. By July 2022, Russian forces and their allies had captured virtually all of the *oblast*, so even the tenuous ability to filter across the porous frontlines of the LPR has disappeared. In short, the Ukrainian courts' minimal ability to dispense justice in the Luhansk *Oblast* has vanished.

No official information has been published concerning the situations of the judges, court staff, and their families from the Luhansk *Oblast* after the most recent Russian attacks. According to one report, a few judges in Luhansk have collaborated with the Russians or the LPR.<sup>399</sup> Information on the State Judicial Administration's website for Luhansk *Oblast* simply reads:

*In order to prevent threats to the life and health of judges and participants in the trial during martial law, access is temporarily suspended.*

*Courts administer justice in an uninterrupted manner in the absence of a threat to the life and health of the participants in the case.*<sup>400</sup>

The remaining prosecutor's offices in Luhansk *Oblast* also presumably shut down. The offices of the Luhansk *Oblast* Bar Council headquartered in Severodonetsk likewise appear to be closed, as that city fell to Russian forces.

## Lviv Oblast



A story often repeated in Lviv reprises an apocryphal conversation between a youngster and an old man. The latter regaled the young person with his exploits in Ukraine, Russia, Poland, Germany, and the Soviet Union. The awe-struck youth commented, "You have travelled a great deal!" The elderly gentleman smiled and replied, "No, I've never left Lviv." Echoes of this history are finding their way into the events in the modern-day city.

On Ukraine's far western border with Poland, the *oblast* of Lviv is one of the cultural centers the country. After the Russian invasion of February 24, 2022, it also became a primary connection between Ukraine and the West. Though far from the front lines, Russia frequently has launched missile strikes at infrastructure in the *oblast*, bringing the sounds of the hostilities home to its residents and the hundreds of thousands of refugees that have fled to Lviv or are passing through to the West.

As the largest city in western Ukraine, Lviv is home to not only *oblast* courts, but also two regional, specialized courts: the Western Commercial Court of Appeals and the Eighth Administrative Court of Appeals. When combined with the *oblast*'s 29 first instance courts and its own "ordinary" court of appeals, the Lviv *Oblast* had 247 judges assigned to it prior to February 24.<sup>401</sup>

399 Andriy Smirnov: 'Judges now give 50 percent of their salaries to the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This decision was made by the judiciary of each court,'" dated 30 March 2022, found at <https://lv.court.gov.ua/tu14/pres-centr/1/1265601/>.

400 Territorial Department of the State Judicial Administration of Ukraine in Luhansk *Oblast*, found at [https://lg.court.gov.ua/tu13/pro\\_tu/21/](https://lg.court.gov.ua/tu13/pro_tu/21/).

401 Annex 1.

Relative to many other courts in the country, the war has caused minimal disruption to the courts in the *oblast*. For example, the Lviv *oblast* has seen no transfers of territorial jurisdiction either from or to its courts. While the courts in the *oblast* now are seeing cases relating to wartime offenses, the case mix still remains relatively balanced.

Prosecutors in Lviv have a similar situation. Each of the ten District Prosecutor's offices in the *oblast* remains open.<sup>402</sup> Prosecutors continue to handle offenses of the sort seen prior to the war, but now also pursue other offenses such as smuggling conscripts to Poland,<sup>403</sup> theft of humanitarian aid,<sup>404</sup> and "inciting national hatred and hatred, humiliation of national honor and dignity."<sup>405</sup>

The *oblast*'s Bar Council and *advokats* continued to work with minimal professional disruptions.<sup>406</sup> The local Bar did undertake a number of humanitarian projects, including the creation of a Legal Support Office for servicemen and their families to provide assistance during the war.<sup>407</sup> Though rumblings of further Russian attacks have kept the members of the justice system on edge, the situation continues to be stable.

## Mykolayiv Oblast



While Russia largely succeeded in its goal of conquering territory to create a "land bridge" along Ukraine's Black Sea coast east from Crimea, its efforts to take control of the coast west of Crimea faltered in the *oblast* of Mykolayiv. There, despite weeks of pounding from artillery and missile strikes, and ground assaults by Russian troops, Ukrainian forces blunted the Russian advance along the country's western Black Sea coast.

The unfortunate result of this combat is that the strategic port city of Mykolayiv, once home to more than 500,000 residents, is now a ghost town, with the few remaining residents relying on handouts and searching for drinkable water.<sup>408</sup> Though the Russians thus far have been held at bay, their relentless barrage continues.<sup>409</sup>

One of the casualties from this bombardment was the Mykolayiv Regional State Administration building, which housed the Commercial Court of Mykolayiv *Oblast*. A Russian strike blew a gaping hole through the middle of the multi-story building, killing more than 30 people, including two employees of the Commercial Court. Another court employee was wounded and lost a leg.<sup>410</sup>

<sup>402</sup> Annex 3. No information has been located regarding the existence or number of departmental prosecutor's offices in Lviv *Oblast*. However, it seems likely that a number of such offices are operating.

<sup>403</sup> "5.5 thousand US dollars for unhindered crossing of the border – detained Lviv woman," dated 6 July 2022, found at [https://lviv.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_c=view&\\_t=rec&id=315883](https://lviv.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=315883).

<sup>404</sup> "Enrichment on humanitarian aid – the perpetrators will be criminally liable," dated 7 June 2022, found at [https://lviv.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=314411&fp=50](https://lviv.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=314411&fp=50).

<sup>405</sup> "In Lviv will judge three men for inciting national hatred and hatred in the social network," dated 26 May 2022, found at [https://lviv.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=313895&fp=60](https://lviv.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=313895&fp=60).

<sup>406</sup> See "News," found at <http://unba.lviv.ua/uk/news.html>.

<sup>407</sup> "Support office for military personnel and their families," found at <http://unba.lviv.ua/uk/news-more/items/pro-utvorennja-ofisu-pidtrimki-vijskovosluzhbovciv-ta-chleniv-jix-simej.html>.

<sup>408</sup> "Ukraine's Mykolaiv on edge amid fears of a new Russian assault," dated 19 May 2022, found at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/19/ukraine-mykolaiv-on-edge-amid-fears-of-new-russian-assault>.

<sup>409</sup> "Day 119: missiles on Mykolayiv, hopes high for Ukraine's EU candidate status," dated 23 June 2022, found at <https://uacrisis.org/en/day-119>.

<sup>410</sup> "Special Rescue Operation": Vira Panchenko, the Sole Survivor of the Fatal Workday on March 29 at the Mykolaiv Regional State Administration," dated 1 June 2022, found at <https://zn.ua/eng/special-rescue-operation-vira-panchenko-the-sole-survivor-of-the-fatal-workday-on-march-29-at-the-mykolaiv-regional-state-administration-.html>.

Though only one of 25 courts in the *oblast*,<sup>411</sup> its destruction symbolizes the devastation that pervades the region. With Russian forces pushing north in an effort to encircle the city of Mykolayiv, a number of outlying courts are in jeopardy of being overrun.<sup>412</sup> However, in an apparent show of defiance, Ukrainian authorities have transferred the territorial jurisdictions of only the destroyed Commercial Court<sup>413</sup> and one other local first instance court.<sup>414</sup>

With most of the *oblast*'s courts still officially open, the judicial system continues to operate. It is unclear how many of the 157 judges<sup>415</sup> have left the area, though the fact that the city of Mykolayiv has emptied suggests that significant numbers have departed. Nonetheless, efforts continue to keep the Mykolayiv *oblast*'s courts open and operating on wartime footing.<sup>416</sup>

Comments from the deputy head of the *oblast*'s regional prosecutor's office confirm the situation. He did not indicate that any of Mykolayiv *Oblast*'s five district and 13 departmental prosecutor's offices<sup>417</sup> had closed. Some staff left the area but, according to him, most have stayed. However, he commented that the pace of work has slowed.<sup>418</sup> And he pointed out that much of the prosecutors' work in the *oblast* – the scene of heavy fighting – was focused on documenting war crimes:

*Everyone is trying to get cases sent to court so that they are considered. But there are still other priorities, and we are also dealing with these issues: we document war crimes committed by the military of the Russian Federation. We have a lot of proceedings open in the region on all acts of aggression, respectively, the investigators are conducting a pre-trial investigation, we are procedurally supervising the investigation. But this does not mean that all other matters have faded into the background. In the foreground, especially crimes against health and life, the facts of theft, robbery, for which the responsibility has been tightened.*<sup>419</sup>

In fact, as of the end of March 2022, over 178 criminal proceedings had been opened in Mykolayiv *Oblast* involving alleged war crimes.<sup>420</sup> Though no statistics are available, it appears that the *oblast*'s prosecutors are spending a significant percentage of their time on such issues.

Little information is available concerning the current status of the Bar in Mykolayiv *Oblast*. As one of the regional Bars where over 40% of the *advokats* are female,<sup>421</sup> dealing with family safety issues likely has been at the forefront for many. As the intensity of Russian attacks increase and residents are advised to evacuate the city of Mykolayiv,<sup>422</sup> it seems likely that remaining, functioning parts of the *oblast*'s justice system will soon be shuttered.

<sup>411</sup> Annex 1.

<sup>412</sup> Annex 2.

<sup>413</sup> Order No. 12/0/9-22, dated 22 March 2022.

<sup>414</sup> Order No. 10/0/9-22, dated 16 March 2022.

<sup>415</sup> Annex 1.

<sup>416</sup> "Oleksiy Salikov: 'The work of the courts in conditions of war is evidence of the presence of the Ukrainian authorities in the regions attacked by the aggressor,'" dated 13 June 2022, found at <https://te.court.gov.ua/tu20/pres-centr/news/1283945/>.

<sup>417</sup> Annex 3.

<sup>418</sup> "'The war has made its own adjustments': Interview with the Deputy Prosecutor of the Mykolaiv region," dated 2 April 2022, found at <https://news.pn/ru/RussiaInvadedUkraine/269970>.

<sup>419</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>420</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>421</sup> Annex 5.

<sup>422</sup> "Mykolaiv mayor urges residents to evacuate," dated 7 July 2022, found at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/7/7/ukraine-russia-live-news-strikes-on-kharkiv-mykolaiv-donetsk-liveblog>.

## Odesa Oblast



Occupying the heart of southwest Ukraine is Odesa, the country's third largest city and a major port and transportation hub. The city has substantial strategic value to both Ukraine and Russia, and has been a key Russian objective since the outset of the hostilities. While the heroic Ukrainian defense of Mykolayiv has blocked Russian ground advances from reaching Odesa Oblast, Russian naval forces have blockaded the port facilities.

The administrative center of the Ukrainian southwest, Odesa is home to two specialized regional courts, the Southwest Commercial Court of Appeals and the Fifth Administrative Court of Appeals. Covering a large and varied area, the *oblast* has 33 first instance courts along with its general jurisdiction court of appeal.<sup>423</sup> Prior to the current hostilities, two of the local courts in the city of Odesa were among the busiest in the country.<sup>424</sup>

Because ground fighting has not reached the Odesa Oblast, none of its courts have had their territorial jurisdiction transferred. On the other hand, the territorial jurisdictions of both the Kherson<sup>425</sup> and the Mykolayiv<sup>426</sup> commercial courts have been transferred to the Commercial Court of Odesa Oblast. Similarly, the territorial jurisdiction of the Kherson Circuit Administrative Court has been transferred to the corresponding court in Odesa.<sup>427</sup>

Missile strikes have hit the region, but residents of Odesa at the moment live relatively normal lives while working to support the Ukrainian forces holding out in Mykolayiv.<sup>428</sup> Throughout the *oblast*, the courts ostensibly are following their usual schedule.<sup>429</sup>

However, there are indications that some portion of the judiciary has left the area. At the beginning of the hostilities, records reflected that 207 judges were assigned to Odesa *oblast*'s local first instance courts.<sup>430</sup> As of June 1, 2022, those same courts reported 93 vacancies.<sup>431</sup> While it is unclear how many of these positions were vacant prior to February 24, the likelihood is that a significant number of judges have left their posts in the *oblast*.

Work in the *oblast*'s 17 district prosecutor's offices<sup>432</sup> continues, but with a different mix of cases. The Odesa Regional Prosecutor's Office reported that since February 24, there has been a significant decrease on the number of crimes reported. At the same time, prosecutors have commenced numerous investigations of war crimes and similar offenses.<sup>433</sup>

<sup>423</sup> Annex 1.

<sup>424</sup> "The ten busiest courts of Ukraine have been identified: details," dated 2 June 2022, found at <https://yaizakon.com.ua/opredelena-desyatka-samyh-zagruzhenyih-sudov-ukrainy-detali/>.

<sup>425</sup> Order No. 11/0/9-22, dated 18 March 2022.

<sup>426</sup> Order No. 12/0/9-22, dated 22 March 2022.

<sup>427</sup> Order No. 11/0/9-22, dated 18 March 2022.

<sup>428</sup> "Residents of Odesa feel remorse and gratitude as Mykolaiv, which is nearby, protects them from the horrors of war in Ukraine," dated 24 June 2022, found at <https://technotrenz.com/news/residents-of-odesa-feel-remorse-and-gratitude-as-mykolaiv-which-is-nearby-protects-them-from-the-horrors-of-war-in-ukraine-1980417.html>.

<sup>429</sup> See "News," found at <http://unba.odessa.ua/news/>.

<sup>430</sup> Annex 1.

<sup>431</sup> "If you ask, we answer," dated 3 June 2020, found at <https://od.court.gov.ua/tu16/pres-centr/interview/948816/>.

<sup>432</sup> Annex 3. No information could be located regarding the existence or locations of departmental prosecutor's offices in Odesa Oblast.

<sup>433</sup> The head of the Odesa regional prosecutor's office informed about the results of work under martial law," dated 24 June 2022, found at <https://yaizakon.com.ua/category/court/>.

Like many regional Bar Councils outside the immediate combat zones, the Bar Council of Odesa Oblast established various support and humanitarian mechanisms shortly after the war began.<sup>434</sup> As active hostilities were kept at bay, the Bar Council continued with its usual routine.

## Poltava Oblast



In the days following February 24, Russian troops swept north of the Poltava Oblast toward Kyiv and attacked east of the *oblast* in an effort to take Kharkiv. Though its infrastructure was pounded by missile strikes, the area has avoided ground assaults from Russian forces. Like other areas in central Ukraine, the *oblast* has both served as a transit point for refugees headed west, and seen tens of thousands of its own citizens join the flight.

All of the 31 first instance courts in the *oblast* continue to operate, but many under markedly different conditions. Though none of their territorial jurisdictions have been transferred, thirteen courts in the Poltava Oblast have had their territorial jurisdictions expanded. Nineteen jurisdictions were transferred from courts in the Kharkiv Oblast, plus two from the Sumy Oblast.<sup>435</sup> These jurisdictional transfers have required the Poltava Oblast courts to address war-related crimes arising from events to the north, since they now exercise jurisdiction over those areas.<sup>436</sup>

No statistical information is available regarding how many of the 187 judges assigned to courts in the Poltava *oblast* have left their positions.<sup>437</sup> Given the conditions in the region, it seems probable that a significant portion have left.

Prosecutors also continue to work in the *oblast*'s five district offices.<sup>438</sup> Like the courts, their workload is a mixture of "routine" criminal matters and some that are specifically related to the war.<sup>439</sup>

The Bar Council in Poltava Oblast also continued to work normally, though it removed personal information concerning lawyers from its website.<sup>440</sup> Yet despite its relatively safe location, lawyers in the Poltava *oblast* suffered a blow when an *advokat* was killed and another wounded in the now-infamous attack on a shopping mall in Kremenchuk.<sup>441</sup>

<sup>434</sup> "Attention! Extremely important information for lawyers of Odessa region!" dated 1 March 2022, found at <http://unba.odessa.ua/uvaga-vkraj-vazhlyva-informatsiya-dlya-advokativ-odeskoyi-oblasti/>.

<sup>435</sup> Annex 2.

<sup>436</sup> See, e.g., "Russian-controlled militants captured in Kharkiv Oblast imprisoned for 15 years," dated 22 June 2022, found at <https://news.yahoo.com/russian-controlled-militants-captured-kharkiv-152246283.html>; "Two Russians were sentenced to 11.5 years for shelling the Kharkiv region," dated 31 May 2022, found at <https://news.yahoo.com/two-russians-were-sentenced-11-084639288.html>.

<sup>437</sup> Annex 1.

<sup>438</sup> Annex 3. No information has been located concerning the existence or number of any departmental prosecutor's offices in the *oblast*.

<sup>439</sup> See <https://pol.gp.gov.ua/ua/aktualno.html#>.

<sup>440</sup> "To the Lawyers of Poltava Region," dated 3 March 2022, found at <https://www.advokatura.poltava.ua/news/do-advokativ-poltavskoyi-oblasti>.

<sup>441</sup> "Attention! Need help!" dated 4 July 2022, found at <https://www.advokatura.poltava.ua/news/uvaga-potribna-do-pomoga-3>.

## Rivne Oblast



One of the smaller *oblasts* in Ukraine, the Rivne *Oblast* lies on the Belarusian border in the country's northwestern region and is home to Ukraine's second largest nuclear power facility. In the days after February 24, residents and police in the *oblast* built barricades to stop the predicted Russian invasion.<sup>442</sup> However, because it was sufficiently distant from Kyiv, it was not involved in the Russian ground assault from Belarus against the capital.

Like much of central and western Ukraine, the Rivne *Oblast* has been hit with sporadic, but deadly, missile strikes. These attacks have not damaged any courts in the *oblast*; none have been closed or had their territorial jurisdictions transferred. One first instance court in the Rivne *oblast* briefly took over the territorial jurisdiction of three courts in Zhytomyr *Oblast*, but that order was reversed after about six weeks.<sup>443</sup>

Accordingly, the work of the *oblast's* 18 first instance courts and its *oblast* court of appeals continues uninterrupted. Rivne *Oblast* is also home to the Northwest Commercial Court of Appeals, a regional second instance court handling commercial appeals from the Vinnytsya, Volyn, Zhytomyr, Rivne, and Khmelnytsky *oblasts*.<sup>444</sup>

As in other areas of Ukraine, prosecutors in the Rivne *Oblast* have noted a significant decrease in crime since the Russian invasion.<sup>445</sup> Despite that decrease, prosecutors continued to prosecute "ordinary" crimes,<sup>446</sup> as well as develop mechanisms for addressing crimes that had not been encountered before the latest Russian aggression in Ukraine.<sup>447</sup> The Bar Council in the *oblast* similarly continued essentially "business as usual."<sup>448</sup>

## Sumy Oblast



The *oblast* of Sumy was a focal point for the Russian assault on Ukraine in late February 2022. From bases inside Russia, its forces attempted to race across the Sumy *Oblast* to attack Kyiv from the east, while other forces attacked from the north and west. This plan meant that the Russian military in some cases passed through parts of the *oblast* without making an effort to control the area, on the assumption that those locations could later be secured.

442 "We will stand for our city.' Ukrainian city of Rivne mayor speaks to News 12 about arming citizens," dated 1 March 2022, found at <https://longisland.news12.com/we-will-stand-for-our-city-ukrainian-city-of-rivne-mayor-speaks-to-news-12-about-arming-citizens>.

443 Annex 2.

444 *Ibid*.

445 "'Crime in Rivne Region Decreased by a Third' – Andriy Rudnytski," dated 18 May 2022, found at <https://pro.gov.ua/zlochynnist-na-rivnenshchyni-znyzylas-na-tretnu-andriy-rudnycky>.

446 "Under Martial Law, Prosecutors Sent Almost Half a Hundred Indictments to Court, the Same Number of Sentences Were Passed," dated 24 March 2022, found at <https://pro.gov.ua/v-umovah-voyennogo-stanu-prokurory-skeruvaly-do-sudu-mayzhe-piv-sotni-obvynuvalnyh-aktiv-shche>.

447 "Detection of Collaborators and Prevention of Theft of "Humanitarian" – Law Enforcement Officers of Riven Region Outlined the Current Directions of Work," dated 24 May 2022, found at <https://pro.gov.ua/vyavlennya-kolaborantiv-ta-poperedzhennya-rozkRadannya-gumanitarky-pravoohoronci-rivnenshchyny>.

448 See "News," found at <http://raro.in.ua/news/news>.

When the Russian offensive against Kyiv failed, many of these forces retraced their steps back across the *oblast* toward Russia. By April 6, Russian forces had withdrawn from all of the Sumy *Oblast*.<sup>449</sup> Since that time, the region has been hit by periodic cross-border shelling and occasional probes by Russian forces, but no significant territorial advances.

Sumy *Oblast* accordingly is a patchwork of areas that had never been touched, were bypassed but never occupied, or were subject to significant Russian violence but are now liberated. The impact on the courts of the *oblast* was appreciable. At least four of the *oblast*'s 20 courts were damaged.<sup>450</sup> Given the violence, the territorial jurisdictions of three local first instance courts and the commercial court in Sumy *Oblast* were transferred, though two were later restored.<sup>451</sup>

It is unclear how many of the 122 first and second instance judges assigned to the courts of the *oblast* at the start of the hostilities remain working.<sup>452</sup> Given the level of violence and proximity of Russian forces, the sense remains that the region is unsafe, suggesting that a significant number of judges may not have remained at or resumed their posts.

Official reports concerning damage to prosecutor's offices or the displacement of prosecutors are not available. As in other areas subject to intense hostilities, prosecutors still working in the *oblast* have been devoting substantial time to documenting war crimes and similar offenses.<sup>453</sup>

Prior to the war, fewer *advokats* were working in the Sumy *Oblast* than in any other region in Ukraine.<sup>454</sup> In view of the violence that shattered the region, it appears that many fled, and that the Bar Council is struggling to regain its footing.

## Ternopil *Oblast*



Situated in west-central Ukraine, the rocky, mountainous Ternopil *oblast* is on the transit corridor between Western Europe and Kyiv and the country's industrial areas in the East. When Russian attacks began in late February 2022, the *oblast* became a pathway for refugees fleeing further west, and supplies from the West destined for the eastern battlefields. Though far from the front, the region continues to see Russian missile attacks.<sup>455</sup>

These attacks have not damaged any court structures or required that the territorial jurisdiction of any Ternopil *oblast* court be transferred. All 17 of the *oblast*'s first instance courts and its court of appeals continue to function.<sup>456</sup> However, no information is available concerning how many of the *oblast*'s small cadre of 91 first instance and 15 second instance judges continue to work.<sup>457</sup>

449 "Russo-Ukrainian war, day 43: Russian troops left Sumy *Oblast*, preparing an offensive in Donbas in 3-4 days," dated 7 April 2022, found at <https://euromaidanpress.com/2022/04/07/russo-ukrainian-war-day-43-russian-troops-left-sumy-oblast-preparing-an-offensive-in-donbas-in-3-4-days/>.

450 Annex 1.

451 Annex 2.

452 Annex 1.

453 See "News," found at [https://sumy.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=cat&id=117266&fp=0](https://sumy.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=cat&id=117266&fp=0).

454 Annex 5.

455 "Chortkiv, Ukraine, rocket attack injures 22, regional governor says," dated 12 June 2022, found at <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/rocket-attack-ukraines-chortkiv-city-injures-22-regional-governor-2022-06-12/>.

456 "Head of territorial department paid working visits to all local general courts of Ternopil region," dated 20 June 2022, found at <https://te.court.gov.ua/tu20/pres-centr/news/1286243/>; "Meeting with heads of local general courts of Ternopil region," dated 23 June 2022, found at <https://te.court.gov.ua/tu20/pres-centr/news/1287624/>.

457 Annex 1.

The *oblast*'s six district prosecutor's offices remain open,<sup>458</sup> and continue to work on a variety of matters.<sup>459</sup> Though away from the active hostilities, prosecutors in the Ternopil *oblast* also worked with refugees to gather evidence on war crimes committed in other regions.<sup>460</sup>

## Kharkiv Oblast



The battle for Kharkiv fixated the attention of the world in the Spring of 2022. Ukraine's second-largest city, located roughly 50 kilometers from the Russian border, Kharkiv was a prime objective for Russian forces. For weeks, the two armies fought in the surrounding *oblast* and city outskirts, while Russian artillery pounded the area. By mid-May, Russian forces had withdrawn from the immediate vicinity of Kharkiv, relieving the pressure on the city.

By late May, Ukrainian forces controlled roughly 70% of the Kharkiv *Oblast*.<sup>461</sup> Russian forces, however, continued to occupy areas in the east of the *oblast* in the vicinity of Izyum, which it captured in early April.<sup>462</sup> Using the Izyum bridgehead, Russian forces continued to push south toward areas in Luhansk *Oblast* that were the scene of intense attacks.<sup>463</sup>

The courts of Kharkiv *Oblast* suffered significantly from this intense combat. Prior to February 24, the *oblast* was home to 37 first instance courts with 290 judges. Moreover, the city of Kharkiv was a major court center, serving as home to an additional 66 second instance judges from three courts: the Kharkiv *Oblast* Court of Appeals, the Eastern Commercial Court of Appeals, and the Second Administrative Court of Appeals.<sup>464</sup> The number of courts were further increased when the Donetsk and Luhansk Commercial Courts, and the Luhansk Commercial Court of Appeals were moved to Kharkiv in 2014.<sup>465</sup>

On February 24, the Kharkiv *Oblast* Court of Appeals suspended all work in the region's courts.<sup>466</sup> During the subsequent fighting in the *oblast*, 19 court buildings were damaged or destroyed.<sup>467</sup> While many of the structures remained standing, the exteriors and office spaces were heavily damaged.<sup>468</sup>

The territorial jurisdictions of 60% (23 out of 37) local first instance courts in Kharkiv *Oblast* were transferred to courts in the Poltava and Dnipropetrovsk *oblasts*, while the Kharkiv *Oblast* Court of Appeals was transferred to the Poltava *Oblast* Court of Appeals. Eight of those first

<sup>458</sup> Annex 3. No information is available on the existence or number of departmental prosecutor's offices in Ternopil *Oblast*.

<sup>459</sup> See "News," found at <https://tern.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html>.

<sup>460</sup> "Dear Ukrainians who came from the places of hostilities to the Ternopil region!" dated 19 March 2022, found at [https://tern.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=311903&fp=63](https://tern.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=311903&fp=63).

<sup>461</sup> "Ukraine, Russia battle in the east as Zelenskyy visits front," dated 29 May 2022, found at <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/russia-takes-small-cities-aims-widen-east-ukraine-85047943>.

<sup>462</sup> "Russo-Ukrainian war, day 38: Ukraine recaptures large swathes of terrain near Kyiv as Russia focuses on Ukraine's east," dated 2 April 2022, found at <https://euromaidanpress.com/2022/04/02/russo-ukrainian-war-latest-news-april-2/>.

<sup>463</sup> "Zelenskyy discusses EU membership with Macron; fighting rages in key city of Severodonetsk," dated 10 June 2022, found at <https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/09/russia-ukraine-live-updates.html>.

<sup>464</sup> Annex 2.

<sup>465</sup> Decree No. 868/2014, dated 12 November 2014.

<sup>466</sup> "Important! Attention lawyers! The work of the courts is suspended!" dated 24 February 2022, found at <https://advokat.org.ua/articles/1601-vazhlyvo-do-uvahy-advokativ-roboty-sudiv-pryzupynena.html>.

<sup>467</sup> SJA Report.

<sup>468</sup> *Ibid*.

instance courts are in territory occupied by Russian forces, and another three are located where active hostilities are continuing.<sup>469</sup>

For the remaining courts, including the 14 local first instance courts in the *oblast* whose jurisdictions were not transferred,<sup>470</sup> steps have been taken to expand the security in court buildings.<sup>471</sup> The Supreme Court also has been asked to restore the territorial jurisdictions of 10 of the 23 transferred courts, but no decision has been made.<sup>472</sup>

The intensity of the combat in the Kharkiv region and the closure of so many courts suggests that a significant number of the judges in the Kharkiv *Oblast* are not presently working in their positions. Detailed information on the current status of the *oblast's* judges could not be located. At least one judge in an outlying local court, however, is under investigation for cooperating with the enemy, since she allegedly called on her subordinates to join a planned Russian-installed judiciary.<sup>473</sup>

When the attacks began on February 24, the *oblast's* regional prosecutor's office moved quickly to remove vital documents, and destroy those that need not be retained.<sup>474</sup> Given the destruction and ongoing hostilities, it is unclear how many of the *oblast's* 14 district and 17 departmental prosecutor's office remain open.<sup>475</sup> Nonetheless, the regional office identified six priority areas for the *oblast's* prosecutors: documentation of war crimes, treason, collaboration, protection of the property from theft and looting, prevention of abuses in the distribution of humanitarian aid, and the prosecution of so-called "pseudo-volunteers."<sup>476</sup>

The Kharkiv *Oblast* also was home to nearly 3,000 *advokats* before the war.<sup>477</sup> When the work of the courts was suspended on February 24, many joined the exodus from the region. Some unknown number joined the Armed Forces and territorial defense forces,<sup>478</sup> with at least one being killed.<sup>479</sup>

469 "The head of the territorial administration took part in the meeting," dated 14 July 2022, found at <https://hr.court.gov.ua/tu21/pres-centr/nov/1295858/>.

470 "Information on local general courts of Kharkiv and Kharkiv region, the jurisdiction over the consideration of cases of which was transferred to the courts of Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava regions," dated 8 June 2022, found at <https://hr.court.gov.ua/tu21/pres-centr/nov/1282469/>.

471 "Joint meeting of the leadership of the Territorial Department of the State Judicial Administration of Ukraine in Kharkiv region and the leadership of the Territorial Department of the Judicial Protection Service in Kharkiv region," dated 6 June 2022, found at <https://dbr.gov.ua/news/dbr-povidomilo-pro-pidozru-u-derzhavnij-zradi-golovam-dvoh-rajonnih-sudiv-na-luganshhini-ta-harkivshhini>; "A joint meeting was held between the territorial administration, SSO and local general courts of the Ivano-Frankivsk region," dated 7 July 2022, found at <https://if.court.gov.ua/tu09/pres-centr/news/1295830/>.

472 "The head of the territorial administration took part in the meeting," dated 14 July 2022, found at <https://hr.court.gov.ua/tu21/pres-centr/nov/1295858/>.

473 "SBI reported on suspicion of treason to the heads of two district courts in Luhansk and Kharkiv regions," dated 15 May 2022, found at <https://dbr.gov.ua/news/dbr-povidomilo-pro-pidozru-u-derzhavnij-zradi-golovam-dvoh-rajonnih-sudiv-na-luganshhini-ta-harkivshhini>.

474 "We know the majority of persons involved in crimes against the people of Ukraine – the head of the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor's Office," dated 5 May 2022, found at [https://khar.gp.gov.ua/ua/intervu\\_ta\\_komentari?\\_m=publications&\\_c=view&\\_t=rec&id=313141](https://khar.gp.gov.ua/ua/intervu_ta_komentari?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=313141).

475 Annex 3.

476 "We know the majority of persons involved in crimes against the people of Ukraine – the head of the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor's Office," dated 5 May 2022, found at [https://khar.gp.gov.ua/ua/intervu\\_ta\\_komentari?\\_m=publications&\\_c=view&\\_t=rec&id=313141](https://khar.gp.gov.ua/ua/intervu_ta_komentari?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=313141).

477 Annex 5.

478 "The Bar Council of Kharkiv region expresses its gratitude to our lawyers, assistants and trainees who defend Ukraine in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Theroboron," dated 23 March 2022, found at <https://advokat.org.ua/articles/1605-Rada-advokativ-kharkivskoyi-oblasti-vyslovyuye-vdyachnist-nashym-advokat-am-pomichnykam-ta-staz.html>.

479 "In memory of the deceased defender of Ukraine lawyer Dmitry Antonenko," dated 28 June 2022, found at <https://advokat.org.ua/articles/1622-pam-yati-zahybloho-zakhysnyka-ukrayiny-advokata-dmytra-antonenka.html>.

## Kherson Oblast



Kherson *Oblast* is the pivot point for Russian aggression along the Black Sea coast of Ukraine. Lying just north of the narrow isthmus connecting Crimea to the mainland, the *oblast* was a natural route for Russian forces from the south to attack north and then spread east and west along the coast. On the morning of February 24, the Russian assault began, and by March 2, the city of Kherson – the administrative center of the *oblast* – surrendered.

In succeeding days, Russian forces sought to occupy the entire *oblast* and to make Kherson a centerpiece of the “Russification” of Ukraine.<sup>480</sup> Local Ukrainian officials were arrested, and pro-Russian surrogates were installed. In mid-June, Russian occupation authorities began handing out Russian passports to local Ukrainians and plans for a referendum on annexation to Russia were reported.

But other factors have thrown some doubt on that scheme. Peaceful anti-Russian citizen protests in Kherson reportedly have given way to violent partisan attacks in the *oblast*.<sup>481</sup> Moreover, Ukrainian officials have claimed that their forces have regained territory in the north of the *oblast*,<sup>482</sup> and suggest that a major counteroffensive may begin in the region by August 2022.<sup>483</sup>

Regardless of those claims, the Kherson *Oblast* at present is almost completely controlled by Russian forces. In the battle to occupy the *oblast*, at least seven court buildings were damaged and computers and other materials stolen.<sup>484</sup> The territorial jurisdictions of all 22 first instance courts in the Kherson *oblast*,<sup>485</sup> as well as the territorial jurisdiction of the Kherson *Oblast* Court of Appeals, have been transferred to other courts in the Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk *oblasts*.<sup>486</sup>

With no courts functioning in the *oblast*, there is scant information concerning the judges previously assigned to those courts. Indeed, the website for the Kherson *Oblast* courts simply reads: “In order to prevent threats to the life and health of judges and participants in the trial during martial law, access is temporarily suspended.”<sup>487</sup>

Though no official statement has been released, it seems likely that all six district and four departmental prosecutor’s offices in the Kherson *Oblast* have been closed. Prosecutors from the area reportedly were evacuated to Mykolayiv on February 24–25, where they were given housing and new jobs. When Russian troops began to advance toward Mykolayiv, some were sent to other regions and are working under the direction of the Office of the Prosecutor General.<sup>488</sup>

480 See “‘Russia Is Here Forever,’ Top Putin Ally Tells Occupied Ukraine City,” dated 6 May 2022, found at <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-here-forever-putin-ally-andrei-turchak-kherson-1704311>.

481 See “Growing partisan movement of Kherson *Oblast* now bombs collaborators,” dated 25 June 2022, found at <https://euromaidanpress.com/2022/06/25/growing-partisan-movement-of-kherson-oblast-now-bombs-collaborators/>.

482 “Counteroffensive in Kherson ‘quite successful’: Ukraine,” dated 22 June 2022, found at <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/counteroffensive-in-kherson-quite-successful-ukraine/2619995>.

483 “Ukraine should see impact of Kherson counterattack from August, spy chief says,” dated 25 June 2022, found at <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-should-see-impact-kherson-counterattack-august-spy-chief-2022-06-25/>.

484 See SJA Report.

485 Annex 1. Some reports have indicated that there were three additional local courts located in the city of Kherson, but no judges have been shown as assigned to them on February 22, 2022, and no orders were entered to transfer their territorial jurisdictions after the fall of Kherson.

486 Annex 2.

487 See <https://ks.court.gov.ua/tu22/>.

488 “‘The war has made its own adjustments’: Interview with the Deputy Prosecutor of the Mykolaiv region,” dated 2 April 2022, found at <https://news.pn/ru/RussiaInvadedUkraine/269970>.

Despite these evacuations, the Kherson Regional Prosecutor's Office continues to be working on a variety of matters, primarily involving the documentation of war crimes, treason, and collaboration occurring in the *oblast*.<sup>489</sup> Prosecutors also are looking for witnesses to the violent dispersal and arrest of non-violent citizen protesters by Russian troops.<sup>490</sup> In a show of resilience, the regional office even announced that it is hiring additional staff.<sup>491</sup>

Prior to the war, relatively few *advokats* were practicing in the Kherson *Oblast*.<sup>492</sup> In recent weeks, Ukrainian officials have been urging the residents of Kherson to evacuate ahead of the planned Ukrainian military offensive.<sup>493</sup> Presumably, most *advokats* have heeded those warnings, though the *oblast*'s Bar Council continues to post items on its website suggesting that it is meeting as normal in Kherson,<sup>494</sup> and other items reflecting its headquarters' address in Kherson.<sup>495</sup>

## Khmelnyskiy Oblast



In November 2020, the Regional Prosecutor announced that Khmelnytskyi *Oblast* was the safest place in Ukraine. Drunk driving and computer fraud persisted, but the *oblast* generally remained safe.<sup>496</sup> Eighteen months later, the country's circumstances have dramatically changed, but the *oblast* may still be the safest in Ukraine. It endured frightening air raid warnings and a handful of actual missile strikes, but relatively little physical damage from the war.

The 20 first instance and one second instance courts in the Khmelnytskyi *Oblast* are intact,<sup>497</sup> with no physical damage and no transfers of territorial jurisdiction. Nor are there any indications of any significant departures from among the members of the bench due to the war. Prosecutors in the *oblast*'s five district offices<sup>498</sup> continue to charge fraudsters and drunk drivers, though now they also deal with crimes not previously seen such as treason or collaboration with or support for the enemy.<sup>499</sup>

<sup>489</sup> See <https://kherson.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html>.

<sup>490</sup> "Attention! The Prosecutor's office is looking for witnesses who know the circumstances and information about the missing people after the rallies against the invaders in Kherson," dated 24 May 2022, found at [https://kherson.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=313813&fp=20](https://kherson.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=313813&fp=20).

<sup>491</sup> "The Kherson Regional Prosecutor's Office announced the selection for the vacant position of the civil service during the period of martial law: chief specialist of the financing and accounting department," dated 6 June 2022, found at [https://kherson.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=314239&fp=10](https://kherson.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=314239&fp=10).

<sup>492</sup> Annex 5.

<sup>493</sup> "Ukraine urges people of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia to evacuate," dated 9 July 2022, found at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/09/ukraine-urges-people-of-kherson-and-zaporizhzhia-to-evacuate>.

<sup>494</sup> "Announcement," dated 26 April 2022, found at <http://advokat.csit.org.ua/>.

<sup>495</sup> See, e.g., Decision No. 46 of 29-06-2022, dated 7 July 2022, found at <http://feeds.feedburner.com/advokatkherson>.

<sup>496</sup> "Khmelnyskiy Region is the Safest for Citizens to Live In – Regional Prosecutor," dated 19 November 2020, found at <https://www.xm-inside.com/statti/hmelnichchyna-ye-najbilsh-bezpechnoyu-dlya-prozhyvannya-gromadyan-oblasnyj-prokuror/>.

<sup>497</sup> Annex 1.

<sup>498</sup> Annex 3. No information is available on the existence or number of departmental prosecutor's offices in Khmelnytskyi *oblast*.

<sup>499</sup> See "News," found at <https://khmel.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html>.

As in most *oblasts*, the *oblast's* Bar Council mobilized its members for a variety of activities including emergency medical training, firearms training, and the resettlement and employment of women with children abroad.<sup>500</sup> A number of *advokats* from the Khmelnytskyi *Oblast* have enlisted in the Armed Forces and territorial defense forces,<sup>501</sup> and other *advokats* assumed their cases.<sup>502</sup> The *oblast's* Bar Council also assisted with the resettlement of *advokats* from other regions of Ukraine, including providing them with jobs and office space.<sup>503</sup>

## Cherkasy Oblast



Not by coincidence, Cherkasy *oblast* is an official “sister state” with the American state of Iowa. Both lie in the geographic heartlands of their countries, and both are agricultural powerhouses. But Cherkasy *oblast* now finds itself caught in the crosscurrents of the war of Russian aggression. The war can be felt in the region. Battles have raged to the north, east, and south, and Russia continues missile strikes against targets in the *oblast*.<sup>504</sup>

Yet residents continue to work, with many volunteering to aid the Ukrainian armed forces or displaced persons – some 80,000 in the region – in their spare time. Others joined territorial defense units and patrol their routes.<sup>505</sup>

In this environment, the courts of Cherkasy *Oblast* attempt to continue their work.<sup>506</sup> Neither the *oblast* court of appeals nor any of the 23 first instance courts<sup>507</sup> have been damaged or lost their territorial jurisdictions. Conditions in other *oblasts* led the Ukrainian government in March 2022 to transfer the territorial jurisdictions of 14 courts from Chernihiv and Sumy *oblasts* to seven different courts in the Cherkasy *Oblast*, but those changes were reversed several weeks later in May 2022.<sup>508</sup>

No data has been located reflecting the current status of the 130 judges assigned to the Cherkasy *oblast* before February 24.<sup>509</sup> Like all courts, the courts in the Cherkasy *Oblast* are struggling with financial issues and the payment of salaries to judges and employees.<sup>510</sup> Nine judges have been seconded to the *oblast's* first instance courts from courts in occupied areas.<sup>511</sup>

500 “The Front of Good Deeds,” dated 22 March 2022, found at <http://kmRada-unba.org/?p=6989>.

501 “Since the beginning of the invasion of Russian troops on the territory of Ukraine, lawyers of Khmelnytskyi region and their families have been actively involved in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and territorial defense,” dated 22 March 2022, found at <http://kmRada-unba.org/?p=6985>.

502 “According to the results of an emergency meeting of the Bar Council of Khmelnytskyi region and the Committee for the Protection of lawyers’ rights, it was decided,” dated 24 February 2022, found at <http://kmRada-unba.org/?p=6943>.

503 “Working offices for lawyers from other regions have been created in Khmelnytskyi *oblast*,” dated 22 March 2022, found at <http://kmRada-unba.org/?p=6976>.

504 “Missiles kill one person and hit strategic bridge near Ukraine’s Cherkasy, officials say,” dated 26 June 2022, found at <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/missile-strikes-kill-one-near-central-ukrainian-city-cherkasy-governor-2022-06-26/>.

505 “How central Ukraine is reacting to war and its new displaced residents,” dated 26 April 2022, found at <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/ukraine-russia-cherkasy-displaced-persons/>.

506 “On June 26, 2022, a video conference was held to consider topical issues that arise in the work of local general courts of Cherkasy region during the wartime period,” dated 24 June 2022, found at <https://ck.court.gov.ua/tu24/pres-centr/news/1288201/>.

507 Annex 1.

508 Annex 2.

509 Annex 1.

510 “On June 26, 2022, a video conference was held to consider topical issues that arise in the work of local general courts of Cherkasy region during the wartime period,” dated 24 June 2022, found at <https://ck.court.gov.ua/tu24/pres-centr/news/1288201/>.

511 “Information on the secondment of judges to local general courts of the Cherkasy region,” dated 15 July 2022, found at <https://ck.court.gov.ua/tu24/pres-centr/news/1296182/>.

Since the *oblast* has no large population centers, its prosecutors are dispersed, with five district offices and 16 departmental offices in the *oblast*.<sup>512</sup> Those offices continue to work,<sup>513</sup> handling a mix of cases.<sup>514</sup> With the start of the war, some enlisted and at least one prosecutor has died in combat.<sup>515</sup>

## Chernivtsi Oblast



The smallest *oblast* in Ukraine by area and population, the Chernivtsi *oblast* may also be the most remote. Tucked along the border with Romania and Moldova, the *oblast* has little infrastructure of military importance, and no reports of any Russian attacks. But since the start of the recent conflict, it has become a sanctuary: the area's population has grown by 150,000 people, increasing the demand for food, shelter and medical care.<sup>516</sup>

Given its remoteness, none of the Chernivtsi *oblast*'s 15 first instance courts, or the general jurisdiction *oblast* court of appeals,<sup>517</sup> have suffered any damage or received transfers of territorial jurisdiction from courts in other *oblasts*. The *oblast*'s judicial corps of 97 judges is the smallest in the country, and continues to function, handling routine cases<sup>518</sup> as well as those related to wartime conditions.<sup>519</sup>

The three district and six departmental prosecutor's offices in the *oblast* likewise pursue a mixed diet of cases. A significant number deal with attempts to illegally cross the relatively porous borders by deserters and men seeking to avoid military service.<sup>520</sup> The regional prosecutor has indicated that his office is focused on combating organized crime, as well as collecting evidence of war crimes from the thousands of internally displaced persons now in the *oblast*.<sup>521</sup>

Given the *oblast*'s remote location, its *advokats* have been less affected by the war than in other regions. Nonetheless, several have been mobilized into the Armed Forces,<sup>522</sup> and other *advokats* in the *oblast* have assumed their cases.<sup>523</sup>

512 Annex 3.

513 "Cherkasy regional prosecutor's office and district prosecutor's offices of the region continue to work in conditions of war," dated 4 March 2022, found at [https://chk.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=311723&fp=140](https://chk.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=311723&fp=140).

514 See "News," found at <https://chk.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?fp=0>.

515 "Eternal memory!" dated 30 May 2022, found at [https://chk.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=314071&fp=50](https://chk.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=314071&fp=50).

516 "Saskatoon raises \$250k for Ukrainian sister city," dated 4 May 2022, found at <https://globalnews.ca/news/8810444/saskatoon-raises-250k-for-ukrainian-sister-city/>.

517 Annex 2.

518 See, e.g., "Suspected of ill-treatment of peacock taken into custody - the court satisfied the appeal of the Prosecutor's office," dated 23 June 2022, found at [https://chnr.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=315176&fp=10](https://chnr.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=315176&fp=10).

519 See, e.g., "Calls for the overthrow of the constitutional order and propaganda of war will judge bukovinian," dated 6 May 2022, found at [https://chnr.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=313215&fp=70](https://chnr.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=313215&fp=70).

520 See <https://chnr.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?fp=0>.

521 "Head of Chernivtsi Regional Prosecutor's Office met with representatives of the European Union Advisory Mission in Ukraine," dated 21 June 2022, found at [https://chnr.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=315054&fp=10](https://chnr.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=315054&fp=10).

522 "Decisions were made at a meeting of the Council of Advocates of Chernivtsi region June 24, 2022," dated 24 June 2022, found at [https://12cc3e78-a81d-dbd9-6170-9717cf815f2e.filesusr.com/ugd/c81e5e\\_2feb1183e79c4b79b-6c263f00ac6e2f8.pdf](https://12cc3e78-a81d-dbd9-6170-9717cf815f2e.filesusr.com/ugd/c81e5e_2feb1183e79c4b79b-6c263f00ac6e2f8.pdf).

523 "TO THE ATTENTION OF THE REGION'S LAWYERS! Decision of rar from 25.02.2022 No2/25," dated 25 February 2022, found at [https://12cc3e78-a81d-dbd9-6170-9717cf815f2e.filesusr.com/ugd/c81e5e\\_3dfe4672342f4377a58f139ce1004820.pdf](https://12cc3e78-a81d-dbd9-6170-9717cf815f2e.filesusr.com/ugd/c81e5e_3dfe4672342f4377a58f139ce1004820.pdf).

## Chernihiv Oblast



The city of Chernihiv is about 75 kilometers from Belarusian border. On the morning of February 24, hundreds of Russian tanks and other armored vehicles poured across the border, intent on attacking Kyiv to the south. For 39 days, Russian forces besieged the city. After they withdrew in early April, an estimated seven hundred people had died, though many others likely died from exposure, lack of medical care, and shortages of food and medicines.<sup>524</sup>

Across the Chernihiv *oblast*, the damage to the courts' infrastructure was significant. Roughly a quarter of the *oblast's* 26 first instance courts, as well as the Chernihiv *Oblast* Court of Appeal, suffered damage from the Russian bombardment.<sup>525</sup> In early March, the territorial jurisdictions of all but one of the courts in the *oblast* were transferred to courts in neighboring areas.<sup>526</sup>

When the Russian forces withdrew, the territorial jurisdictions of the Chernihiv courts were restored, and the courts resumed working.<sup>527</sup> But it is unclear how many judges and court personnel remain. The devastation in the region was severe, driving tens of thousands to flee the region.<sup>528</sup> Though Russian ground forces have withdrawn behind the Belarusian border, attacks on the Chernihiv *Oblast* continue.<sup>529</sup>

These conditions also impact the work of the regional and six district prosecutor's offices in the Chernihiv *Oblast*.<sup>530</sup> With much of the population absent and commercial life at a standstill, much of prosecutors' work is on matters preceding the war or related to the Russian aggression.<sup>531</sup>

*Advokats* in the *oblast* were also hit hard by the violence and destruction.<sup>532</sup> Slowly, justice systems in the region are beginning to recover. On May 26, the day after the courts fully reopened, the Chernihiv *Oblast* Bar Council was able to resume work in its offices.<sup>533</sup>

## Kyiv City



As in most countries, the political capital – Kyiv – also is the center of the country's judicial and legal community. Home to the Constitutional and Supreme Courts, and HACC, as well as agencies responsible for judicial administration such as the HQCJ, HCJ and SJA, Kyiv is the nerve center for much of the judiciary. As discussed in preceding sections, the future of those entities will be affected by the war and the baggage from pre-war events.

524 "The Siege of Chernihiv," dated 15 April 2022, found at <https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-siege-of-cherernihiv>.

525 See SJA Report.

526 Annex 2.

527 *Ibid.*; "25 courts in Chernihiv region resumed work," dated 5 May 2022, found at <https://cn.court.gov.ua/tu25/pres-centr/news/1272524/>.

528 "From the Frontlines of the Ukraine Invasion by Russia, a Mad Dash To Rescue Refugees," dated 22 April 2022, found at <https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/frontlines-ukraine-invasion-russia-mad-dash-rescue-refugees>.

529 "Border Guard Service records about 230 Russia's attacks on Chernihiv and Sumy regions in June," dated 23 June 2022, found at <https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/841092.html>.

530 Annex 3. No information has been located regarding the existence or number of departmental prosecutor's offices in the Chernihiv *Oblast*.

531 See <https://chrg.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html>.

532 See "Born during the war," dated 28 June 2022, found at <https://uacrisis.org/en/narodytysya-pid-chas-vijny>.

533 "Attention Lawyers," dated 17 May 2022, found at <https://advokatRada.cn.ua>.

But the city of Kyiv also is the commercial hub of Ukraine and, at least prior to the war, its most populous city. The city's "local" courts handle cases that, both in volume and significance, outweigh the work of other equivalent courts in Ukraine. Prior to February 24, six of the country's ten busiest courts were first instance courts in the city of Kyiv.<sup>534</sup>

Not surprisingly, the ten local first instance courts in the city of Kyiv have more judges than the local first instance courts of any *oblast*.<sup>535</sup> Similarly, the general jurisdiction court of appeals and commercial court in the city of Kyiv have more judges than comparable courts in any *oblast*.<sup>536</sup>

Though the national and local courts in the city of Kyiv were not specifically targeted by Russian attacks after February 24, they were part of the Ukrainian governmental infrastructure that President Putin intended to decapitate. Two of the local courts were damaged by shock waves from missile strikes.<sup>537</sup> No other damage has been reported, despite sporadic Russian missile attacks that continue to hit the city.<sup>538</sup>

As with other citizens of Kyiv, some judges elected to leave the city when the attacks on Kyiv began, often to move the families west to safer areas.<sup>539</sup> No official data is available concerning the number of the first and second instance judges assigned to courts in the city who have left and not returned to their positions.

The Kyiv City Prosecutor's Office mirrors the courts structure with ten district prosecutor's offices.<sup>540</sup> And, as with the courts, those offices continue to operate, though there is no official data concerning the number of prosecutors who have left their positions in the city of Kyiv.

Hamstrung by the pre-war political infighting within the Bar,<sup>541</sup> the Bar Council in the City of Kyiv has been dysfunctional since the start of the war. The UNBA has assumed the local Bar Council's powers,<sup>542</sup> but the outcome of the current dispute is unclear. Meanwhile, *advokats* from Kyiv deal with the Russian aggression like other residents of the city, with some joining military forces,<sup>543</sup> some fleeing,<sup>544</sup> and others staying to carry-on in the city.<sup>545</sup>

534 "The ten busiest courts of Ukraine have been identified: details," dated 2 June 2022, found at <https://yaizakon.com.ua/opredelena-desyatka-samyh-zagruzhennyh-sudov-ukrainy-detali/>.

535 Annex 1.

536 *Ibid*.

537 Annex 2; "The Premises of the Capital's Courts Suffered from the Explosion of the Missiles," dated 26 February 2022, found at <https://ki.court.gov.ua/tu11/pres-centr/news/1284391/>.

538 "Russia strikes Kyiv as G-7 summit begins," dated 26 June 2022, found at <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/russia-strikes-kyiv-as-g-7-summit-begins>.

539 Kniaziev Interview.

540 Annex 3.

541 See "The Council of Advocates of The City of Kyiv of the past did not provide a transparent and open mode of operation," dated 16 February 2022, found at <https://kyiv.unba.org.ua/activity/news/7291-Rada-advokativ-mis-ta-kieva-minulogo-skladu-ne-zabezpechila-prozorogo-i-vidkritogo-rezhimu-roboti.html>.

542 "Current contacts of the Secretariat of the Kyiv KDKA," dated 7 June 2022, found at <https://kyiv.unba.org.ua/activity/news/7457-aktual-ni-kontakti-sekretariatu-kdka-m-kieva.html>.

543 "Lawyers, a factory worker among the ordinary Ukrainians holding the line against Russia at Izyum," dated 25 May 2022, found at <https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukrainian-nationalists-izyum-1.6463544>.

544 "Refugee lawyer describes harrowing invasion of Ukraine," dated 14 April 2022, found at <https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/at-aba-panel-refugee-lawyer-describes-harrowing-invasion-of-ukraine>.

545 "As male colleagues help fight in Ukraine, women are left to defend the legal system," dated 31 March 2022, found at <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/as-male-colleagues-help-fight-in-ukraine-women-are-left-to-defend-the-legal-system-7f5wbksjv>.

## Challenges for a Post-Conflict Justice System

With Putin showing no signs of relenting in his war against Ukraine and its democratic system, months or years of further violence appear on the horizon. Though the country is preoccupied with the military essentials for survival, stakeholders in the justice system struggle to keep it afloat.

Others are looking ahead at the priorities for the coming years.<sup>546</sup> While the outcome of the ongoing military struggle remains uncertain, the nature of the conflict coupled with the pre-war issues facing Ukraine provide insights into the challenges likely to face the country's justice system in a post-conflict environment. Among these are:

**Rebuilding destroyed, damaged, and looted courts.** Perhaps the most obvious issue facing the Ukrainian judicial system is physical infrastructure. Roughly 10% of the court structures functioning on February 24, 2022 have been destroyed, damaged, and/or looted. The damage to prosecutor's offices is unknown, but presumably is of comparable magnitude. No price tag has been placed on reconstructing and re-equipping these facilities, but the cost will be considerable and an added burden for strained financial resources of Ukraine and its judicial system.

**Restoring and augmenting the judicial workforce and court staff.** Prior to February 2022, many Ukrainian courts were significantly understaffed with roughly 28% of the authorized positions on local first instance courts vacant. The current hostilities have caused and continue to cause further attrition.<sup>547</sup> More than 2000 sitting judges have not yet finished the vetting process and are "unable to administer justice."<sup>548</sup> However, those judges cannot be vetted and candidates for vacancies cannot be selected and appointed until the HQCJ and HCJ are fully operational. Numerous non-judicial positions likewise remain vacant.<sup>549</sup> While ways of resolving these issues have been suggested, no concrete steps have been taken.<sup>550</sup>

**Transferred courts.** As of July 4, 2022, the territorial jurisdictions of 98 courts had been changed to, and remained with, other courts.<sup>551</sup> For litigants and lawyers, these transfers generate significant inconvenience and personal risk, particularly given the difficulties with transportation during wartime. For the judges of the transferee courts, already substantial workloads have been increased. Both the efficiency and quality of justice have suffered, and steps will need to be taken to resolve the status of such courts in a post-conflict environment.

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546 Report on COE Conference; "How Ukraine will reboot the judicial system to European standards. Interview with deputy head of OP Andriy Smirnov," dated 11 July 2022, found at <https://su.court.gov.ua/tu19/pres-centr/news/1294053/>.

547 "The vast majority of civil servants (83.4%) did not change their location during the war," dated 17 June 2022, found at <https://te.court.gov.ua/tu20/pres-centr/news/1285741/>.

548 "Oksana Blazhivska outlined the problems that are relevant for judicial governance bodies and courts," dated 15 July 2022, found at <https://court.gov.ua/press/news/1296167>.

549 "Actual vacancies in the courts," dated 13 July 2022, found at <https://court.gov.ua/press/news/1295409/>.

550 "The ways of settling the issues of restoring the powers of 'five-year judges' and posting the advisory opinions of the VRP on the website of the Parliament have been determined," dated 11 July 2022, found at <https://su.court.gov.ua/tu19/pres-centr/news/1294044/>.

551 "DSA of Ukraine on administration of justice in conditions of war as of July 4, 2022," dated 4 July 2022, found at <https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/pres-centr/news/1291681/>.

**Restoration of files.** Judicial files in the Ukrainian system include not only documents relating to litigation, but also a variety of personal and commercial documentation needed in daily life. Some of this documentation was destroyed or carried away from court buildings during the hostilities. Other documentation remains behind in areas now controlled by Russian forces or their allies. While some documentation was saved by judges and court staff, and some exists in digital form, the loss of judicial documentation likely will cause significant issues when the conflict ends.

**Remote proceedings and the digitization of the courts.** For years prior to February 2022, Ukraine in conjunction with Western donors invested millions of Euros in an effort to digitize its court system, with little success. The pandemic raised these issues in a different context as judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and litigants pressed for remote appearances in court proceedings. The current wartime conditions, coupled with the transfer of thousands of cases to new and more distant venues, have reignited the pressure for the court system to adopt such measures. The donation of a handful of StarLink satellite communication systems to the judiciary during the war increased the appetite for such technology,<sup>552</sup> but budgetary constraints, military considerations, and technical failings continue to stymie such projects.<sup>553</sup>

**Displaced judges and prosecutors from occupied territories.** Ukrainian authorities have begun reassigning judges from occupied areas to courts needing additional workforce. While such reassignments are an interim solution, experience after the 2014 Russian occupation of portions of the Donbas suggest that some of these judges and prosecutors may be subject to coercion based on threats directed at their family members remaining behind in the occupied areas.<sup>554</sup>

**Personal and courthouse security.** Ukraine's experience prior to February 2022 with personal security for members of the justice system portends major issues in a post-conflict environment.<sup>555</sup> On one hand, experience in the Donbas for the past 7+ years suggests that Russian forces and their allies will exert significant pressure on courts at or near the frontlines. At the same time, threats and coercion from right-wing groups, some of whom are fighting for the Ukrainian side during the war, likely will intensify. These predictions are borne out by the fact that in the first six months of 2022, visitors attempted bring 1449 firearms into courts around the country, a fifteen-fold increase over the equivalent period in 2021.<sup>556</sup>

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552 "SJA of Ukraine on the administration of justice in wartime as of May 18, 2022," dated 18 May 2022, found at <https://court.gov.ua/press/news/1275655/>.

553 "Judges of the Supreme Court discussed with representatives of the Council of Europe the priorities of the judicial system in wartime," dated 13 June 2022, found at <https://court.gov.ua/press/news/1283735/>.

554 *KuIbida*, p. 6.

555 "In the first half of 2022, the number of attempts to get to court with weapons increased 15 times compared to last year 2021," dated 8 July 2022, found at <https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/pres-centr/news/1293572/>.

556 *Ibid.*

**The changing face of the courts' dockets.** In virtually every court and prosecutor's office in Ukraine, the Russian aggression has changed the nature of cases under consideration:

- Crimes by Russian forces. Much Ukrainian prosecutorial time and considerable international attention has been focused for the past several months on thousands of alleged instances of war crimes by Russian forces and their allies. Numerous trainings sponsored by international groups have been organized, and hundreds of investigations have been opened. While political considerations may interfere, Ukrainian courts and prosecutors may be devoting significant effort in a post-conflict environment to litigating the myriad war crimes allegations arising from the hostilities.
- Treason and collaboration. A cursory review of cases being investigated and pursued by Ukrainian prosecutors reveals a wide array of matters involving alleged collaboration with or support for Russian forces by Ukrainian citizens. Some of these matters involve allegations of treason, espionage, draft evasion, material support for the enemy, or theft of humanitarian supplies.<sup>557</sup> Other offenses, however, are more political in nature, often based on allegations of support for Russia's invasion or criticism of Ukraine's actions on social media or in other settings.<sup>558</sup> Prosecutors and courts will be dealing with such issues long after the conflict ends.
- Private claims for damages or reparations. The world has seen the devastation suffered by Ukraine's civilian population during the war. Ukrainian officials have signaled their intent to allow citizens of the country to pursue reparations or damage claims against Russian institutions for their losses.<sup>559</sup> While undoubtedly smaller in number, private claims also may be brought for destruction, injuries, or expropriation of property caused by Ukrainian forces during the war. Depending on the political outcomes, these claims may flood the courts.
- New complications in established proceedings. Wars create chaos, and this turmoil seeps into many issues handled by the justice system. For example, the war is already creating new issues for families dealing with inheritance issues.<sup>560</sup> Courts, prosecutors, and lawyers will need to find solutions to new problems on a wide array of legal matters, ranging from property rights to family law to citizenship questions.

557 See, e.g., "Headed the administration illegally created by the occupation authorities – a resident of Kherson region is suspected of collaborationism," dated 30 June 2022, found at [https://kherson.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_c=view&\\_t=rec&id=315584](https://kherson.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=315584); "Support of the aggressor country and appointment to the post of head of the police department in the occupied Vovchansk: a former law enforcement officer is suspected," dated 30 June 2022, found at [https://khar.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=315651&fp=10](https://khar.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=315651&fp=10).

558 See, e.g., "In Zhitomir will judge a teacher of a music school accused of collaborationism," dated 29 June 2022, found at [https://zhit.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_c=view&\\_t=rec&id=315533](https://zhit.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=315533); "Believes that Ukrainians occupy the territory of the Russian Federation – a resident of Okhtyrka has been notified of suspicion," dated 30 June 2022, found at [https://sumy.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_c=view&\\_t=rec&id=315559](https://sumy.gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=315559).

559 "On the collection, processing and accounting of information on damaged and destroyed real estate as a result of hostilities, terrorist acts, sabotage caused by military aggression of the Russian Federation," Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Resolution No. 380, dated 26 March 2022.

560 "Inheriting during the War," dated 7 June 2022, found at <https://advokatRada.cn.ua/>.

**Reconstituting the Bar.** Rebuilding the Ukrainian economy in a post-conflict environment will be a Herculean task. While judges and prosecutors who fled the hostilities to other parts of Ukraine face substantial personal disruptions, most will be able to resume working if they choose, either when their home courts are liberated or made secure, or in new assignments in other courts in Ukraine. Lawyers face different challenges. When lawyers leave their home area, most leave their clients – and their source of income – behind. Even when lawyers stay in their home area, many clients have fled, relocated, or lost their businesses. The number of lawyers actively practicing in Ukraine unquestionably will be reduced by factors such as migration to the West, retirement, or family or personal issues. Whether such reductions will offset the loss of legal business is unknown. Regardless, the turmoil and displacements created by the Russian aggression will reverberate for years as the legal marketplace adjusts to a new reality.

**Rethinking legal education.** The twin cataclysms of the pandemic and the Russian invasion further weakened an already ineffectual system of legal education in Ukraine. Retaining the will and energy to repair this inefficient system will be challenging, but training skilled, ethical judges, prosecutors, and lawyers will be a critical task in a post-conflict Ukraine.

**Continuing the fight against corruption.** At this writing, thousands have died and tens of thousands have been wounded defending the ideal of a democratic Ukraine governed by the rule of law. This war erupted during – and in part due to – the country’s efforts to rid itself of corruption and kleptocracy. Those efforts are not complete.

An unfortunate truism is that war tends to intensify existing corruption and create new threats. Enormous amounts of international monetary support, military assistance, and humanitarian aid have generated endless opportunities for fraud and theft in Ukraine. The work of the embryonic anti-corruption institutions put in place by the government shortly before the new Russian aggression began has been disrupted by personnel shortages as staff join the country’s defense or focus on personal or family safety. Civil society organizations normally involved in surveilling the system likewise have shifted to other priorities.<sup>561</sup>

The focus on national survival also appears to be lessening concerns among some Ukrainians about the country’s historic challenges with endemic corruption. Part of this tolerance is simply fatigue – “too many battles to fight, so choose your priorities.” Other influences are more alarming, such as the tendency to blame criticism of corruption on Russian disinformation. Some worry that Ukrainian officials have reacted defensively to suggestions that anti-corruption reforms should remain a priority.<sup>562</sup> It would be a cruel irony if forces within Ukraine are able to block anti-corruption reforms using the turmoil from a war begun in part because of the success of those reforms.

<sup>561</sup> See, e.g., “100 days of full-scale war. How the Anti-Corruption Action Center readjusted the work of organization,” dated 3 June 2022, found at <https://antac.org.ua/en/news/100-days-of-full-scale-war-how-the-anti-corruption-action-center-readjusted-the-work-of-organization/>; “To Keep Western Assistance Flowing, Ukraine Must Engage Corruption Concerns Head-On,” dated 30 June 2022, found at <https://www.csis.org/analysis/keep-western-assistance-flowing-ukraine-must-engage-corruption-concerns-head>.

<sup>562</sup> “To Keep Western Assistance Flowing, Ukraine Must Engage Corruption Concerns Head-On,” dated 30 June 2022, found at <https://www.csis.org/analysis/keep-western-assistance-flowing-ukraine-must-engage-corruption-concerns-head>.

## ANNEX 1

### Fist and Second Instance Courts

Oblast	Second Instance Courts	Second Instance Judges 21 February 2022 <sup>a</sup>	First Instance Courts	First Instance Judges 21 February 2022 <sup>a</sup>	Court Buildings Damaged <sup>b</sup>	Courts Closed or Transferred <sup>d</sup>
Vinnitsia Oblast	2	44	29	162	-	-
Volyn Oblast	1	14	17	101	-	-
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast	3	73	46	352	-	-
Donetsk Oblast	2	42	55	258	12	12 <sup>e</sup>
Zhytomyr Oblast	1	17	25	148	3	3
Zakarpattia (Trans-Carpathian) Oblast	1	12	13	104	-	-
Zaporizhzhia Oblast	1	12	28	194	5	18
Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast	1	13	17	105	-	-
Kyiv Oblast	0	0	28	192	3	4
Kirovohrad Oblast	1	19	23	113	-	-
Luhansk Oblast	1	12	32	110	-	16 <sup>e</sup>
Lviv Oblast	3	27	29	220	-	-
Mykolayiv Oblast	1	22	24	135	2	2
Odesa Oblast	3	64	33	265	1	-
Poltava Oblast	1	27	31	160	-	-
Rivne Oblast	2	29	18	119	-	-
Sumy Oblast	1	7	20	115	4	4
Ternopil Oblast	1	15	17	97	-	-
Kharkiv Oblast	3	66	37	290	19	24
Kherson Oblast	1	25	23	116	7	23
Khmelnyskyi Oblast	1	16	20	140	-	-
Cherkasy Oblast	1	15	23	115	-	-
Chernivtsi Oblast	1	16	15	81	-	-
Chernihiv Oblast	1	16	24	119	7	26
Kyiv (city)	3	181	10	360	2	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>784</b>	<b>637</b>	<b>4171</b>	<b>71<sup>c</sup></b>	<b>132</b>

a Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

b “SJA of Ukraine on the administration of justice in wartime as of May 18, 2022,” dated 18 May 2022, found at <https://court.gov.ua/press/news/1275655/>; State Judicial Administration of Ukraine, “Destroyed/damaged premises of judicial institutions as a result of armed aggression of the Russian Federation,” dated 26 May 2022, found at [https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts\\_buildings](https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts_buildings).

c “The most painful issues for the judicial system are the fate of judges in the occupied territories and courts, the premises of which are destroyed,” dated 21 June 2022, found at <https://ck.court.gov.ua/tu24/pres-centr/news/1286942/>. This total does not align with the number of premises specifically identified as damaged in the above column.

d “List of Courts, territorial jurisdiction of which has been changed in connection with the with the inability to administer justice during martial law,” dated 26 May 2022, found at [https://supreme.court.gov.ua/supreme/gromadyanam/terutor\\_pidsudnist/](https://supreme.court.gov.ua/supreme/gromadyanam/terutor_pidsudnist/).

e Does not include 84 courts in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and the City of Sevastopol whose territorial jurisdictions were transferred to other courts in Ukraine in 2014.

## ANNEX 2

### Individual *Oblast* Courts

#### Vinnytsia *Oblast*

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction	Nature of Conflict	Damage to Court Buildings
Vinnytsia <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeals	Vinnytsia	25	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Seventh Administrative Court of Appeals	Vinnytsia	19	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Vinnytsia Circuit Administrative Court	Vinnytsia	23	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Commercial Court of Vinnytsia <i>Oblast</i>	Vinnytsia	9	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Barskyi District Court	Bar	4	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Bershadshtadskyi District Court	Bershad	4	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Vinnytskyi District Court	Vinnytsia	6	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Haisynskyi District Court	Haisyn	5	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zhmerynskyi City-District Court	Zhmerynka	5	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Illinetskyi District Court	Illintsi	3	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kalynivskyi District Court	Kalynivka	4	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Koziantynskyi City-District Court	Koziatyn	2	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kryzhopilskyi District Court	Kryzhopil	4	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Lypovetskyi District Court	Lypovets	3	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Litynskyi District Court	Lityn	3	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Mohyliv-Podilskyi City-District Court	Mohyliv-Podilskyi	5	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Murovanokurylovetzkyi District Court	Murovani Kurylivtsi	2	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Nemyrivskyi District Court	Nemyriv	4	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Orativskyi District Court	Orativ	2	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Pishchanskyi District Court	Peschanka	3	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Pohrebyshchenskyi District Court	Pohrebyshche	2	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Teplytskyi District Court	Teplyk	3	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Tyvrivskyi District Court	Tyvriv	1	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Tomashpilskyi District Court	Tomashpil	2	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Trostianetskyi District Court	Trostianets	3	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Tulchynskyi District Court	Tulchyn	3	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Khmilnytskyi City-District Court	Khmilnyk	6	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Chernivetskyi District Court	Mazurivka	3	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Chechelnytskyi District Court	Chechelnyk	2	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Sharhorodskyi District Court	Sharhorod	4	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Yampilskyi District Court	Yampil	4	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ladyzhyn District Court	Ladyzhin	2	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Vinnytsia City Court	Vinnytsia	36	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
<b>Total</b>		<b>206</b>			

<sup>a</sup> Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

**Volyn Oblast**

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction	Nature of Conflict	Damage to Court Buildings
Volyn <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeals	Lutsk	14	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Volyn Circuit Administrative Court	Lutsk	15	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Commercial Court of Volyn <i>Oblast</i>	Lutsk	8	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Volodymyr-Volynskiy City Court	Vladimir-Volyn	3	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ivanychivskiy District Court	Berezovka	2	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kamin-Kashyrskiy District Court	Kamen-Kashirsky	2	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Lokachynskiy District Court	Michailovka	3	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Lutskiy City-District Court	Lutsk	23	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Liubomirskiy District Court	Lyubomir	4	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Novovolynskiy City Court	Novovolynsk	3	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Starovyzhivskiy District Court	Staraya Vyzhevka	3	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Shatskiy District Court	Shatsk	3	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kovelskiy City-District Court	Kovel	5	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Manevytskiy District Court	Manevichi	3	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Horokhivskiy District Court	Horokhiv	4	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kivertsivskiy District Court	Kivertsiv	5	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ratnivskiy District Court	Ratne	4	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Liubeshivskiy District Court	Lubeshiv	4	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ratnivskiy District Court	Rozhyshe	4	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Turiiskiy District Court	Turisk	3	None	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
<b>Total</b>		<b>115</b>			

<sup>a</sup> Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

**Dnipropetrovsk Oblast**

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction <sup>b</sup>	Nature of Conflict	Damage to Court Buildings
Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeals	Dnipro	29	Luhansk and Donetsk <i>Oblasts</i> Courts of Appeals transferred to this court on March 6, 2016	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Central Commercial Court of Appeals	Dnipro	16		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Third Administrative Court of Appeals	Dnipro	28		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Dnipropetrovsk Circuit Administrative Court	Dnipro	44		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Commercial Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i>	Dnipro	33		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Apostolivskyy District Court	Apostolovo	4	Verkhnorohachytskyi District Court and Velykooleksandrivskyy District Court, both of Kherson <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on March 6, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Vasylkivskyy District Court	Vasilkovka	2	Novopetrovskyy District Court and Popasnianskyi District Court, both of Luhansk <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on March 6, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Dovhintsevskyy District Court in Kryvyi Rih	Kryvyi Rih	5		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zhovtnevyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk City	Dnipro	14		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zhovtovodskyy City Court	Zhovty Vody	5	Beryslavskyy District Court, Bilozerskyi District Court, and Velykolepetyskyi District Court, all of Kherson <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on March 6, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kirovskyy District Court of Dnipropetrovsk City	Dnipro	9		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kryvorizkyi District Court	Kryvyi Rih	4	Kakhovskyy City-District Court, Novovorontsovskyy District Court, and Nyzhnosirohozkyi District Court, all of Kherson <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on March 6, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Mahdalynivskyy District Court	Magdalenivka	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Mezhivskyy District Court	Mezhevaya	3	Kremynskyy District Court of Luhansk <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court on March 6, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Novomoskovskyy City-District Court	Novomoskovsk	14	Sievierodonetskyi Town Court of Luhansk <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court on March 6, 2022; Balakliiskyy District Court and Kupianskyi City-District Court, both of Kharkiv <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on March 18, 2022.	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Petropavlivskyy District Court	Petropavlovka	4	Lysychanskyy Town Court of Luhansk <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court on March 6, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Pyatikhatkyi District Court	Pyatikhatki	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported

Saksahanskyi District Court of Kryvyi Rih City	Kryvyi Rih	10	Chaplynskyi District Court, Kherson City Court, and Tsiurupynskyi District Court, all of Kherson <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on March 6, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Solonianskyi District Court	Solenoe	4	Polohivskyi District Court, Kuibyshevskyi District Court, and Kamiansko-Dniprovskyi District Court, all of Zaporizhzhia <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on March 10, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ternivskyi Town Court	Ternovka	3	Novoaidarskyi District Court of Luhansk <i>Oblast</i> , and Hornostaivskyi District Court and Holoprystanskyi District Court, both of Kherson <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on March 6, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Tomakivskyi District Court	Tomakovka	3	Berdianskyi City-District Court and Melitopolskyi City-District Court, both of Zaporizhzhia <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on March 10, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Shyrokivskyi District Court	Shirokoe	2	Vysokopilskyi District Court and Henicheskyi District Court, both of Kherson <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on March 6, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Vilnohirskyi District Court	Volnogorsk	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Amur-Nyzhniodniprovskyi District Court	Dnipro	13		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Bahliyskyi District Court	Kamyanske	5		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Dzerzhynskyi District Court of Kryvyi Rih City	Kryvyi Rih	8		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Dnipropetrovskyi District Court	Slobozhans'ke	6	Prymorskyi District Court, Pryazovskyi District Court, and Chernihivskyi District Court, all of Zaporizhzhya <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on March 12, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Leninskyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk City	Dnipro	9		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Marhanets Town and District Court	Marhanets'	5		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Petrykivskyi District Court	Petrykivka	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Pokrovskyi District Court	Pokrovske	4	Marinskyi District Court of Donetsk <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court in September 2014; Markivskyi District Court and Milovskyi District Court, both of Luhansk <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on March 6, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported

Samarskyi District Court	Dnipro	7	Enerhodarskyi Town Court and Yakymivskyi District Court, both of Zaporizhzhya <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on March 14, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ternivskyi District Court of Kryvyi Rih City	Kryvyi Rih	8		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Tsentrarno-Miskyi District Court of Kryvyi Rih City	Kryvyi Rih	4	Kalanchatskyi District Court and Ivanivskyi District Court, both of Kherson <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on March 6, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Yurivskyi District Court	Yurivka	2	Stanychno-Luhanskyi District Court of Luhansk <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court on March 6, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Nikopolskyi City-District Court	Nikopol	8		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Verkhniodniprovskyi District Court	Verkhnedneprovsk	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Babushkynskyi District Court	Dnipro	8		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Dniprovskyi District Court of Dniprodzerzhynsk Town	Kamyanske	6		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zavodskyi District Court of Dniprodzerzhynsk Town	Kamynske	7		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Inhuletskyi District Court of Kryvyi Rih City	Kryvyi Rih	5		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Krynchanskyi District Court	Krynchky	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ordzhonikidze Town Court	Pokrov	5		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Pershotravensk Town Court	Pershotravensk	3	Bilovodskyi District Court of Luhansk <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court on March 6, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Synelnykivskyi City-District Court	Sinelnikove	7	Starobilskyi District Court and Troitskyi District Court, both of Luhansk <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on March 6, 2022; Tokmatskyi District Court, Huliaipilskyi District Court, Mykhailivskyi District Court, and Vasylivskyi District Court, all of Zaporizhzhia <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on March 10, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Sofiivskyi District Court	Sofiyivka	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Tsarychanskyi District Court	Tsarychanka	1		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Krasnohvardiyskyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk City	Dnipro	11	Vuhledarskyi Town Court of Donetsk <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court on March 18, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported

Pavlohradskyi City-District Court	Pavlograd	17	Kyivskyi District Court, Kuibyshevskyi District Court, and Kalinivskyi District Court, all of Donetsk City in Donetsk <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court in September 2014; Rubizhanskyi Town Court and Svativskyi District Court, both of Luhansk <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court on March 6, 2022; Iziumskyi City-District Court of Kharkiv <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court on March 10, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zhovtnevyi District Court of Kryvyi Rih City	Kryvyi Rih	10	Novokakhovskiyi Town Court, Skadovskiyi District Court, and Novotroitskiy District Court, all of Kherson <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on March 6, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Industrialnyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk City	Dnipro	10	Krasnoarmiiskiyi City-District Court of Donetsk <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court on March 14, 2022; Kramatorsk Town Court of Donetsk <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court on March 15, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
<b>Total</b>		<b>425</b>			

a Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

b From decrees and orders issued by the Supreme Court of Ukraine.

**Donetsk Oblast**

Court	Location <sup>a</sup>	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction <sup>e</sup>	Nature of Conflict <sup>d</sup>	Damage to Court Buildings <sup>e</sup>
Donetsk <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeal	Bakhmut	34	Transferred to Court of Appeal of Zaporizhzhia <i>Oblast</i> in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	Destroyed
Donetsk Administrative Court of Appeals	Donetsk	8	Moved to Kramatorsk in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Donetsk Commercial Court of Appeals	Donetsk	-	Moved to Kharkiv in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Donetsk Circuit Administrative Court	Donetsk	50	Moved to Slavyansk in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Commercial Court of Donetsk <i>Oblast</i>	Donetsk	27	Moved to Kharkiv in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Amvrosiivskiy District Court	Amvrosiyivka	-	Transferred to Orikhov District Court in Zaporizhzhia <i>Oblast</i> in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Artemivskiy City-District Court	Bakhmut (working remotely after 5 May 2022)	Authorized for 21 positions, 15 filled, 13 authorized to administer justice	Yenakiivskiy Town Court and Zhdaniivskiy Town Court transferred to this court in September 2014	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Avdiivskiy Town Court	Avdiivka (working remotely after 6 May 2022)	Authorized for 4 positions, 2 filled, 1 authorized to administer justice	Transferred to Dobropilskiy City District Court in September 2014; territorial jurisdiction restored January 20, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Budonnivskiy District Court of Donetsk City	Donetsk	-	Transferred to Krasnoarmeysk City District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Chervonohvardiiskiy District Court of Makiyivka Town	Makeevka	-	Transferred to Kostiantynivka City District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Debaltsevskiy Town Court	Debaltsevo	-	Transferred to Oleksandrivskiy District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Dobropilskiy City-District Court	Dobropillia	14 positions authorized, 9 positions filled, 6 authorized to administer justice	Avdiivskiy Town Court and Khartsyzkyy Town Court transferred to this court in September 2014	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Dokuchaievskiy Town Court of Donetsk <i>Oblast</i>	Dokuchaevsk	-	Transferred to Pology District Court in Zaporizhzhia <i>Oblast</i> in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Druzhkivskiy Town Court of Donetsk <i>Oblast</i>	Druzhkivka	9 positions authorized, 6 positions filled, 5 authorized to administer justice	Yasynuvatskyy City-District Court transferred to this court in September 2014	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Dymytrov Town Court in Donetsk <i>Oblast</i>	Mirnograd	6 positions authorized, 6 positions filled, 6 authorized to administer justice		Under Ukrainian control	None reported

Dzerzhynskiyi Town Court of Donetsk <i>Oblast</i>	Toretsk (Dzerzhinsk) (working remotely after 11 May 2022)	14 positions authorized, 8 positions filled, 3 authorized to administer justice	Leninskyi District Court and Proletarskyi District Court, both of Donetsk City, transferred to this court in September 2014	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Hirnytskyi District Court of Makiyivka Town	Makeevka	-	Transferred to Kramatorsk City District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Illichivskiyi District Court of Mariupol City	Mariupol	11 positions authorized, 9 positions filled, 6 authorized to administer justice	Transferred to Kirovskiyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk City in Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on March 6, 2022	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces in May 2022.	None reported
Kalininskyi District Court of Donetsk City	Donetsk	-	Transferred to Pavlograd City District Court in Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Kalininskyi District Court of Horlivka Town	Horlovka	-	Transferred to Slavyansk City District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Khartsyzkyi Town Court	Khartsyzsk	-	Transferred to Dobropilskyi City District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Kirovskiyi District Court of Donetsk City	Donetsk	-	Transferred to Krasnoarmiyskyi City-District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Kirovskiyi District Court of Makiyivka Town	Makeevka	-	Transferred to Kramatorsk City District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Kirovskiyi Town Court	Kirovske	-	Transferred to Chernihiv District Court of Zaporizhzhia <i>Oblast</i> in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Kostiantynivskiyi City-District Court	Kostyantynivka (working remotely after 28 April 2022)	15 positions authorized, 13 positions filled, 10 authorized to administer justice	Chervonohvardiyskyi District Court and Tsentralno-Miskiyi District Court, both of Makiyivka, transferred to this court in September 2014	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kramatorsk Town Court	Kramatorsk	22 positions authorized, 17 positions filled, 7 authorized to administer justice	Kirovskiyi District Court, Hirnytskyi District Court, and Sovietskyi District Court, all of Makiyivka Town, transferred to this court in September 2014; this court transferred to Industrialnyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk City in Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on March 15, 2020	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Krasnoarmiyskyi City-District Court	Pokrovsk	15 positions authorized, 13 positions filled, 10 authorized to administer justice	Budonnivskiyi District Court and Kirovskiyi District Court, both of Donetsk City, transferred to this court in September 2014; this court transferred to Industrialnyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk City in Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on March 14, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported

Krasnolymanskyi Town Court of Donetsk <i>Oblast</i>	Lyman	8 positions authorized, 7 positions filled, 2 authorized to administer justice	Petrovskyi District Court of Donetsk City transferred to this court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces in May 2022.	Destroyed
Kuibyshevskyi District Court of Donetsk City	Donetsk	-	Transferred to Pavlograd City District Court in Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Kyivskyi District Court of Donetsk City	Donetsk	-	Transferred to Pavlograd City District Court in Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Leninskyi District Court of Donetsk City	Donetsk	-	Transferred to Dzerzhinsky City District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Marinskyi District Court	Kurakhovo	7 positions authorized, 6 positions filled, 2 authorized to administer justice	Transferred to Pokrovsky District Court in Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Mykytivskyi District Court of Horlivka Town	Horlovka	-	Transferred to Slavyansk City District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Novoazovskyi District Court	Novoazovsk	-	Transferred to Pryazovsky District Court in Zaporizhzhia <i>Oblast</i> in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Novohrodivskyi Town Court of Donetsk <i>Oblast</i>	Novohrodivka (working remotely after 29 April 2022)	3 positions authorized, 1 positions filled, 1 authorized to administer justice	Transferred to Industrialnyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk City of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on April 29, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Oleksandrivskyi District Court	Oleksandrivka	3 positions authorized, 2 positions filled, 1 authorized to administer justice	Debaltsevskyi Town Court transferred to this court in September 2014	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ordzhonikidzevskyi District Court of Mariupol City	Mariupol	11 positions authorized, 9 positions filled, 4 authorized to administer justice	Transferred to Leninskyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk City in Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on March 6, 2022	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces in May 2022.	None reported
Pershotravnevyi District Court	Mangush	3 positions authorized, 2 positions filled, 1 authorized to administer justice	Transferred to Leninskyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk City in Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on March 6, 2022	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces in March 2022.	None reported
Petrovskyi District Court of Donetsk City	Donetsk	-	Transferred to Krasnolymanskyi City District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Proletarskyi District Court of Donetsk City	Donetsk	-	Transferred to Dzerzhinsky City District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Prymorskyi District Court of Mariupol City	Mariupol	8 positions authorized, 6 positions filled, 0 authorized to administer justice	Transferred to Leninskyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk City in Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on March 6, 2022	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces in May 2022.	None reported
Selydivskyi Town Court of Donetsk <i>Oblast</i>	Selidovo (working remotely after 9 May 2022)	11 positions authorized, 7 positions filled, 3 authorized to administer justice	Voroshyllovskyi District Court of Donetsk City transferred to this court in September 2014	Under Ukrainian control	None reported

Shakhtarskyi City-District Court	Shakhtersk	-	Transferred to Berdyansk City District Court of Zaporizhzhia <i>Oblast</i> in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Slovianskyi City-District Court	Slavyansk (working remotely after 11 May 2022)	23 positions authorized, 12 positions filled, 9 authorized to administer justice	Kalininskyi District Court, Tsentralno-Miskyi District Court, and Mykytivskyi District Court, all of Horlivka Town, transferred to this court in September 2014	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Snizhnianskyi Town Court	Snizhne	-	Transferred to Kuibyshevsky District Court in Zaporizhzhia <i>Oblast</i> in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Sovietskyi District Court of Makiyivka Town	Makeevka	-	Transferred to Kramatorsk City District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Starobeshivskyi District Court	Starobeshevo	-	Transferred to Tokmak District Court in Zaporizhzhia <i>Oblast</i> in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Telmanivskyi District Court	Telmanovo	-	Transferred to Primorsky District Court in Zaporizhzhia <i>Oblast</i> in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Torezkyi Town Court	Torez	-	Transferred to Berdyansk City District Court of Zaporizhzhia <i>Oblast</i> in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Tsentralno-Miskyi District Court of Horlivka Town	Horlovka	-	Transferred to Slavyansk City District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Tsentralno-Miskyi District Court of Makiyivka Town	Makeevka	-	Transferred to Kostiantynivka City District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Velykonovosilkivskyi District Court	Velika Novoselka (working remotely after 17 May 2022)	4 positions authorized, 4 positions filled, 2 authorized to administer justice	Volnovaskyi District Court transferred to this court in September 2014	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Volnovaskyi District Court	Volnovaha	8 positions authorized, 6 positions filled, 4 authorized to administer justice	Transferred to Velikonovosilkivskyi District Court in September 2014; transferred to Krasnohvardiyskyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk City in Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on March 6, 2022	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces in March 2022.	None reported
Volodarskyi District Court	Nykolske	4 positions authorized, 4 positions filled, 1 authorized to administer justice	Transferred to Amur-Nizhnedniprovskiy District Court in Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on March 6, 2022	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces in March 2022.	None reported
Voroshylovskyi District Court of Donetsk City	Donetsk	-	Transferred to Selydiv City District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	

Vuhledarskyi Town Court	Ugledar	3 positions authorized, 2 positions filled, 0 authorized to administer justice	Transferred to Amur-Nyzhniodniprovskyy District Court in Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on March 6, 2022; transferred to Krasnohvardiiskiy District Court of Dnipropetrovsk City in Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on March 6, 2022	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces in May 2022.	None reported
Yasynuvatskyi City-District Court	Yasinovataya	-	Transferred to Druzhkovskiy District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Yenakiivskyi Town Court of Donetsk <i>Oblast</i>	Yenakiyev	-	Transferred to Artemivsk City District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Zhdanivskyi Town Court	Zhdanovka	-	Transferred to Artemivsk City District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Zhovtnevyi District Court of Mariupol City	Mariupol	19 positions authorized, 3 positions filled, 3 authorized to administer justice	Transferred to Zhovtnevyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk City on March 6, 2022	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces in May 2022.	None reported
<b>Total</b>		<b>180<sup>b</sup></b>			

a "Information on the consideration of cases," dated 12 July 2022, found at <https://dn.court.gov.ua/tu05/pres-centr/news/1294674/>.

b Total of positions filled, including judges "not authorized to administer justice."

c From decrees and orders issued by the Supreme Court of Ukraine.

d Reports as of 30 June 2022.

e According to one report, 12 court buildings have been damaged or destroyed in the Donetsk oblast. See "SJA of Ukraine on the administration of justice in wartime as of May 18, 2022," dated 18 May 2022, found at <https://court.gov.ua/press/news/1275655/>.

**Zhytomyr Oblast**

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction <sup>b</sup>	Nature of Conflict <sup>c</sup>	Damage to Court Buildings <sup>d</sup>
Zhytomyr <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeals	Zhytomyr			Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zhytomyr Circuit Administrative Court	Zhytomyr			Under Ukrainian control	Damaged
Commercial Court of Zhytomyr <i>Oblast</i>	Zhytomyr			Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Brusylivskiy District Court	Brusilov, Donetsk <i>Oblast</i>	3	Transferred to Koretskyi District Court of Rivne <i>Oblast</i> on March 10, 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored April 22, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Volodarsko-Volynskiy District Court	Horoshev	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zhytomyrskiy District Court	Zhytomyr	5		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Korostyshivskiy District Court	Korostyshev	5		Under Ukrainian control	
Malynskiy District Court	Malin	4	Transferred to Koretskyi District Court of Rivne <i>Oblast</i> on March 10, 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored April 22, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	Damaged
Novohrad-Volynskiy City-District Court	Novograd-Volynsky	10		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Popilnianskiy District Court	Popelya	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Romanivskiy District Court	Romanov	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Chervonoarmiiskiy District Court	Pulino	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Liubarskiy District Court	Lubar	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Andrushivskiy District Court	Andriivka	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Yemilchynskiy District Court	Yemilchyne	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Korolovskiy District Court of Zhytomyr City	Zhytomyr	14		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Luhynskiy District Court	Luhyny	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Olevskiy District Court	Olevsk	1		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Radomyshl'skiy District Court	Radomyshl	3	Makarivskiy District Court of Kyiv <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court on March 6, 2022; territorial jurisdiction of that court restored on May 5, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Chudnivskiy District Court	Chudniv	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported

Baranivskiy District Court	Baranivka	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Bohunskiy District Court of Zhytomyr City	Zhytomyr	15		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Korostenskiy City-District Court	Korosten	6		Under Ukrainian control	Damaged None reported
Narodytskiy District Court	Narodichi	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ovrutskiy District Court	Ovruch	5	Transferred to Koretskyi District Court of Rivne <i>Oblast</i> on March 10, 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored April 22, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Berdychivskiy City-District Court	Berdychiv	8		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ruzhynskiy District Court	Ruzhin	1		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Cherniakhivskiy District Court	Chernyakhiv	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
<b>Total</b>		<b>165</b>			

a Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

b From decrees and orders issued by the Supreme Court of Ukraine.

c Reports as of 30 June 2022.

d State Judicial Administration of Ukraine, “Destroyed/damaged premises of judicial institutions as a result of armed aggression of the Russian Federation,” found at [https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts\\_buildings](https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts_buildings).

**Zakarpattia Oblast**

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction	Nature of Conflict	Damage to Court Buildings
Zakarpattia Oblast Court of Appeals	Uzhhorod	12		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zakarpattia Circuit Administrative Court	Uzhhorod	12		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Commercial Court of Zakarpattia Oblast	Uzhhorod	5		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Mizhhirskiy District Court	Mezhigorye	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Rakhivskiy District Court	Rakhiv	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Svaliavskiy District Court	Svaliava	6		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Tiachivskiy District Court	Tyachiv	8		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Khustskiy District Court	Khust	9		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Volovetskiy District Court	Volovets	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Vynohradivskiy District Court	Vinogradov	6		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Irshavskiy District Court	Irshava	6		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Perechynskiy District Court	Perechyn	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Uzhhorodskiy City-District Court	Uzhgorod	20		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Velykobereznianskiy District Court	Velikiy Berezny	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Berehivskiy District Court	Berehove	5		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Mukachivskiy City-District Court	Mukachevo	14		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
<b>Total</b>		<b>116</b>			

a Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

Zaporizhzhia *Oblast*

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction <sup>b</sup>	Nature of Conflict <sup>c</sup>	Damage to Court Buildings <sup>d</sup>
Zaporizhzhia <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeals	Zaporizhzhia	12	Donetsk <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeal (Bakhmut City) transferred to this court in September 2014	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zaporizhzhia Circuit Administrative Court	Zaporizhzhia	21		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Commercial Court of Zaporizhzhia <i>Oblast</i>	Zaporizhzhia	21		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Lenynskiy District Court of Zaporizhzhia City	Zaporizhzhia	10		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Orikhivskiy District Court	Orehov	5	Amvrosiivskiy District Court of Donetsk <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court in September 2014; this court transferred to Shevchenkivskiy District Court of Zaporizhzhia City on 10 May 2022	Under Ukrainian control, but under Russian pressure	None reported
Prymorskiy District Court	Primorsk	1	Telmanivskiy District Court of Donetsk <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court in September 2014; this court transferred to Dnipropetrovskiy District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 12 March 2022.	Under Ukrainian control, but under Russian pressure	None reported
Tokmatskiy District Court	Tokmak	6	Starobeshivskiy District Court of Donetsk <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court in September 2014; this court transferred to Sinelnikivskiy District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>oblast</i> on 10 March 2022.	Russian occupied	None reported
Veselivskiy District Court	Vesele	1	Transferred to Zaporizkiy District Court on 4 April 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Huliaipilskiy District Court	Hulyaypole	3	Transferred to Sinelnikivskiy District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>oblast</i> on 10 March 2022.	Under Ukrainian control, but under Russian pressure	Damaged
Enerhodarskiy Town Court	Energodar	3	Transferred to Samarskiy District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 14 March 2022.	Russian occupied	Ransacked
Zhovtnevyi District Court of Zaporizhzhia City	Zaporizhzhia	8		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kamiansko-Dniprovskiy District Court	Kamenka-Dneprovskaya	1	Transferred to Solonyansky District Court in Dnipropetrovsk <i>oblast</i> on 10 March 2022	Under Ukrainian control, but under Russian pressure	None reported
Novomykolayivskiy District Court	Novomykhailivka	2		Russian occupied	None reported
Ordzhonikidzevskiy District Court of Zaporizhzhia City	Zaporizhzhia	13		Under Ukrainian control	None reported

Polohivskiy District Court	Pology	2	Dokuchaievskiy Town Court of Donetsk <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court in September 2014; this court transferred to Solonyansky District Court in Dnipropetrovsk <i>oblast</i> on 10 March 2022	Russian occupied	Damaged
Rozivskiy District Court	Rozivka	3	Transferred to Zaporizkiy District Court on 4 April 2022	Russian occupied	Damaged
Chernihivskiy District Court	Chernigovka	4	Transferred to Dnipropetrovskiy District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 12 March 2022.	Russian occupied	None reported
Komunarskiy District Court of Zaporizhia City	Zaporizhzhia	10		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zavodskiy District Court of Zaporizhia City	Zaporizhzhia	6		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Melitopolskiy City-District Court	Melitopol	12	Transferred to Tomakivskiy District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>oblast</i> on 10 March 2022.	Russian occupied	None reported
Mykhailivskiy District Court	Mikhailivka	4	Transferred to Sinelnikivskiy District Court in Dnipropetrovsk <i>oblast</i> on 10 March 2022	Russian occupied	None reported
Yakymivskiy District Court	Yakimivka	4	Transferred to Samarskiy District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 14 March 2022.	Russian occupied	None reported
Berdianskiy City-District Court	Berdyansk	13	Torezkiy Town Court and Shakhtarskiy City-District Court, both of Donetsk <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court in September 2014; this court transferred to Tomakivskiy District Court in the Dnipropetrovsk <i>oblast</i> on 10 March 2022.	Russian occupied	None reported
Vilnianskiy District Court	Vilnyansk	5		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kuibyshevskiy District Court	Bilmac	5	Snizhnianskiy Town Court of Donetsk <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court in September 2014; this court transferred to Solonyansky District Court in Dnipropetrovsk <i>oblast</i> on 10 March 2022	Russian occupied	None reported
Khortytyskiy District Court of Zaporizhzhia City	Zaporizhzhia	8		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Velykobilozerskiy District Court	Velyka Bilozerka Village	1	Transferred to Zaporizkiy District Court on 6 April 2022.	Russian occupied	None reported
Shevchenkivskiy District Court of Zaporizhia City	Zaporizhzhia	11	Orikhivskiy District Court transferred to this court on 10 March 2022.	Under Ukrainian control	None reported

Zaporizkyi District Court	Zaporizhzhia	6	Veselivskyi District Court and Rozivskyi District Court transferred to this court on 4 April 2022; Velykobilozerskyi District Court transferred to this court on 6 April 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Pryazovskyi District Court	Pryazovsky	3	Kirovskyi Town Court and Novoazovskyi District Court, both of Donetsk <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court in September 2014; this court transferred to Dnipropetrovskyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 12 March 2022.	Russian occupied	None reported
Vasylivskyi District Court	Vasylivka	3	Transferred to Sinelnykivsky District Court in Dnipropetrovsk <i>oblast</i> on 10 March 2022	Under Ukrainian control	Damaged
<b>Total</b>		<b>207</b>			

a Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

b From decrees and orders issued by the Supreme Court of Ukraine.

c Reports as of 30 June 2022.

d State Judicial Administration of Ukraine, “Destroyed/damaged premises of judicial institutions as a result of armed aggression of the Russian Federation,” found at [https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts\\_buildings](https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts_buildings).

**Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast**

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction	Nature of Conflict	Damage to Court Buildings
Ivano-Frankivsk <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeals	Ivano-Frankivsk	13		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ivano-Frankivsk Circuit Administrative Court	Ivano-Frankivsk	16		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Commercial Court of Ivano-Frankivsk <i>Oblast</i>	Ivano-Frankivsk	14		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Bolekhivskiyi Town Court	Bolekhiv	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Horodenkivskiyi District Court	Horodenka	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ivano-Frankivsk City Court	Ivano-Frankivsk	19		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Rozhniatvskiyi District Court	Rozhnyatov	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Tlumatskyyi District Court	Tlumach	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Bohorodchanskiy District Court	Bogorodchany	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Verkhovynskiyi District Court	Verkhovyna	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Halytskyyi District Court	Galich	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kaluskyi City-District Court	Kalush	7		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kolomyiskyyi City-District Court	Kolomyya	7		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Nadvirnianskiy District Court	Nadvirna	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Sniatynskyyi District Court	Snyatin	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Tysmenytskyyi District Court	Ivano-Frankivsk	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Yaremchanskiy Town Court	Yaremche	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kosivskyyi District Court	Kosiv	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Rohatynskyyi District Court	Rogatyn	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Dolynskyyi District Court	Dolyna	5		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
<b>Total</b>		<b>118</b>			

a Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

**Kyiv Oblast**

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction <sup>b</sup>	Nature of Conflict <sup>c</sup>	Damage to Court Buildings <sup>d</sup>
Kyiv Circuit Administrative Court	Kyiv	23		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Commercial Court of Kyiv Oblast	Kyiv	28		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zghurivskiyi District Court	Dolina	2	Horodnianskyi District Court, Ripkynskiyi District Court, and Chernihivskiyi District Court transferred to this court on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction of these courts restored on 4 May 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Irpin Town Court	Irpin	8	Transferred to Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi City-District Court on 6 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction of this court restored on 19 May 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	Damaged
Kyiv-Sviatoshyn District Court, Kyiv	Kyiv	14		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Makarivskiyi District Court	Makarov	4	Transferred to Radomyshl'skyi District Court of Zhytomyr Oblast on 6 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 5 May 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	Damaged
Myronivskiyi District Court	Myronivka	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Rzhyshevskiyi Town Court	Rzhyschiv	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Slavutyskyyi Town Court	Slavutych	3		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Stavyshchenskyi District Court	Stavyshche	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Tarashchanskyi District Court	Tarashcha	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Fastivskiyi City-District Court	Fastiv	8		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Baryshivskiyi District Court	Baryshevka	2		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Vyshhorodskiyi District Court	Vyshgorod	7		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Berezanskyi Town Court	Berezan	4	Koriukivskiyi District Court, Menskyi District Court, Sosnytskyi District Court, and Koropskiyi District Court, all of Chernihiv Oblast, transferred to this court on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction of these courts restored on 4 May 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Bilotserkivskiyi City-District Court	Bila Tserkva	16		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Brovarskiyi City-District Court	Brovary	6		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Vasylkivskiyi City-District Court	Vasilkov	7		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported

Rokytnianskyi District Court	Rokytno	0		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi City-District Court	Pereiaslav	7	Borodianskyi District Court, Irpin Town Court, and Ivankivskyi District Court transferred to this court on 6 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction for Ivankivskyi District Court restored 22 April 2022; territorial jurisdiction for Irpin District Court restored 19 May 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Yahotynskyi District Court	Yahotyn	3	Desnianskyi District Court of Chernihiv City, Semenivskyi District Court, Sribnianskyi District Court, Novozavodskyi District Court of Chernihiv City, and Novhorod-Siverskyi District, all of Chernihiv Oblast, transferred to this court on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdictions of these courts restored on 4 May 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Boryspilskyi City-District Court	Borispil	11		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Borodianskyi District Court	Borodianka	4	Transferred to Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi City-District Court on 6 March 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	Destroyed
Obukhivskyi District Court	Obukhiv	8		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Volodarskyi District Court	Volodarka	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kaharlytskyi District Court	Kagarlyk	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Tetiivskyi District Court	Tetiev	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Bohuslavskyi District Court	Boguslav	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Skvyrskyi District Court	Skvira	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ivankivskyi District Court	Ivankiv	4	Transferred to Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi City-District Court on 6 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored 22 April 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
<b>Total</b>		<b>192</b>			

a Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

b From decrees and orders issued by the Supreme Court of Ukraine.

c Reports as of 30 June 2022.

d State Judicial Administration of Ukraine, “Destroyed/damaged premises of judicial institutions as a result of armed aggression of the Russian Federation,” found at [https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/insh/courts\\_buildings](https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/insh/courts_buildings).

**Kirovohrad Oblast**

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction <sup>b</sup>	Nature of Conflict	Damage to Court Buildings
Kirovohrad <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeals	Kropyvnytsky	19		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kirovohrad Circuit Administrative Court	Kropyvnytsky	14		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Commercial Court of Kirovohrad <i>Oblast</i>	Kropyvnytsky	6		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Holovanivskiy District Court	Golovanevsk	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Dolynskiy District Court	Dolinsk	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kirovskiy District Court of Kirovohrad City	Kropyvnytsky	14		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Novoarkhangel'skiy District Court	Novoarkhangel'sk	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Novomyrhorodskiy District Court	Novomirgorod	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Onufriivskiy District Court	Onufrievka	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Svitlovodskiy City-District Court	Sverlovodsk	6		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ulianovskiy District Court	Blagoveshchenskoe	1		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Dobrovelychkivskiy District Court	Dobrovelychkivka	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kirovohradskiy District Court	Kropyvnytsky	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Leninskiy District Court of Kirovohrad City	Kropyvnytsky	9		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Novhorodkivskiy District Court	Novhorodka	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Petrivskiy District Court	Petrove	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ustynivskiy District Court	Ustynivka	1		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Znamianskiy City-District Court	Znamianka	7		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Haivoronskiy District Court	Haivoron	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kompaniivskiy District Court	Kompaniivka	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Oleksandrivskiy District Court	Oleksandrivka	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Malovyskivskiy District Court	Mala Vyska	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Bobrynetskiy District Court	Bobrynets, Poltava <i>Oblast</i>	3	Snihurivskiy District Court of Mykolayiv <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court on March 16, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Vilshanskiy District Court	Vilshanka	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Novoukrainskiy District Court	Novoukrainka	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Oleksandriivskiy City-District Court	Alexandria	7		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
<b>Total</b>		<b>132</b>			

a Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

b From decrees and orders issued by the Supreme Court of Ukraine.

**Luhansk Oblast**

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction <sup>b</sup>	Nature of Conflict <sup>c</sup>	Damage to Court Buildings <sup>d</sup>
Luhansk <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeals	Luhansk	12	Transferred to Kharkiv <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeals in September 2014; transferred to Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeal on 6 March 2016	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	Damaged
Luhansk Circuit Administrative Court	Luhansk	16	Moved to Severodonetsk in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	Damaged
Commercial Court of Luhansk <i>Oblast</i>	Luhansk	18	Moved to Kharkiv in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Anratsyivskiyi City-District Court	Anratsyt	-	Transferred to Starobilskiyi District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Artemivskiyi District Court of Luhansk City	Luhansk	-	Transferred to Bilokurakynskiyi District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Zhovtnevyyi District Court of Luhansk City	Luhansk	-	Transferred to Troitskyyi District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Kamianobridskiyi District Court of Luhansk City	Luhansk	-	Transferred to Markivskiyi District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Krasnodonskyyi City-District Court	Krasnodon	1	Transferred to Svativskyyi District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014	None reported
Leninskyyi District Court of Luhansk City	Luhansk	-	Transferred to Svativskyyi District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Lutuhynskiyi District Court	Lutuhyne	-	Transferred to Bilokurakynskiyi District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Milovskiyi District Court	Melove	3	Transferred to Pokrovskyyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since February 2022.	None reported
Pervomaiskyyi Town Court	Pervomaisk	-	Transferred to Rubizhne District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Rovenkivskyyi Town Court	Rovenky	-	Transferred to Bilovodskyyi District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Sievierodonetskyi Town Court	Severodonetsk	12	Stakhanovskyyi Town Court transferred to this court in September 2014; transferred to Novomoskovskyyi City-District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since June 2022.	Damaged

Slovianoserbskyi District Court	Slovianoserbsk	-		Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Stakhanovskyi Town Court	Stakhanov	-	Transferred to Sievierodonetsky District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Alchevskyi Town Court	Alchevsk	-	Moved to Lysychanski City Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Bilovodskyi District Court	Bilovodsk	4	Rovenkivskyi Town Court transferred to this court in September 2014; this court transferred to Pershotravensk Town Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since February 2022.	None reported
Briankivskyi Town Court	Bryanka	1	Transferred to Starobilskyi District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Kirovskyi Town Court	Kirovsk	-	Transferred to Kreminskyi District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014.	None reported
Krasnolutskyi Town Court	Krasnyy Luch	-	Transferred to Novopskov District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014	None reported
Lysychanskyi Town Court	Lysychansk	8	Alchevskyi Town Court transferred to this court in September 2014; this court transferred to Petropavlivskyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Markivskyi District Court	Markivka	5	Kamianobridskyi District Court of Luhansk City transferred to this court in September 2014; this court transferred to Pokrovskyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since February 2022.	None reported
Novopskovskyi District Court	Novopskov	3	Krasnolutskyi Town Court and Stanychno-Luhanskyi District Court transferred to this court in September 2014; this court transferred to Vasytkivskyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since February 2022.	None reported
Rubizhanskyi Town Court	Rubizhne	8	Pervomaiskyi Town Court transferred to this court in September 2014; this court transferred to Pavlohradskyi City-District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since May 2022.	Damaged

Troitskyi District Court	Troitske	3	Zhovtnevyi District Court of Luhansk City transferred to this court in September 2014; this court transferred to Synelnykivskiy City-District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since May 2022.	None reported
Kreminskyi District Court	Kreminna	5	Kirovskiy Town Court transferred to this court in September 2014; this court transferred to Mezhyvskiy District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since April 2022.	Damaged
Novoaidarskyi District Court	Novoaydar	3	Transferred to Ternivskiy Town Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since April 2022.	None reported
Stanychno-Luhanskyi District Court	Stanychno-Luhanske	-	Transferred to Novopskov District Court in September 2014; territorial jurisdiction restored on 1 December 2020; this court transferred to Yurivskiy District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since February 2022.	None reported
Starobilskiy District Court	Starobilsk	7	Anratsyivskiy City-District Court and Briankivskiy Town Court transferred to this court in September 2014; this court transferred to Synelnykivskiy City-District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since March 2022.	None reported
Perevalskiy District Court	Perevalsk	-		Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014	None reported
Bilokurakynskiy District Court	Bilokurakyne	3	Lutuhynskiy District Court and Artemivskiy District Court of Luhansk City transferred to this court in September 2014; this court transferred to Pershotravensk Town Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since February 2022.	None reported
Popasnianskyi District Court	Popasna	-	Transferred to Vasylkivskyy District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since May 2022.	None reported

Svativskiy District Court	Svatovo	10	Krasnodonskiy City-District Court and Leninskiy District Court of Luhansk City transferred to this court in September 2014; this court transferred to Pavlohradskiy City-District Court of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on 6 March 2022	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since April 2022.	None reported
Sverdlovskiy Town Court	Sverdlovsk	-	Transferred to Bilovodskiy District Court in September 2014	Occupied by Russian-controlled forces since 2014	
<b>Total</b>		<b>122</b>			

a Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

b From decrees and orders issued by the Supreme Court of Ukraine.

c Reports as of 30 June 2022.

d State Judicial Administration of Ukraine, “Destroyed/damaged premises of judicial institutions as a result of armed aggression of the Russian Federation,” found at [https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts\\_buildings](https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts_buildings).

**Lviv Oblast**

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction	Nature of Conflict	Damage to Court Buildings
Lviv Oblast Court of Appeals	Lviv	23		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Western Commercial Court of Appeal	Lviv	16		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Eighth Administrative Court of Appeal	Lviv	35		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Lviv Circuit Administrative Court	Lviv	29		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Commercial Court of Lviv Oblast	Lviv	33		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Brodivskiy District Court	Brody	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Buskyi District Court	Busk	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zhydachivskiy District Court	Zhidachev	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zaliznychniy District Court of Lviv City	Lviv	13		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kamianka-Buzkyi District Court	Kamenka-Bugskaya	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Lychakivskiy District Court of Lviv City	Lviv	8		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Mykolayivskiy District Court	Nikolaev	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Peremyslianskiy District Court	Peremyslyany	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Pustomytskiy District Court	Pustomyty	6		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Radekhivskiy District Court	Radekhiv	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Sykhivskiy District Court of Lviv City	Lviv	10		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Skolivskiy District Court	Skole	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Starosambirskiy District Court	Old Sambor	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Sokalskiy District Court	Sokal	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Truskavetskiy Town Court	Truskavets	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Frankivskiy District Court of Lviv City	Lviv	8		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Shevchenkivskiy District Court of Lviv City	Lviv	13		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Boryslavskiy Town Court	Boryslav	1		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Drohobyt'skiy City-District Court	Drohobych	11		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Horodotskiy District Court	Horodok	5		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zolochivskiy District Court	Zolochiv	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Mostyskiy District Court	Mostys'ka	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Sambirskiy City-District Court	Sambir	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Stryiskiy City-District Court	Stryi	6		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Yavorivskiy District Court	Yavoriv	7		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Turkivskiy District Court	Turka	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Chervonohradskiy Town Court	Chervonograd	7		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Halytskiy District Court of Lviv City	Lviv	10		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zhovkivskiy District Court	Zhovkva	5		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
<b>Total</b>		<b>294</b>			

a Number of judges "administering justice" from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, "List of Judges as of 21.02.2022," found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

**Mykolayiv Oblast**

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction <sup>b</sup>	Nature of Conflict <sup>c</sup>	Damage to Court Buildings <sup>d</sup>
Mykolayiv <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeals	Mykolayiv	22		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Mykolayiv Circuit Administrative Court	Mykolayiv	15		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Commercial Court of Mykolayiv <i>Oblast</i>	Mykolayiv	11	Transferred to Commercial Court of Odesa <i>Oblast</i> on 22 March 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	Destroyed
Bashtanskyi District Court	Bashtanka	2		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Berezhnevatskyi District Court	Berezhnevate	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Vradiivskyi District Court	Vradiivka	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Domanivskyi District Court	Domanivka	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Yelanetskyi District Court	Yelanets	1		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kazankivskyi District Court	Kazanka	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Korabelnyi District Court of Mykolayiv City	Mykolayiv	7		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kryvozerskyi District Court	Kryve Ozero	1		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Mykolayivskyi District Court	Mykolayiv	2		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Novoodeskyi District Court	Nova Odesa	3		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Snihurivskyi District Court	Snihurivka	4	Transferred to Bobrynetskyi District Court in Kirovohrad <i>Oblast</i> on 16 March 2022	Occupied by Russian forces	Damaged
Tsentrалnyi District Court	Mykolayiv	13		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Voznesenskyi City-District Court	Voznesensk	8		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Novobuzkyi District Court	Novy Buh	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Veselynivskyi District Court	Veselynove	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Leninskyi District Court of Mykolayiv City	Mykolayiv	9		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ochakivskyi City-District Court	Ochakiv	3		Under Ukrainian control, but frequently attacked by missiles	None reported
Yuzhnoukrainskyi Town Court	Yuzhnoukrainsk	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zavodskyi District Court of Mykolayiv City	Mykolayiv	13		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Arbuzynskyi District Court	Arbuzynka	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Berezanskyi District Court	Berezanka	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zhovtnevyi District Court	Mykolayiv	5	Transferred to Bobrynetskyi District Court in Kirovohrad <i>Oblast</i> on 16 March 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported

Bratskyi District Court	Bratske	1		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Pervomaiskyi City-District Court	Pervomaisk	10		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
<b>Total</b>		<b>157</b>			

a Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

b From decrees and orders issued by the Supreme Court of Ukraine.

c Reports as of 30 June 2022.

d State Judicial Administration of Ukraine, “Destroyed/damaged premises of judicial institutions as a result of armed aggression of the Russian Federation,” found at [https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts\\_buildings](https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts_buildings).

## Odesa Oblast

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction <sup>b</sup>	Nature of Conflict	Damage to Court Buildings <sup>c</sup>
Odesa Oblast Court of Appeals	Odesa	20		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Southwest Commercial Court of Appeals	Odesa	17		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Fifth Administrative Court of Appeals	Odesa	27		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Odesa Circuit Administrative Court	Odesa	34	Kherson Circuit Administrative Court transferred to this court on March 18, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Commercial Court of Odesa Oblast	Odesa	27	Commercial Court of Kherson Oblast transferred to this court on March 18, 2022; Commercial Court of Mykolayiv Oblast transferred to this court on March 22, 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Mykolayivskyi District Court	Mykolayiv	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Prymorskyi District Court of Odesa City	Odesa	28		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Reniiskyi District Court	Reni	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Rozdilnianskyi District Court	Razdelnaya	6		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Tatarbunarskyi District Court	Tatarbunary	1		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Tarutynskyi District Court	Tarutino	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Frunzivskyi District Court	Zakharovka	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Yuzhnyi Town Court	Yuzhny	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Artsyzkyi District Court	Artsiz	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Berezivskyi District Court	Berezovka	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Biliaivskyi District Court	Belyaevka	7		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ivanivskyi District Court	Ivanovka	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Illichivskyi Town Court	Chernomorsk	5		Under Ukrainian control	Damaged
Kotovskiy City-District Court	Podolsk	5		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Liubashivskyi District Court	Lyubashevka	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Izmailskyi City-District Court	Izmail	10		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ovidiopol'skyi District Court	Ovidiopol	8		Under Ukrainian control	None reported

Savranskyi District Court	Savran	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Saratskyi District Court	Sarata	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Shyriaivskyi District Court	Shyryayevo	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Bolhradskyi District Court	Bolgrad	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kominternivskyi District Court	Dobroslav	8		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Baltskyi District Court	Balta	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Billhorod-Dnistrovskyi City-District Court	Belgorod-Dnistrovsky	11		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Velykomykhailivskyi District Court	Velykomikhailivka	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kyivskyi District Court of Odesa City	Odesa	22		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kodymskyi District Court	Kodima	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ananivskyi District Court	Ananiev	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kiliivskyi District Court	Kilia	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Krasnooknianskyi District Court	Okni	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Malynovskyi District Court of Odesa City	Odesa	26		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Suvorovskyi District Court of Odesa City	Odesa	18		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Teplodarskyi Town Court	Tepلودar	1		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
<b>Total</b>		<b>329</b>			

a Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

b From decrees and orders issued by the Supreme Court of Ukraine.

c State Judicial Administration of Ukraine, “Destroyed/damaged premises of judicial institutions as a result of armed aggression of the Russian Federation,” found at [https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts\\_buildings](https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts_buildings).

**Poltava Oblast**

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction <sup>b</sup>	Nature of Conflict	Damage to Court Buildings
Poltava <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeals	Poltava	27	Kharkiv <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeals transferred to this court on 25 March 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Poltava Circuit Administrative Court	Poltava	19		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Commercial Court of Poltava <i>Oblast</i>	Poltava	16		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Velykobahachanskyi District Court	Velika Aleksandrovka	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Hrebinkivskyi District Court	Hrebinka	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zinkivskyi District Court	Zinkiv	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kobeliatskyi District Court	Kobelyaki	5		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Komsomolskyi Town Court	Horishnii Plavni	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Lokhvytskyi District Court	Lokhvytsia	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Lubenskyi City-District Court	Lubny	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Oktiabrskyi District Court of Poltava City	Kyiv	15	Moskovskyi District Court and Frunzenskyi District Court, both of Kharkiv, transferred to this court on 8 March 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Poltavskyi District Court	Poltava	7	Kharkivskyi District Court of Kharkiv <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court on 8 March 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Khorolskyi District Court	Horol	3		Under Ukrainian control	
Chutivskyi District Court	Chutovo	1		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Avtozavodskyi District Court of Kremenchuk Town	Kremenchuk	13		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Hlobynskyi District Court	Hlobyne	4	Chuhuivskyi Town Court of Kharkiv <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court on 8 March 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Dykanskyi District Court	Dykanka	2	Zolochivskyi District Court, Sakhnovshchynskyi District Court, and Shevchenkivskyi District Court, all of Kharkiv <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on 14 March 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kyivskyi District Court of Poltava City	Poltava	10	Leninskyi District Court and Ordzhonikidzevskyi District Court, both of Kharkiv City in Kharkiv <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on 14 March 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kremenchutskyi District Court	Kremenchuk	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Leninskyi District Court of Poltava City	Kyiv	7	Chervonozavodskyi District Court and Kominternivskyi District Court, both of Kharkiv City in Kharkiv <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on 10 March 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported

Mashivskiy District Court	Mashivka	2	Velykoburlutskiy District Court and Vovchanskyy District Court, both of Kharkiv <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on 8 March 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Novosanzharskyy District Court	Novi Sanzhary	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Pyriatynskyy District Court	Pyriatyn	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Semenivskyy District Court	Semenivka	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Chornukhynskyy District Court	Chornukhy	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Hadiatskyy District Court	Hadyach	4	Trostianetskyy District Court and Seredyna-Buda District Court, both of Sumy <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on 18 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction of Trostianetskyy District Court restored 25 May 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Karlivskyy District Court	Karlivka	2	Karlivskyy District Court of Kharkiv <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court on 8 March 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kriukivskyy District Court of Kremenchuk Town	Kremenchuk	6		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Myrhorodskyy City-District Court	Myrhorod	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Reshetylivskyy District Court	Reshetylivka	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Shyshatskyy District Court	Shyshaky	3	Okhtyrskyy City-District Court of Sumy <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court on 25 March 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kozelshchynskyy District Court	Kozelshchyna	3	Pechenizkyy District Court of Kharkiv <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court on 8 March 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kotelevskyy District Court	Kotelva	2	Derhachivskyy District Court and Borivskyy District Court, both of Kharkiv <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on 16 March 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Orzhitskyy District Court	Orzhitsa	3			
<b>Total</b>		<b>187</b>			

a Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

b From decrees and orders issued by the Supreme Court of Ukraine.

**Rivne Oblast**

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction <sup>b</sup>	Nature of Conflict	Damage to Court Buildings
Rivne <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeals	Rivne	8		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Northwest Commercial Court of Appeals	Rivne	21		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Rivne Circuit Administrative Court	Rivne	16		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Commercial Court of Rivne <i>Oblast</i>	Rivne	16		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Bereznivskiy District Court	Berezne	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Dubrovyskiy District Court	Dubrovitsa	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Dolbunivskiy District Court	Zdolbuniv	6		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Koretskiy District Court	Korets	4	Ovrutskiy District Court, Brusylivskiy District Court, and Malynskiy District Court, all of Zhytomyr <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on 10 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored to those three courts on 22 April 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ostrozkiy District Court	Ostrog	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Radyvylivskiy District Court	Radivilov	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Rivnenskiy District Court	Rivne	9		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Volodymyretskiy District Court	Vladimerets	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kostopilskiy District Court	Kostopil	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Rivnenskiy Town Court	Rivne	21		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Sarnenskiy District Court	Sarny	5		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Hoshchanskiy District Court	Hoshcha	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Lubny Town-District Court	Dubno	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zarichnenskiy District Court	Zarichne	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kuznetsovskiy Town Court	Kuznetsovsk	6		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Rokytnivskiy District Court	Rokytny	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Demydivskiy District Court	Demidivka	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Mlynivskiy District Court	Mlyniv	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
<b>Total</b>		<b>148</b>			

a Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

b From decrees and orders issued by the Supreme Court of Ukraine.

**Sumy Oblast**

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction <sup>b</sup>	Nature of Conflict <sup>c</sup>	Damage to Court Buildings <sup>d</sup>
Sumy <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeals	Sumy	7		Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	None reported
Sumy Circuit Administrative Court	Sumy	16		Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	None reported
Commercial Court of Sumy <i>Oblast</i>	Sumy	9	Transferred to the Commercial Court of Cherkasy <i>Oblast</i> on 22 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 22 April 2022.	Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	None reported
Konotopskyi City-District Court	Konotop	9		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Krasnopilskyi District Court	Krasnopillia	3		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Krolevetskyi District Court	Krolevets	3		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Lypovodolynskyi District Court	Lipova Dolyna	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Nedryhailivskyi District Court	Nedryhailiv	3		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Putyvlskyi District Court	Putivl	2		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Sumskyi District Court	Sumy	3		Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	None reported
Trostanetskyi District Court	Trostanets	2	Transferred to Hadiatskyi District Court in Poltava <i>Oblast</i> on 22 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction of this court restored 25 May 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	Damaged
Yampilskyi District Court	Yampil	3		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Burynskyi District Court	Buryń	1		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	Damaged
Velykopysarivskyi District Court	Velyka Pysarivka	3		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	Damaged
Zarichnyi District Court of Sumy City	Sumy	12		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Hlukhivskyi City-District Court	Hlukhiv	4		Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	None reported
Bilopilskyi District Court	Bilopillya	3		Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kovpakivskyi District Court of Sumy City	Sumy	13		Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	None reported
Lebedynskyi District Court	Lebedyn	4		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Romenskyi City-District Court	Romny	5		Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	None reported
Shostkynskyi City-District Court	Shostka	6		Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported

Okhtyrskyi City-District Court	Yaroslavsky	6	Transferred to Shyshatskyi District Court in Poltava <i>Oblast</i> on 25 March 2022	Under Ukrainian control	Damaged
Seredyna-Buda District Court	Seredyna-Buda	2	Transferred to Hadiatskyi District Court in Poltava <i>Oblast</i> on 22 March 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
<b>Total</b>		<b>122</b>			

a Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

b From decrees and orders issued by the Supreme Court of Ukraine.

c Reports as of 30 June 2022.

d State Judicial Administration of Ukraine, “Destroyed/damaged premises of judicial institutions as a result of armed aggression of the Russian Federation,” found at [https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts\\_buildings](https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts_buildings).

### Ternopil *Oblast*

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction	Nature of Conflict	Damage to Court Buildings
Ternopil <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeals	Ternopil	15		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ternopil Circuit Administrative Court	Ternopil	10		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Commercial Court of Ternopil <i>Oblast</i>	Ternopil	13		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Berezhanskyi District Court	Berezhany	5		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Borshchivskyi District Court	Borshchev	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zbarazkyi District Court	Zbarazh	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kremenetskyi District Court	Kremenets	5		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Pidvolochyskyi District Court	Pidvolochisk	-		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ternopilskyi City-District Court	Ternopil	25		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Husiatynskyi District Court	Husiatin	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zborivskyi District Court	Zboriv	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Pidhaietskyi District Court	Pidgaytsi	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Chortkivskyi District Court	Chortkiv	5		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Buchatskyi District Court	Buchach	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Lanovetskyi District Court	Lanivtsi	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Monastyrskyi District Court	Monastyrska	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Terebovlianskyi District Court	Terebovlya	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kozivskyi District Court	Kozova	1		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zalishchytskyi District Court	Zalishchyky	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Shumskyi District Court	Shumsk	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
<b>Total</b>		<b>112</b>			

a Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

**Kharkiv Oblast**

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction <sup>b</sup>	Nature of Conflict <sup>c</sup>	Damage to Court Buildings <sup>d</sup>
Kharkiv <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeals	Kharkiv	13	Luhansk <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeals transferred to this court in September 2014; this court transferred to Poltava Court of Appeal on 25 March 2022.	Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	Destroyed
Eastern Commercial Court of Appeals	Kharkiv	31		Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	None reported
Second Administrative Court of Appeals	Kharkiv	22		Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kharkiv Circuit Administrative Court	Kharkiv	34		Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	None reported
Commercial Court of Kharkiv <i>Oblast</i>	Kharkiv	39	Donetsk and Luhansk Commercial Courts of Appeals moved to Kharkiv in September 2014	Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	Damaged
Barvinkivskyi District Court	Barvenkovo	1	Transferred to Dnipropetrovsk District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 April 2022	Under Ukrainian control	Damaged
Velykoburlutskyi District Court	Velykyi Burluk	3	Transferred to Mashivskyi District Court in Poltava <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022	Occupied by Russian forces	None reported
Karlivskyi District Court	Dvorichna	2	Transferred to Karlivskyi District Court in Poltava <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022	Occupied by Russian forces	None reported
Dzerzhynskyi District Court of Kharkiv City	Kharkiv	17		Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zmiivskyi District Court	Zmiiv	5		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zolochivskyi District Court	Zolochiv	2	Transferred to Dykan District Court in Poltava <i>Oblast</i> on 14 March 2022	Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	Damaged
Kyivskyi District Court of Kharkiv City	Kharkiv	11		Beseiged by Russians until early May 2022	None reported
Krasnohradskyi District Court	Krasnograd	4		Remained under Ukrainian control	None reported
Krasnokutskyi District Court	Krasnokutsk	3		Remained under Ukrainian control	None reported
Leninskyi District Court of Kharkiv City	Kharkiv	11	Transferred to Kyiv District Court in Poltava <i>Oblast</i> on 14 March 2022	Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	Damaged
Lozivskyi City-District Court	Lozovaya	6	Transferred to Amur-Nizhnedniprovskiy District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 April 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Liubotynskyi Town Court	Liubotyn	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Novovodolazkyi District Court	Nova Vodolaha	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported

Ordzhonikidzevskiy District Court of Kharkiv City	Kharkiv	12	Transferred to Kyiv District Court in Poltava <i>Oblast</i> on 14 March 2022	Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	Damaged
Frunzenskiy District Court of Kharkiv City	Kharkiv	11	Transferred to Oktiabrskiy District Court of Poltava City on 8 March 2022	Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	None reported
Chuhuivskiy Town Court	Chuguyiv	5	Transferred to Hlobynskiy District Court of Poltava <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022	Under Ukrainian control	Damaged
Kominternivskiy District Court of Kharkiv City	Kharkiv	11	Transferred to Leninskyy District Court of Poltava City of Poltava <i>Oblast</i> on 10 March 2022	Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	None reported
Balakiiskiy District Court	Balakiia	5	Transferred to Novomoskovskiy City-District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 10 March 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	Damaged and ransacked
Blyzniukivskiy District Court	Blyzniuky	2	Transferred to Amur-Nizhnedniprovskiy District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 April 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zhovtnevyi District Court of Kharkiv City	Kharkiv	13		Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	Damaged
Iziumskiy City-District Court	Izium	4	Transferred to Pavlohradskiy City-District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 10 March 2022	Occupied by Russian forces	Destroyed
Kehychivskiy District Court	Kehychivka	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kolomatskiy District Court	Rizenkovo	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kupianskiy City-District Court	Kupyansk	9	Transferred to Novomoskovskiy City-District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 10 March 2022	Occupied by Russian forces	None reported
Moskovskiy District Court of Kharkiv City	Kharkiv	18	Transferred to Oktiabrskiy District Court of Poltava City on 8 March 2022	Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kharkivskiy District Court	Pokotylyvka	9	Transferred to Poltavskiy District Court in Poltava <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022	Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	None reported
Borivskiy District Court	Borova	1	Transferred to Kotelevskiy District Court in Poltava <i>Oblast</i> on 16 March 2022	Occupied by Russian forces	Damaged
Vovchanskiy District Court	Vovchansk	4	Transferred to Mashivskiy District Court in Poltava <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022	Occupied by Russian forces	None reported
Zachepylivskiy District Court	Zachepylivka	1		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Chervonozavodskiy District Court of Kharkiv City	Kharkiv	9	Transferred to Leninskyy District Court of Poltava City of Poltava <i>Oblast</i> on 10 March 2022	Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	Damaged
Sakhnovshchynskiy District Court	Sakhnovshchyna	2	Transferred to Dykan District Court in Poltava <i>Oblast</i> on 14 March 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Shevchenkivskiy District Court	Shevchenkove	2	Transferred to Dykan District Court in Poltava <i>Oblast</i> on 14 March 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	Damaged
Valkivskiy District Court	Valky	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported

Pechenizkyi District Court	Pechenihiy	3	Transferred to Kozelshchynskyi District Court in Poltava <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Pervomaisky City-District Court	Pervomaisky	7		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Bohodukhivskyi District Court	Bohodukhiv	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Derhachivskyi District Court	Dergachi	7	Transferred to Kotelevsky District Court in Poltava <i>Oblast</i> on 16 March 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	Damaged
<b>Total</b>		<b>356</b>			

a Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

b From decrees and orders issued by the Supreme Court of Ukraine.

c Reports as of 30 June 2022.

d State Judicial Administration of Ukraine, “Destroyed/damaged premises of judicial institutions as a result of armed aggression of the Russian Federation,” found at [https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts\\_buildings](https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts_buildings).

### Kherson *Oblast*

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction <sup>b</sup>	Nature of Conflict <sup>c</sup>	Damage to Court Buildings <sup>d</sup>
Kherson <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeals	Kherson	25	Transferred to Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeal on 6 March 2022	Russian occupied	None reported
Kherson Circuit Administrative Court	Kherson	14	Transferred to Odesa Circuit Administrative Court on 18 March 2022	Russian occupied	None reported
Commercial Court of Kherson <i>Oblast</i>	Kherson	10	Transferred to Commercial Court of Odesa <i>Oblast</i> on 18 March 2022	Russian occupied	None reported
Beryslavskyi District Court	Beryslav	4	Transferred to Zhovtovidskyi City Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Russian occupied	None reported
Verkhnorohachytskyi District Court	Verkhni Rohachyk	1	Transferred to Apostolivskyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Russian occupied	None reported
Vysokopilskyi District Court	Vysokopillia	2	Transferred to Shyrokyivskyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Russian occupied	Damaged
Holoprystanskyi District Court	Hola Prystan	5	Transferred to Ternivskyi Town Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Russian occupied	Damaged
Ivanivskyi District Court	Ivanivka	3	Transferred to Tsentralno-Miskyi District Court of Kryvyi Rih City of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Russian occupied	None reported
Kakhovskiy City-District Court	Kakhovka	7	Transferred to Kryvorizkyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Russian occupied	None reported
Novovorontsovskyi District Court	Novovorontsovka	2	Transferred to Kryvorizkyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Novotroitskyi District Court	Novotroitsk	2	Transferred to Zhovtnevi District Court of Kryvyi Rih City of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Russian occupied	None reported

Tsiurupynskiy District Court	Oleshki	5	Transferred to Saksahanskyi District Court of Kryvyi Rih City of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Russian occupied	Damaged
Velykooleksandrivskiy District Court	Velyka Oleksandrivka	3	Transferred to Apostolivskyy District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Russian occupied	None reported
Dniprovskiy District Court of Kherson City	Kherson	-		Russian occupied	None reported
Komsomolskyi District Court of Kherson City	Kherson			Russian occupied	None reported
Nyzhnosirohozkyi District Court	Nyzhni Sirohozy	2	Transferred to Kryvorizkyi District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Russian occupied	None reported
Skadovskiy District Court	Skadovsk	5	Transferred to Zhovtnevyi District Court of Kryvyi Rih City of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Russian occupied	Damaged
Bilozerskyi District Court	Bilozerka	7	Transferred to Zhovtovodskiy City Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Russian occupied	Damaged
Kalanchatskyi District Court	Kalanchak	3	Transferred to Tsentralno-Miskiyi District Court of Kryvyi Rih City of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Russian occupied	None reported
Novokakhovskiy Town Court	Nova Kakhovka	5	Transferred to Zhovtnevyi District Court of Kryvyi Rih City of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Russian occupied	None reported
Kherson City Court	Kherson	24	Transferred to Saksahanskyi District Court of Kryvyi Rih City of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Russian occupied	None reported
Hornostaivskiy District Court	Hornostaivka	1	Transferred to Ternivskiy Town Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Russian occupied	None reported
Suvorovskiy District Court of Kherson City	Kherson	-		Russian occupied	None reported
Henicheskyy District Court	Henichesk	5	Transferred to Shyroktivskiy District Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Russian occupied	None reported
Chaplynskyy District Court	Chaplinka	3	Transferred to Saksahanskyi District Court of Kryvyi Rih City of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Russian occupied	Damaged
Velykolepetyskyi District Court	Velyka Lepetykha	3	Transferred to Zhovtovodskiy City Court of Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i> on 6 March 2022	Russian occupied	Damaged
<b>Total</b>		<b>141</b>			

a Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

b From decrees and orders issued by the Supreme Court of Ukraine.

c Reports as of 30 June 2022.

d State Judicial Administration of Ukraine, “Destroyed/damaged premises of judicial institutions as a result of armed aggression of the Russian Federation,” found at [https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts\\_buildings](https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts_buildings).

**Khmelnyskyi Oblast**

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction	Nature of Conflict	Damage to Court Buildings
Khmelnyskyi Oblast Court of Appeals	Khmelnyskyi	16		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Khmelnyskyi Circuit Administrative Court	Khmelnyskyi	16		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Commercial Court of Khmelnyskyi Oblast	Khmelnyskyi	16		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Novoushytskyi District Court	Novaya Ushica	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Bilohirskyi District Court	Belogorie	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Dunaievtskyi District Court	Dunaivtsi	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Netishynskyi Town Court	Neteshin	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Slavutskyi City-District Court	Slavuta	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Starokostiantynivskyi District Court	Starokonstantinov	7		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Khmelnyskyi City-District Court	Khmelnitsky	32		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Shepetivskyi City-District Court	Shepetivka	6		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Vinkovetskyi District Court	Vinkivtsi	1		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Volochyskyi District Court	Volochysk	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Krasylivskyi District Court	Krasyliv	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Teofipolskyi District Court	Teofipol'	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Horodotskyi District Court	Horodok	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Yarmolynetskyi District Court	Yarmolyntsi	5		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Derazhnianskyi District Court	Derazhnya	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Iziaslavskyi District Court	Iziaslav	6		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Letychivskyi District Court	Letychiv	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Polonskyi District Court	Polonne	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Starosyniavskyi District Court	Stara Synyava	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Chemerovetskyi District Court	Chemervitsi	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kamianets-Podilskyi City-District Court	Kamyanets-Podilsky	14		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
<b>Total</b>		<b>156</b>			

a Number of judges "administering justice" from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, "List of Judges as of 21.02.2022," found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

**Cherkasy Oblast**

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction <sup>b</sup>	Nature of Conflict <sup>c</sup>	Damage to Court Buildings <sup>d</sup>
Cherkasy <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeals	Cherkasy	15	Chernihiv <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeals transferred to this court on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction of that court restored on 4 May 2022		None reported
Cherkasy Circuit Administrative Court	Cherkasy	7			None reported
Commercial Court of Cherkasy <i>Oblast</i>	Cherkasy	12	Commercial Courts of Sumy and Chernihiv <i>Oblasts</i> transferred to this court on 22 March 2022; territorial jurisdictions of these courts restored on 22 April 2022		None reported
Zvenyhorodskyi District Court	Zvenigorodka	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zolotonyskyi City-District Court	Zolotonosha	4	Bakhmatskyi District Court, Borznianskyi District Court, and Nizhynskyi City-District Court, all in Chernihiv <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdictions of both courts restored on 4 May 2022.	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Umanskyi City-District Court	Uman	7		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kamianskyi District Court	Kamenka	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Drabivskyi District Court	Drabov	2	Ichnianskyi District Court, Talalaivskyi District Court, and Sribnianskyi District Court, all in Chernihiv <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction of those courts restored on 4 May 2022.	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Katerynopilskyi District Court	Katerinopol	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Mankivskyi District Court	Mankovka	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Prydniprovskyi District Court of Cherkasy City	Cherkasy	9		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Smilianskyi City-District Court	Smila	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Cherkaskyi District Court	Cherkasy	5	Kozeletsky District Court of Chernihiv <i>Oblast</i> transferred to this court on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction of those courts restored on 4 May 2022.	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Chyhyrinskyi District Court	Chigirin	1		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Chornobaivskyi District Court	Chernobay	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported

Shpolianskyi District Court	Shpola	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kanivskyi City-District Court	Kaniv	5	Bobrovytskyi District Court and Nosivskyi District Court, both in Chernihiv <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction of these courts restored on 4 May 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Horodyschenskyi District Court	Horodishche	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi District Court	Korsun-Shevchenkivsky	2	Prylutskyi City-District Court and Varvynskyi District Court, both in Chernihiv <i>Oblast</i> , transferred to this court on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction for these courts restored on 4 May 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Khrystynivskyi District Court	Khrystynivka	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Vatutinskyi Town Court	Vatutino	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zhashkivskyi District Court	Zhashkiv	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Lysianskyi District Court	Lysyanka	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Monastyryshchenskyi District Court	Monastyryshche			Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Sosnivskyi District Court	Cherkasy	12		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Talnivskyi District Court	Talne	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
<b>Total</b>		<b>130</b>			

a Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

b From decrees and orders issued by the Supreme Court of Ukraine.

c Reports as of 30 June 2022.

d State Judicial Administration of Ukraine, “Destroyed/damaged premises of judicial institutions as a result of armed aggression of the Russian Federation,” found at [https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts\\_buildings](https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts_buildings).

**Chernivtsi Oblast**

<b>Court</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Judges<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>Transfers of Jurisdiction</b>	<b>Nature of Conflict</b>	<b>Damage to Court Buildings</b>
Chernivtsi Oblast Court of Appeals	Chernivtsi	16		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Chernivtsi Circuit Administrative Court	Chernivtsi	8		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Commercial Court of Chernivtsi Oblast	Chernivtsi	13		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Vyzhnytskyi District Court	Vizhnitsa	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Zastavniivskyi District Court	Zastavna	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kitsmanskyi District Court	Kitsman	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Pershotravnevyi District Court of Chernivtsi City	Chernivtsi	9		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Putylskyi District Court of Chernivtsi Oblast	Putil	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Sadhirskyi District Court of Chernivtsi City	Chernivtsi	5		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Chernivtsi City	Chernivtsi	8		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Hlybotskyi District Court	Hlyboka	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Novoselytskyi District Court	Novoselytsia	4		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Sokyranskyi District Court	Sokiryany	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kelmenetskyi District Court	Kelmentsi	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Khotynskyi District Court	Khotyn	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Novodnistrovsk Town Court	Novodnistrovsk	2		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Storozhynetskyi District Court	Storozhynets	5		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Hertsavivskyi District Court	Hertz	3		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
<b>Total</b>		<b>97</b>			

a Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

Chernihiv *Oblast*

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction <sup>b</sup>	Nature of Conflict <sup>c</sup>	Damage to Court Buildings <sup>d</sup>
Chernihiv <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeals	Chernihiv	16	Transferred to Cherkasy <i>Oblast</i> Court of Appeals on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction of that court restored on 4 May 2022	Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	Damaged
Chernihiv Circuit Administrative Court	Chernihiv	14		Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	None reported
Commercial Court of Chernihiv <i>Oblast</i>	Chernihiv	9	Transferred to the Commercial Court of Cherkasy <i>Oblast</i> on 22 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	Damaged
Horodnianskyi District Court	Horodnia	2	Transferred to Zghurivskyi District Court in Kyiv <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ichnianskyi District Court	Ichnia	4	Transferred to Drabivskyi District Court in Cherkasy <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Koriukivskyi District Court	Koriukivka	4	Transferred to Berezanskyi Town Court in Kyiv <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Menskyi District Court	Mena	4	Transferred to Berezanskyi Town Court in Kyiv <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Prylutskyi City-District Court	Priluki	6	Transferred to Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi District Court in Cherkasy <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Ripkynskyi District Court	Ripky	2	Transferred to Zghurivskyi District Court in Kyiv <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Sosnytskyi District Court	Sosnytsia	3	Transferred to Berezanskyi Town Court in Kyiv <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Chernihivskyi District Court	Chernihiv	5	Transferred to Zghurivskyi District Court in Kyiv <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	None reported
Bobrovytskyi District Court	Bobrovytsia	4	Transferred to Kanivskyi City-District Court in Cherkasy <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Koropskyi District Court	Korop	2	Transferred to Berezanskyi Town Court in Kyiv <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Novozavodskyi District Court of Chernihiv City	Chernihiv	5	Transferred to Yahotynskyi District Court in Kyiv <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	None reported
Sribnianskyi District Court	Sribne	2	Transferred to Yahotynskyi District Court in Kyiv <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported

Bakhmatskiy District Court	Bakhmach	4	Transferred to Zolotonisky City-District Court in Cherkasy <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Borznianskiy District Court	Borzna	3	Transferred to Zolotonisky City-District Court in Cherkasy <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Desnianskiy District Court of Chernihiv City	Chernihiv	16	Transferred to Yahotynski District Court in Kyiv <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Heavy fighting, remained under Ukrainian control	Damaged
Kozeletski District Court	Kozelets	5	Transferred to Cherkaskiy District Court in Cherkasy <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kulykivski District Court	Kulykivka	3	Transferred to Cherkaskiy District Court in Cherkasy <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Nizhynski City-District Court	Nizhyn	7	Transferred to Zolotonisky City-District Court in Cherkasy <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Nosivski District Court	Nosivka	3	Transferred to Kanivski City-District Court in Cherkasy <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Semenivski District Court	Semenivka	2	Transferred to Yahotynski District Court in Kyiv <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Talalaivski District Court	Talalayevka	2	Transferred to Drabivski District Court in Cherkasy <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Varvynski District Court	Varva	1	Transferred to Korsun-Shevchenkivski District Court in Cherkasy <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
Novhorod-Siverskiy District	Novgorod-Siversky	4	Transferred to Yahotynski District Court in Kyiv <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	Damaged
Shchorskiy District Court	Snovsk	3	Transferred to Zghurivski District Court in Kyiv <i>Oblast</i> on 8 March 2022; territorial jurisdiction restored on 4 May 2022	Heavy fighting, now under Ukrainian control	None reported
<b>Total</b>		<b>135</b>			

a Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

b From decrees and orders issued by the Supreme Court of Ukraine.

c Reports as of 30 June 2022.

d State Judicial Administration of Ukraine, “Destroyed/damaged premises of judicial institutions as a result of armed aggression of the Russian Federation,” found at [https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts\\_buildings](https://dsa.court.gov.ua/dsa/inshe/courts_buildings).

## Kyiv City

Court	Location	Judges <sup>a</sup>	Transfers of Jurisdiction	Nature of Conflict	Damage to Court Buildings
Kyiv City Court of Appeals	Kyiv	97		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Eighth Administrative Court of Appeals	Kyiv	34		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Northern Commercial Court of Appeals	Kyiv	50		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Kyiv City Circuit Administrative Court	Kyiv	48		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Commercial Court of Kyiv City	Kyiv	74		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Holosiivskiy District Court of Kyiv City	Kyiv	20		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Obolonskyi District Court of Kyiv City	Kyiv	20		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Pecherskyi District Court of Kyiv City	Kyiv	29		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Sviatoshynskiy District Court of Kyiv City	Kyiv	27		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Desnianskyi District Court of Kyiv City	Kyiv	23		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Solomianskyi District Court of Kyiv City	Kyiv	26		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Shevchenkivskiy District Court of Kyiv City	Kyiv	35		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Dniprovskiy District Court of Kyiv City	Kyiv	24		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Darnytskyi District Court of Kyiv City	Kyiv	23		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
Podilskyi District Court of Kyiv City	Kyiv	11		Under Ukrainian control	None reported
<b>Total</b>		<b>541</b>			

a Number of judges “administering justice” from High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine, “List of Judges as of 21.02.2022,” found at [https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok\\_suddiv\\_na\\_21.02.2022.pdf](https://www.vkksu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/pdf/spysok_suddiv_na_21.02.2022.pdf).

## ANNEX 3

### District and Departmental Prosecutor's Offices

<i>Oblast</i>	District Offices <sup>a</sup>	Departmental Offices <sup>b</sup>
Vinnitsia <i>Oblast</i>	7	12
Volyn <i>Oblast</i>	4	6
Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i>	16	10
Donetsk <i>Oblast</i>	8	10
Zhytomyr <i>Oblast</i>	6	-
Zakarpattia (Trans-Carpathian) <i>Oblast</i>	5	4
Zaporizhzhia <i>Oblast</i>	8	-
Ivano-Frankivsk <i>Oblast</i>	6	10
Kyiv <i>Oblast</i>	8	-
Kirovohrad <i>Oblast</i>	5	14
Luhansk <i>Oblast</i>	5	10
Lviv <i>Oblast</i>	10	-
Mykolayiv <i>Oblast</i>	5	13
Odesa <i>Oblast</i>	14	-
Poltava <i>Oblast</i>	7	-
Rivne <i>Oblast</i>	5	11
Sumy <i>Oblast</i>	6	13
Ternopil <i>Oblast</i>	6	-
Kharkiv <i>Oblast</i>	14	17
Kherson <i>Oblast</i>	6	4
Khmelnyskyi <i>Oblast</i>	5	-
Cherkasy <i>Oblast</i>	5	16
Chernivtsi <i>Oblast</i>	3	6
Chernihiv <i>Oblast</i>	6	-
Kyiv (city)	10	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>156</b>

a Annex 4

b Annex 4. However, no information has been located from ten *oblasts* regarding the existence or locations of any departmental offices.

## ANNEX 4

### Regional, District, and Departmental Prosecutor's Offices

#### Vinnitsia Oblast<sup>1</sup>

Vinnitsia Regional Prosecutor's Office (Vinnitsia)  
 Vinnitsia District Prosecutor's Office (Vinnitsia)  
 Tyvriv Department (Tyvriv)  
 Nemyriv District Prosecutor's Office (Nemyriv)  
 Lypovets Department (Lypovets)  
 Haisyn District Prosecutor's Office (Haisyn)  
 Bershad Department (Bershad)  
 Teplyk Department (Teplyk)  
 Trostyanets Department (Trostyanets)  
 Zhmerynka District Prosecutor's Office (Zhmerynka)  
 Bar Department (Bar)  
 Sharhorod Department (Sharhorod)  
 Mohyliv-Podilsky District Prosecutor's Office (Mohyliv-Podilsky)  
 Yampil Department (Yampil)  
 Tulchyn District Prosecutor's Office (Tulchyn)  
 Kryzhopil Department (Kryzhopil)  
 Tomashpil Department (Tomashpil)  
 Khmilnytsky District Prosecutor's Office (Khmilnyk)  
 Kozyatyn Department (Kozyatyn)  
 Kalynivka Department (Kalynivka)

#### Volyn Oblast<sup>2</sup>

Volyn Regional Prosecutor's Office (Lutsk)  
 Volodymyr-Volyn District Prosecutor's Office  
 (Volodymyr-Volynskiy)  
 Novovolynsk Department (Novovolynsk)  
 Kamin-Kashira District Prosecutor's Office (Kamin-Kashirskiy)  
 Manevychi Department (Manevychi)  
 Kovel District Prosecutor's Office (Kovel)  
 Liuboml Department (Liuboml)  
 Ratniv Department (Ratne)  
 Lutsk District Prosecutor's Office (Lutsk)  
 Gorokhiv Department (Gorokhiv)  
 Kivertsi Department (Kivertsi)

#### Dnipropetrovsk Oblast<sup>3</sup>

Dnipropetrovsk Regional Prosecutor's Office (Dnipro)  
 Zhovtovodsk District Prosecutor's Office (Zhovti Vody)  
 Vilnohirska Department (Vilnohirska)  
 Krynytsky Department (Krynytsky)  
 Piatykhatky Department (Piatykhatky)  
 Western District Prosecutor's Office of the City of Dnipro  
 (Dnipro)  
 Kamianske District Prosecutor's Office (Kamianske)  
 Kryvyi Rih Southern District Prosecutor's Office (Kryvyi Rih)  
 Shirokiv Department (Shirokiv)  
 Kryvyi Rih Northern District Prosecutor's Office (Kryvyi Rih)  
 Kryvyi Rih Eastern District Prosecutor's Office (Kryvyi Rih)  
 Sofia Department (Sofia)

Kryvyi Rih Central District Prosecutor's Office (Kryvyi Rih)  
 Left Bank District Prosecutor's Office of the Dnieper City (Dnipro)  
 Nikopol District Prosecutor's Office (Nikopol)  
 Pokrovsky Department (Pokrovsky)  
 Tomakovsky Department (Tomakivka)  
 Novomoskovsk District Prosecutor's Office (Novomoskovsk)  
 Pavlograd District Prosecutor's Office (Pavlograd)  
 Pershotravensk District Prosecutor's Office (Pershotravensk)  
 Mezhyiv Department (Mezhova)  
 Right-bank District Prosecutor's Office of the City of Dnipro  
 (Dnipro)  
 Synelnykiv District Prosecutor's Office (Pershotravensk)  
 Pokrovsky Department (Pokrovsky)  
 Slobozhansk District Prosecutor's Office (Slobozhanske)  
 Tsarychansky Department (Tsarychanka)  
 Central District Prosecutor's Office of the City of Dnipro (Dnipro)

#### Donetsk Oblast<sup>4</sup>

Donetsk Regional Prosecutor's Office (Dnipro)  
 Bakhmut District Prosecutor's Office (Bakhmut)  
 Toretsky Department (Toretsk)  
 Volnovakha District Prosecutor's Office (Volnovakha)  
 Velykonovosilkivsky Department (Velyka Novosilka)  
 Konstantinovka District Prosecutor's Office (Kostiantynivka)  
 Avdiivka Department (Avdiivka)  
 Kramatorsk District Prosecutor's Office (Kramatorsk)  
 Druzhkivsky Department (Druzhkivka)  
 Oleksandrivka Department (Oleksandrivka)  
 Left Bank District Prosecutor's Office (Mariupol)  
 Mariupol District Prosecutor's Office (Mariupol)  
 Pokrovsky District Prosecutor's Office (Pokrovsk)  
 Myrnohrad Department (Myrnohrad)  
 Selidovo department (Selidove)  
 Dobropol Department (Dobropillya)  
 Kurakhiv Department (Kurakhove)  
 Slavic District Prosecutor's Office (Slavyansk)  
 Lyman Department (Lyman)

#### Zhytomyr Oblast<sup>5</sup>

Zhytomyr Regional Prosecutor's Office (Zhytomyr)  
 Berdychiv District Prosecutor's Office (Berdychiv)  
 Zhytomyr District Prosecutor's Office (Zhytomyr)  
 Korosten District Prosecutor's Office (Korosten)  
 Korostyshiv District Prosecutor's Office (Korostyshiv)  
 Novograd-Volyn District Prosecutor's Office  
 (Novograd-Volynsky)  
 Chudniv District Prosecutor's Office (Chudniv)

1 Vinnitsia Regional Prosecutor's Office, "The structure of the Vinnitsia Regional Prosecutor's Office," found at <https://vin.gov.ua/ua/structure.html>.

2 Volyn Regional Prosecutor's Office, "Structure - Volyn Regional Prosecutor's Office," found at <https://vol.gov.ua/ua/structure.html>.

3 Dnipropetrovsk Regional Prosecutor's Office, "Structure - Dnipropetrovsk Regional Prosecutor's Office," found at <https://dnipr.gov.ua/ua/structure.html>.

4 Donetsk Region Prosecutor's Office, "For the knowledge of the residents of the region," found at [https://don.gov.ua/ua/subordinate\\_offices\\_.html](https://don.gov.ua/ua/subordinate_offices_.html). Recent military operations suggest that a number of these offices have closed.

5 Zhytomyr Region Prosecutor's Office, "List of district Prosecutor's offices," found at [https://zhit.gov.ua/ua/subordinate\\_offices\\_.html](https://zhit.gov.ua/ua/subordinate_offices_.html). No information is available regarding the existence or locations of any departmental offices in Zhytomyr Oblast.

**Zakarpattia Oblast<sup>6</sup>**

Zakarpattia Regional Prosecutor's Office (Uzhgorod)  
 Berehiv District Prosecutor's Office (Berehovo)  
 Vynohradiv Department (Vynohrad)  
 Mukachiv District Prosecutor's Office (Mukachevo)  
 Volovets Department (Volovets)  
 Svaliava Department (Svaliava)  
 Tyachiv District Prosecutor's Office (Tyachiv)  
 Rakhiv Department (Rakhiv)  
 Uzhgorod District Prosecutor's Office (Uzhgorod)  
 Velykoberezhniansky Department (Velykoberezhniansky)  
 Perechyn Department (Perechyn)  
 Khust District Prosecutor's Office (Khust)  
 Irshava Department (Irshava)  
 Mizhhiria Department (Mizhhiria)

**Zaporizhzhia Oblast<sup>7</sup>**

Zaporizhzhia Regional Prosecutor's Office (Zaporizhzhia)  
 Vozneseniv District Prosecutor's Office of Zaporizhzhia  
 (Zaporizhzhia)  
 Dnipro District Prosecutor's Office of Zaporizhzhia  
 (Zaporizhzhia)  
 Shevchenkivsky District Prosecutors Office of Zaporizhzhia  
 (Zaporizhzhia)  
 Berdyansk District Prosecutor's Office (Berdyansk)  
 Vasylivka District Prosecutor's Office (Vasylivka)  
 Zaporizhzhia District Prosecutor's Office (Zaporizhzhia)  
 Melitopol District Prosecutor's Office (Melitopol)  
 Pology District Prosecutor's Office (Pology)

**Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast<sup>8</sup>**

Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Prosecutor's Office (Ivano-Frankivsk)  
 Ivano-Frankivsk District Prosecutor's Office (Ivano-Frankivsk)  
 Bohorodchany Department (Bohorodchany)  
 Halych Department (Halych)  
 Rohatyn Department (Rohatyn)  
 Tlumach Department (Tlumach)  
 Kalush District Prosecutor's Office (Kalush)  
 Dolyna Department (Dolyna)  
 Rozhnativ Department (Rozhnativ)  
 Kolomyia District Prosecutor's Office (Kolomyia)  
 Horodenka Department (Horodenka)  
 Sniatyn Department (Sniatyn)  
 Kosiv District Prosecutor's Office (Kosiv)  
 Verkhovyna Department (Verkhovyna)  
 Nadvirna District Prosecutor's Office (Nadvirna)  
 Yaremche Department (Yaremche)  
 The District Prosecutor's Office of Ivano-Frankivsk  
 (Ivano-Frankivsk)

**Kyiv Oblast<sup>9</sup>**

Kyiv Regional Prosecutor's Office (Kyiv)  
 Vyshhorod District Prosecutor's Office (Vyshhorod)  
 Bucha District Prosecutor's Office (Bucha)  
 Bila Tserkva District Prosecutor's Office (Bila Tserkva)  
 Boryspil District Prosecutor's Office (Boryspil)  
 Brovary District Prosecutor's Office (Brovary)  
 Obukhiv District Prosecutor's Office (Obukhiv)  
 Kyiv-Sviatoshynsky District Prosecutor's Office (Sofiiivska  
 Borshchahivka)  
 Fastiv District Prosecutor's Office (Fastiv)

**Kirovohrad Oblast<sup>10</sup>**

Kirovohrad Regional Prosecutor's Office (Kropyvnytskyi)  
 Golovanivka District Prosecutor's Office (Golovanivsk)  
 Blahovishchenske Department (Blahovishchenske)  
 Vilshansky Department (Vilshanka)  
 Haivoron Department (Haivoron)  
 Novoarkhanhelsk Department (Novoarkhanhelsk)  
 Znamyansk District Prosecutor's Office (Znamyanka)  
 Bobrynets Department (Bobrynets)  
 Dolynska Department (Dolynska)  
 Novgorod Department (Novgorod)  
 Oleksandrivka Department (Oleksandrivka)  
 Kropyvnytskyi District Prosecutor's Office (Kropyvnytskyi)  
 Novoukrainska District Prosecutor's Office (Novoukrainka)  
 Dobrovelychkivsky Department (Dobrovelychkivka)  
 Malovysk Department (Mala Vyska)  
 Novomyrhorod Department (Novomyrhorod)  
 Oleksandrivka District Prosecutor's Office (Oleksandrivka)  
 Onufriivsky Department (Onufriivka)  
 Petrovsky Department (Petrove)  
 Svitlovodsk Department (Svitlovodsk)

**Luhansk Oblast<sup>11</sup>**

Luhansk Regional Prosecutor's Office (Severodonetsk)  
 Lysychansk District Prosecutor's Office (Lysychansk)  
 Popasnyansky Department (Popasna)  
 Svativka District Prosecutor's Office (Svatove)  
 Belokurakinsky Department (Bilokurakynne)  
 Troitske Department (Troitske)  
 Severodonetsk District Prosecutor's Office (Severodonetsk)  
 Kreminna Department (Kreminna)  
 Rubizhne Department (Rubizhne)  
 Starobilsk District Prosecutor's Office (Starobilsk)  
 Belovodsk Department (Belovodsk)  
 Markiv Department (Markiv)  
 Milovsky Department (Milove)  
 Novopskovsky Department (Novopskov)  
 Shchastyn District Prosecutor's Office (Novoaydar)  
 Stanychno-Luhansk Department (Stanytsia)

6 Zakarpattia Region Prosecutor's Office, "The structure of the regional Prosecutor's office," found at <https://zak.gp.gov.ua/ua/structure.html>.

7 Annex to Order of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine No. 39 "On certain issues of ensuring the start of work of district Prosecutor's offices," dated 17 February 2021. No information is available regarding the existence or locations of any departmental offices in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

8 Ivano-Frankivsk Region Prosecutor's Office, "The structure of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Prosecutor's Office," found at <https://ifr.gp.gov.ua/ua/structure.html>.

9 Kyiv Region Prosecutor's Office, "Subordinate to the Prosecutor's office," found at <https://kobl.gp.gov.ua/ua/pidprko.html>. No information is available regarding the existence or locations of any departmental offices in the Kyiv Oblast.

10 Kirovohrad Region Prosecutor's Office, "The structure of the Kirovohrad Regional Prosecutor's Office," found at <https://kir.gp.gov.ua/ua/structure.html>.

11 Luhansk Region Prosecutor's Office, "Structure of the Luhansk Regional Prosecutor's Office," found at <https://lug.gp.gov.ua/ua/structure.html>. Recent military operations suggest that some of these offices have closed.

**Lviv Oblast<sup>12</sup>**

Lviv Regional Prosecutor's Office (Lviv)  
 Halych District Prosecutor's Office of Lviv (Lviv)  
 Frankivsk District Prosecutor's Office of Lviv (Lviv)  
 Drohobych District Prosecutor's Office (Drohobych)  
 Zolochiv District Prosecutor's Office (Zolochiv)  
 Zhovkva District Prosecutor's Office (Zhovkva)  
 Pustomyty District Prosecutor's Office (Pustomyty)  
 Stryi District Prosecutor's Office (Stryi)  
 Sambir District Prosecutor's Office (Sambir)  
 Chervonohrad District Prosecutor's Office (Chervonohrad)  
 Yavoriv District Prosecutor's Office (Yavoriv)

**Mykolayiv Oblast<sup>13</sup>**

Mykolayiv Region Prosecutor's Office (Mykolayiv)  
 District Prosecutor's Office of the City of Mykolayiv (Mykolayiv)  
 Bashtan District Prosecutor's Office (Bashtanka)  
 Bereznehuvatsky Department (Berezneguvate)  
 Kazankivsky Department (Kazanka)  
 Novobuzhsky Department (Novy Buh)  
 Snihuriv Department (Snihurivka)  
 Voznesensk District Prosecutor's Office (Voznesensk)  
 Veselinovsky Department (Veselinove)  
 Domanivsky Department (Domanivka)  
 Yelanets Department (Yelanets)  
 Bratske Department (Bratske)  
 Yuzhnoukrainsky Department (Yuzhnoukrainsk)  
 Mykolaiv district Prosecutor's office, Mykolaiv  
 Berezansky Department (Berezanka)  
 Ochakiv Department (Ochakiv)  
 Pervomaisk District Prosecutor's Office (Pervomaisk)  
 Vradiyivskyi Department (Vradiyivka)  
 Kryvozersky Department (Krive Ozero)

**Odesa Oblast<sup>14</sup>**

Odesa Regional Prosecutor's Office (Odesa)  
 Kyiv District Prosecutor's Office of Odesa (Odesa)  
 Malinovsky District Prosecutor's Office of Odesa (Odesa)  
 Primorsky District Prosecutor's Office of Odesa (Odesa)  
 Suvorov District Prosecutor's Office of Odesa (Odesa)  
 Berezivska District Prosecutor's Office (Berezivka)  
 Belgorod-Dniester District Prosecutor's Office  
 (Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi)  
 Bilyayivska District Prosecutor's Office (Biliaivka)  
 Bolhrad District Prosecutor's Office (Bolhrad)  
 Dobroslav District Prosecutor's Office (Dobroslav)  
 Izmail District Prosecutor's Office (Izmail)  
 Lyubashiv District Prosecutor's Office (Liubashivka)  
 Podolsk District Prosecutor's Office (Podolsk)  
 Rozdilna District Prosecutor's Office (Rozdilna)  
 Black Sea District Prosecutor's Office (Odesa)

**Poltava Oblast<sup>15</sup>**

Poltava Regional Prosecutor's Office (Poltava)  
 Globinsk District Prosecutor's Office (Globinsk)  
 Dykansky District Prosecutor's Office (Dykansky)  
 Kremenchuk District Prosecutor's Office (Kremenchuk)  
 Lubny District Prosecutor's Office (Lubny)  
 Myrhorod District Prosecutor's Office (Myrhorod)  
 Poltava District Prosecutor's Office (Poltava)  
 Reshetyliv District Prosecutor's Office (Reshetylivka)

**Rivne Oblast<sup>16</sup>**

Rivne Regional Prosecutor's Office (Rivne)  
 Rivne District Prosecutor's Office (Rivne)  
 Dubno District Prosecutor's Office (Dubno)  
 Mlyniv Department (Mlyniv)  
 Radyvyliv Department (Radyvyliv)  
 Varaska District Prosecutor's Office (Varash)  
 Volodymyrets Department (Volodymyrets)  
 Zarichne Department (Zarichne)  
 Sarny District Prosecutor's Office (Sarny)  
 Dubrovytsia Department (Dubrovytsia)  
 Rokytne Department (Rokytne)  
 Zdolbuniv District Prosecutor's Office (Zdolbuniv)  
 Kostopil Department (Kostopil)  
 Ostroh Department (Ostroh)  
 Hoshchansky Department (Hoshcha)  
 Koretsky Department (Korets)  
 Berezne Department (Berezne)

**Sumy Oblast<sup>17</sup>**

Sumy Regional Prosecutor's Office (Sumy)  
 Konotop District Prosecutor's Office (Konotop)  
 Buryn Department (Buryn)  
 Krolevets Department (Krolevets)  
 Putivl Department (Putivl)  
 Sumy District Prosecutor's Office (Sumy)  
 Okhtyrka District Prosecutor's Office (Okhtyrka)  
 Velykopysarivsky Department (Velyka Pysarivka)  
 Trostyanets Department (Trostyanets)  
 Romen District Prosecutor's Office (Romny)  
 Lipovodolinsky Department (Lypova Dolyna)  
 Nedrigailiv Department (Nedrigailiv)  
 Sumy District Prosecutor's Office (Sumy)  
 Bilopillya Department (Bilopillya)  
 Krasnopil Department (Krasnopillya)  
 Lebedyn Department (Lebedyn)  
 Shostka District Prosecutor's Office (Shostka)  
 Hlukhiv Department (Hlukhiv)  
 Seredino-Buda Department (Seredino-Buda)  
 Yampil Department (Yampil)

12 Lviv Region Prosecutor's Office, "Hotline telephones and e-mail addresses for citizens' appeals," found at [https://lviv.gp.gov.ua/ua/subordinate\\_offices\\_.html](https://lviv.gp.gov.ua/ua/subordinate_offices_.html). No information is available regarding the existence or locations of any departmental offices in the Lviv Oblast.

13 Mykolaiv Region Prosecutor's Office, "The structure of the Prosecutor's office," found at <https://myk.gp.gov.ua/ua/structure.html>.

14 Annex to Order of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine No. 39 "On certain issues of ensuring the start of work of district Prosecutor's offices," dated 17 February 2021. No information has been located regarding the existence or locations of any departmental offices in the Odesa Oblast.

15 Poltava Region Prosecutor's Office, "The structure of the Poltava Regional Prosecutor's Office," found at <https://pol.gp.gov.ua/ua/structure.html>. No information has been located regarding the existence or locations of any departmental offices in the Poltava Oblast.

16 Rivne Region Prosecutor's Office, "Information on the organizational structure of the Rivne Regional Prosecutor's Office, information on the heads of the Rivne Regional Prosecutor's Office, its structural subdivisions, heads of district Prosecutor's offices," found at <https://pro.gov.ua/struktura>.

17 Sumy Region Prosecutor's Office, "Structural subdivisions of the Sumy Regional Prosecutor's Office," found at <https://sumy.gp.gov.ua/ua/structure.html>.

**Ternopil Oblast**<sup>18</sup>

Ternopil Regional Prosecutor's Office (Ternopil)  
 Ternopil District Prosecutor's Office (Ternopil)  
 Kremenets District Prosecutor's Office (Kremenets)  
 Berezhaný District Prosecutor's Office (Berezhaný)  
 Buchach District Prosecutor's Office (Buchach)  
 Terebovlyá District Prosecutor's Office (Terebovlyá)  
 Chortkiv District Prosecutor's Office (Chortkiv)

**Kharkiv Oblast**<sup>19</sup>

Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor's Office (Kharkiv)  
 Kyiv District Prosecutor's Office of Kharkiv (Kharkiv)  
 Nemyshlyany District Prosecutor's Office of Kharkiv (Kharkiv)  
 Novobavarsky District Prosecutor's Office of Kharkiv (Kharkiv)  
 Saltiv District Prosecutor's Office of Kharkiv (Kharkiv)  
 Sloboda District Prosecutor's Office of Kharkiv (Kharkiv)  
 Shevchenkivsky District Prosecutor's Office of Kharkiv (Kharkiv)  
 Bohodukhiv District Prosecutor's Office (Bohodukhiv)  
 Valky Department (Valky)  
 Zolochiv Department (Zolochiv)  
 Krasnokutsk Department (Krasnokutsk)  
 Krasnograd District Prosecutor's Office (Krasnograd)  
 Kegychiv Department (Kegychiv)  
 Zachepyliv Department (Zachepylivka)  
 Sakhnovshchina Department (Sakhnovshchina)  
 Izium District Prosecutor's Office (Izium)  
 Balaklia Department (Balaklia)  
 Barvinkove Department (Barvinkove)  
 Lozova District Prosecutor's Office, Lozova  
 Blyzniuky Department (Blyzniuky)  
 Pershotravneve Department (Pershotravneve)  
 Bor Department (Biliaivka)  
 Kupyansk District Prosecutor's Office (Kupyansk)  
 Velykoburlutsky Department (Velykoburlutska)  
 Dvorychansky Department (Dvorychansky)  
 Shevchenko Department (Shevchenko)  
 Chuguiv District Prosecutor's Office (Chuguiv)  
 Vovchansky Department (Vovchansk)  
 Zmiiv Department (Zmiiv)  
 Kharkiv District Prosecutor's Office (Kharkiv)  
 Novovodolazky Department (Nova Vodolaha)  
 Dergachiv District Prosecutor's Office (Dergachi)

**Kherson Oblast**<sup>20</sup>

Kherson Regional Prosecutor's Office (Kherson)  
 Beryslav District Prosecutor's Office (Beryslav)  
 Velykooleksandrivka Department (Velyka Oleksandrivka)  
 Vysokopol Department (Vysokopolya)  
 Henichesk District Prosecutor's Office (Henichesk)  
 Novotroitske Department (Novotroitske)  
 Nizhny Syrog Department (Nyzhni Syrozy)  
 Kakhovka District Prosecutor's Office (Kakhovka)  
 Oleshkiv District Prosecutor's Office (Oleshky)  
 Skadovsk District Prosecutor's Office (Skadovsk)  
 Kherson District Prosecutor's Office (Kherson)

**Khmelnysky Oblast**<sup>21</sup>

Khmelnysky Regional Prosecutor's Office (Khmelnysky)  
 Volochis District Prosecutor's Office (Volochysk)  
 Kamyanets-Podilsk District Prosecutor's Office (Kamyanets-Podilskiy)  
 Letychiv District Prosecutor's Office (Letychiv)  
 Khmelnysky District Prosecutor's Office (Khmelnysky)  
 Sheptiv District Prosecutor's Office (Shepetivka)

**Cherkasy Oblast**<sup>22</sup>

Cherkasy Regional Prosecutor's Office (Cherkasy)  
 Zvenigorod District Prosecutor's Office (Zvenigorodka)  
 Katerynopil Department (Katerynopil)  
 Lysyansky Department (Lisyanka)  
 Talnivsky Department (Talne)  
 Shpola Department (Shpola)  
 Zolotonosha District Prosecutor's Office (Zolotonosha)  
 Drabiv Department (Drabiv)  
 Chornobayiv Department (Chornobay)  
 Smilyan District Prosecutor's Office (Smila)  
 Horodyshe Department (Horodyshe)  
 Kaniv Department (Kaniv)  
 Kamyanka Department (Kamyanka)  
 Korsun-Shevchenkivsky Department (Korsun-Shevchenkivsky)  
 Uman District Prosecutor's Office (Uman)  
 Zhashkiv Department (Zhashkiv)  
 Mankiv Department (Mankivka)  
 Monastyryshche Department (Monastyryshche)  
 Khrystyniv Department (Khrystynivka)  
 Cherkasy District Prosecutor's Office (Cherkasy)  
 Cherkasy Department (Cherkasy)  
 Chyhyryn Department (Chigirin)

18 Ternopil Region Prosecutor's Office, "Structure of the Ternopil Regional Prosecutor's Office," found at <https://tern.gp.gov.ua/ua/structure.html>. No information has been located regarding the existence or locations of any departmental offices in the Ternopil Oblast.

19 Kharkiv Region Prosecutor's Office, "Structure," found at <https://khar.gp.gov.ua/ua/structure.html>.

20 Kherson Region Prosecutor's Office, "Information about the district Prosecutor's offices of the Kherson region," found at <https://kherson.gp.gov.ua/ua/contacts.html>.

21 Khmelnysky Region Prosecutor's Office, "Structure of the Khmelnysky Regional Prosecutor's Office," found at <https://khmel.gp.gov.ua/ua/structure.html>. No information has been located regarding the existence or locations of any departmental offices in the Khmelnysky Oblast.

22 Cherkasy Region Prosecutor's Office, "Cherkasy Regional Prosecutor's Office," found at <https://chk.gp.gov.ua/ua/structure.html>.

**Chernivtsi Oblast<sup>23</sup>**

Chernivtsi Regional Prosecutor's Office (Chernivtsi)  
Chernivtsi District Prosecutor's Office (Chernivtsi)  
Hertsaiiv Department (Hertz)  
Hlybokaje Department (Hlyboka)  
Zastavniivsky Department (Zastavna)  
Kitsman Department (Kitsman)  
Novoselytsia Department (Novoselytsia)  
Storozhynets Department (Storozhynets)  
Dniester District Prosecutor's Office (Kelmentsi, Putila,  
and Khotyn)  
Vyzhnytsia District Prosecutor's Office (Vyzhnytsia)

**Chernihiv Oblast<sup>24</sup>**

Chernihiv Regional Prosecutor's Office (Chernihiv)  
Kozelets District Prosecutor's Office (Kozelets)  
Koryukiv District Prosecutor's Office (Koryukivka)  
Nizhyn District Prosecutor's Office (Nizhyn)  
Novgorod-Siversky District Prosecutor's Office  
(Novgorod-Siversky)  
Pryluky District Prosecutor's Office (Pryluky)  
Chernihiv District Prosecutor's Office (Chernihiv)

**Kyiv City<sup>25</sup>**

Holosiivskyi District Prosecutor's Office of Kyiv  
Darnytsia District Prosecutor's Office of Kyiv  
Desniansky District Prosecutor's Office of Kyiv  
Dnipro District Prosecutor's Office of Kyiv  
Obolon District Prosecutor's Office of Kyiv  
Pechersk District Prosecutor's Office of Kyiv  
Podolsk District Prosecutor's Office of Kyiv  
Sviatoshynsky District Prosecutor's Office of Kyiv  
Solomiansky District Prosecutor's Office of Kyiv  
Shevchenkivska District Prosecutor's Office of Kyiv

23 Chernivtsi Region Prosecutor's Office, "Chernivtsi Regional Prosecutor's Office," found at <https://chnr.gp.gov.ua/ua/structure.html>.

24 Chernihiv Region Prosecutor's Office, "Information about subordinate Prosecutor's offices," found at [https://chrg.gp.gov.ua/ua/pid\\_prok.html](https://chrg.gp.gov.ua/ua/pid_prok.html). No information has been located regarding the existence or locations of any departmental offices in the Chernihiv Oblast.

25 Kyiv City Prosecutor's Office, "The structure of the Kyiv City Prosecutor's Office," found at <https://kyiv.gp.gov.ua/ua/structure.html>.

## ANNEX 5

### Advokats by Oblast

<i>Oblast</i>	<i>Advokats Registered as of 12/14/20<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Male Advokats as of 12/14/20<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Female Advokats as of 12/14/20<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Oblast Population – 2020<sup>c</sup></i>	<i>Advokats per 100,000 population – 2020</i>
Vinnycia <i>Oblast</i>	1,213	64%	36%	1,529,123	79.3
Volyn <i>Oblast</i>	1,101	68%	32%	1,027,397	107.2
Dnipropetrovsk <i>Oblast</i>	4,144	58%	42%	3,142,035	131.9
Donetsk <i>Oblast</i>	4,208	60%	40%	4,100,280	102.6
Zhytomyr <i>Oblast</i>	937	65%	35%	1,195,495	78.4
Zakarpattia (Trans-Carpathian) <i>Oblast</i>	1,813	70%	30%	1,250,129	145.0
Zaporizhzhia <i>Oblast</i>	2,599	57%	43%	1,666,515	156.0
Ivano-Frankivsk <i>Oblast</i>	1,474	64%	36%	1,361,109	108.3
Kyiv <i>Oblast</i>	8,899	68%	32%	1,788,530	497.6
Kirovohrad <i>Oblast</i>	874	63%	37%	920,128	95.0
Luhansk <i>Oblast</i>	847	62%	38%	2,121,322	39.9
Lviv <i>Oblast</i>	3,769	62%	38%	2,497,750	150.9
Mykolayiv <i>Oblast</i>	1,527	57%	43%	1,108,394	137.8
Odesa <i>Oblast</i>	3,902	57%	43%	2,368,107	164.8
Poltava <i>Oblast</i>	3,276	59%	41%	1,371,529	238.9
Rivne <i>Oblast</i>	1,445	63%	37%	1,148,456	125.8
Sumy <i>Oblast</i>	659	63%	37%	1,053,452	62.6
Ternopil <i>Oblast</i>	900	68%	32%	1,030,562	87.3
Kharkiv <i>Oblast</i>	2,791	59%	41%	2,633,834	106.0
Kherson <i>Oblast</i>	700	59%	41%	1,016,707	68.8
Khmelnyskyi <i>Oblast</i>	985	66%	34%	1,243,787	79.2
Cherkasy <i>Oblast</i>	1,183	66%	34%	1,178,266	100.4
Chernivtsi <i>Oblast</i>	1,063	64%	36%	896,566	118.6
Chernihiv <i>Oblast</i>	992	62%	38%	976,701	101.6
Kyiv (city)	6,015	64%	36%	2,962,180	203.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>58,999<sup>b</sup></b>	<b>62%</b>	<b>38%</b>	<b>41,588,354<sup>d</sup></b>	<b>141.9</b>

a Ukrainian National Bar Association, *Annual Report for 2020* (Kyiv, 2021).

b Includes advokats registered with the UNBA Bar Councils of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol.

c Estimates from Ukrainian Statistical Office, found at <http://www.citypopulation.de/en/ukraine/cities/>.

d Does not include estimated populations of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol.

## **About the Author**

William D. Meyer is a lawyer based in Boulder, Colorado. A magna cum laude graduate of the University of Michigan Law School, he recently retired after 45 years as a trial attorney in private practice. For the past 30 years, Bill has worked with a variety of non-governmental and multinational organizations fostering the rule of law in more than 20 countries in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. He began working in Ukraine in 1993, assisting on various projects through the years. Bill is a co-founder and former chair of the Board of Directors of ILAC, and led teams that developed several of ILAC's previous assessments.

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